Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. STME, LLC

Decision Date15 February 2018
Docket NumberCase No: 8:17–cv–977–MSS–CPT
Parties EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. STME, LLC d/b/a Massage Envy—South Tampa, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Oshia Banks, Esq. Brandi L. Meredith, Esq., Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff EEOC.

Nikhil N. Joshi, Of Counsel to Miller Tack & Madson, Sharon A. Wey, Miller Tack & Madson, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.

Monica M. Leach-Pachinger, Esq., Leach-Pachinger Law & Mediations, Bradenton, FL, for Kimberly Lowe.

ORDER

MARY S. SCRIVEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court for consideration of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) ("Motion to Dismiss") (Dkt. 16); Plaintiff's Response in Opposition thereto (Dkt. 20); Defendant's Reply (Dkt. 26); Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint ("Motion for Leave") (Dkt. 34); and Defendant's Response in Opposition thereto. (Dkt. 37) Upon consideration of all relevant filings, case law, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 16) and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Leave. (Dkt. 34)

I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History

Plaintiff, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC"), sued Defendant, STME, LLC d/b/a Massage Envy—South Tampa ("Massage Envy") for violating the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) and (b)(4). (Dkt. 14) Massage Envy now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. 16) The EEOC opposes the relief requested. (Dkt. 20)

On November 22, 2017, the EEOC filed a motion requesting leave to file a second amended complaint, seeking leave to add an ADA unlawful interference claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) to its current allegations. (Dkt. 34) Massage Envy opposes the relief requested. (Dkt. 37)

For the reasons that follow, the Court orders that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Motion for Leave is DENIED .

B. Relevant Allegations of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint

The relevant allegations of the EEOC's Amended Complaint are as follows. Kimberly Lowe ("Lowe") began working for Massage Envy as a massage therapist on January 13, 2012. (Dkt. 14 at ¶ 13) Lowe did not have a disability at any time relevant to this matter during or after her employment at Massage Envy. (Id. at ¶ 14) In September 2014, Lowe requested time off to visit her sister in Ghana, West Africa. (Id. at ¶ 17) Massage Envy's Business Manager, Roxanna Iorio ("Iorio") approved Lowe's request. (Id. at ¶ 18) On October 22, 2014, three days prior to her trip, Iorio and one of Massage Envy's owners, Ron Wuchko ("Wuchko"), terminated Lowe out of concern that "she would be infected with Ebola

if she traveled to Ghana" and that she would bring it home and infect Massage Envy's employees and clients upon her return.1 (Id. at ¶¶ 20–22; Dkts. 16–1, 16–2) Lowe subsequently traveled to Ghana. (Dkt. 14 at ¶ 24)

Upon her return, Lowe filed a Charge of Discrimination ("the Charge") with the EEOC, alleging that she was discriminated against in that Massage Envy "perceived [Lowe] as disabled or ... as having potential to become disabled," in violation of the ADA. (Dkts. 16–1; Dkt. 14 at ¶ 7) The EEOC conducted an investigation of Lowe's claim and on September 6, 2016, issued a Letter of Determination finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that Lowe was terminated "because she was ‘regarded as’ disabled" in violation of the ADA. (Dkt. 16–2) The EEOC invited Massage Envy to engage in informal conciliation efforts to reach a just resolution of the matter. (Id.; Dkt. 14 at ¶ 9) On December 27, 2016, the EEOC informed Massage Envy that it was unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement. (Dkt. 14 at ¶ 10) In the instant action, the EEOC alleges (1) "regarded as" disability discrimination in violation of Section 102(a) of the ADA, and (2) "association discrimination" in violation of Section 102(a) and (b)(4) of the ADA. (Id. at ¶¶ 28–29)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The threshold for surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a low one. Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., et al., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir. 1983). A plaintiff must plead only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968–69, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating the "no set of facts" standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). Although a complaint challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is still obligated to provide the "grounds" for entitlement to relief, and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Berry v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 497 F.Supp.2d 1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964–65 ). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint in light of a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded facts must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Quality Foods, 711 F.2d at 994–95. However, the court should not assume that the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged. Id. Thus, dismissal is warranted if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As a threshold matter, plaintiffs asserting discrimination under the ADA, including the EEOC, must first exhaust their administrative remedies (or, in the case of the EEOC, demonstrate that exhaustion requirements have been satisfied by the complainant) before bringing suit in district court. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (applying the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in § 2000e–5 to the ADA); E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2002). "[A] plaintiff's judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). Courts will allow judicial claims that "amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus" the EEOC complaint allegations, but "allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate" for a post-charge judicial complaint. Id. To determine whether a complaint falls within the scope of the EEOC investigation, the Court considers whether the complaint is "like or related to, or grew out of, the allegations contained in [plaintiff's] EEOC charge." Id.

Massage Envy contends that the EEOC did not exhaust its administrative remedies as to both its "regarded as" and "association discrimination" claims, to the extent that it alleges any discriminatory conduct occurring after the October 22, 2014 termination date, such as an allegation that it failed to reinstate or rehire Lowe. (Dkt. 16 at 11) However, in its response, the EEOC expressly states that it "does not allege that Massage Envy ‘failed to reinstate or rehire’ Lowe" in its Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 20 at 4) Indeed, the only discriminatory act that the EEOC alleges is Massage Envy's termination of Lowe. (Id. ) The Parties do not dispute that the EEOC exhausted its administrative remedies with respect to the alleged discriminatory act of termination, as this claim "falls squarely within the scope of the underlying Charge." (Id.; Dkt. 16 at 11) As such, the Court considers the EEOC's discrimination claims only to the extent that they apply Lowe's October 22, 2014 termination.

Massage Envy also contends that the EEOC's association discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b)(4) should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Dkt. 16 at 14) However, the Court finds that the EEOC's association discrimination claim is sufficiently related to the facts alleged in Lowe's Charge. Although the factual allegations are brief, Lowe states:

Mr. Wuchko terminated me because he believed that in [sic] my trip I could come into contact with a person having Ebola

and could bring it back home and to work after my trip. However, Ghana has never had Ebola ; thus, there was no risk to my health or the health of those around me.

(Dkt. 16–1) (emphasis added)

Although Lowe does not expressly allege that she has been discriminated against due to her association with known disabled persons, an association discrimination claim could reasonably be expected to grow out of the facts alleged in her Charge. While she does not use the word "associate," she alleges that she was terminated due to her potential "contact with a person having Ebola

." This language is sufficient to give rise to an investigation into an association discrimination claim. Thus, the Court finds that the EEOC exhausted its administrative remedies with respect to its association discrimination claim.

B. "Regarded As" Disabled Claim

The EEOC alleges that Massage Envy discriminated against Lowe in violation of Section § 102(a) of the ADA when it terminated her because Massage Envy regarded her as disabled. (Dkt. 14 at ¶ 28) Section 102(a) prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to ... discharge of employees." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "Disability" under the ADA is defined as (1) having "a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual," (2) having "a record of such an impairment," or (3) "being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. at § 12102...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Collier v. Harland Clarke Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • March 31, 2019
    ...but ‘allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate’ for a post-charge judicial complaint." EEOC v. STME, LLC , 309 F.Supp.3d 1207, 1211 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (quoting Gregory , 355 F.3d at 1279–80 ). An adverse employment action alleged after and as a result of filing an EEOC charg......
  • Champion v. Mannington Mills, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • May 10, 2021
    ...Champion's cannot be based on a plaintiff's association with a person merely regarded as disabled. See E.E.O.C. v. STME, LLC , 309 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1215 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2018), aff'd 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019) ("The ADA does not establish a cause of action for discrimination against......
  • Worrall v. River Shack LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas
    • August 15, 2022
    ... ... 538 F.Supp.3d at 1349 (citing E.E.O.C. v. STME ... ...
  • Lowe v. STME, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • February 5, 2019
    ...initially brought an action on Lowe's behalf for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. EEOC v. STME, LLC, 309 F.Supp.3d 1207 (M.D. Fla. 2018). The EEOC action was dismissed with prejudice, so Lowe's motion to intervene was denied as moot, and therefore, Lowe w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT