Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. PJ Utah, LLC

Decision Date18 May 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15–4079.,15–4079.
Citation32 A.D. Cases 1427,822 F.3d 536
PartiesEQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. PJ UTAH, LLC; PJ Cheese, Inc.; PJ United, Inc., Defendants–Appellees. Scott Bonn, Intervenor–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Aaron M. Kinikini (Laura K. Boswell, with him on the briefs) Disability Law Center, Salt Lake City, UT, for IntervenorAppellant.

Laura J. Maechtlen (Gerald Maatman, Jr., Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Chicago, IL, and Courtney K. Bohl, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, San Francisco, CA, with her on the brief) Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for DefendantsAppellees.

Before BRISCOE, EBEL, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

BACHARACH

, Circuit Judge.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought a civil enforcement action against three Papa John's entities1 for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying a reasonable workplace accommodation to the appellant, Mr. Scott Bonn, and firing him for requesting this accommodation. Mr. Bonn moved to intervene in the EEOC's action, invoking his statutory right to do so. The district court determined that Mr. Bonn's claim was subject to arbitration under an agreement that Mr. Bonn's mother had executed. Based on this determination, the district court denied the motion to intervene and ordered Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim.

Mr. Bonn appeals the denial of his motion to intervene and the order compelling arbitration. We conclude that the arbitration agreement did not curtail Mr. Bonn's unconditional statutory right to intervene. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Mr. Bonn's motion to intervene. We further conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction over the order compelling arbitration. Although the district court ordered Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim, that order did not affect the EEOC's claim against Papa John's, which remains pending. Because that claim remains, the order compelling arbitration did not constitute a “final decision,” which is necessary for appellate jurisdiction over an order compelling arbitration. Therefore, we dismiss this part of Mr. Bonn's appeal.

I. The district court denied Mr. Bonn's motion to intervene and ordered arbitration of Mr. Bonn's claim.

Mr. Bonn was born with Down syndrome

, which prevents him from living on his own. Because of Mr. Bonn's condition, his mother was appointed as a limited guardian to manage Mr. Bonn's personal affairs.

In September 2011, Mr. Bonn went to work at Papa John's as a box folder. Papa John's requires its new employees to review and execute an arbitration agreement before starting work, and Mr. Bonn's mother executed the arbitration agreement on Mr. Bonn's behalf.

To meet his duties as a box folder, Mr. Bonn needed the help of a job coach. After a few months, however, Papa John's decided that it would no longer allow Mr. Bonn to work with a job coach. Believing that Mr. Bonn could not do his job without a job coach, Papa John's fired Mr. Bonn.

Mr. Bonn filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that Papa John's had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The EEOC investigated Mr. Bonn's charge and brought this civil enforcement action against Papa John's under the Americans with Disabilities Act. That statute “direct[s] the EEOC to exercise the same enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures that are set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it is enforcing the ADA's prohibitions....” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002)

; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a) (Americans with Disabilities Act provision adopting Title VII enforcement provisions), 2000e–5 (Title VII enforcement provisions). Thus, in addressing the EEOC's action against Papa John's, we apply Title VII. See

EEOC v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 347 F.3d 1192, 1195–96 (10th Cir.2003) (observing that, in Americans with Disabilities Act enforcement action, enforcement provisions of Title VII “provide the framework for our analysis”).

Title VII allows an aggrieved employee to intervene when the EEOC sues the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1)

. Invoking this provision of Title VII, Mr. Bonn moved to intervene in the EEOC's action against Papa John's. Papa John's objected, arguing that the arbitration agreement required Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim. On this basis, Papa John's urged the district court to deny the motion to intervene and compel Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim.

The district court agreed with Papa John's, disallowing intervention and ordering Mr. Bonn to arbitrate. Mr. Bonn challenges these rulings.

II. The district court erred by denying Mr. Bonn's motion to intervene.

As the aggrieved employee, Mr. Bonn had an unconditional statutory right to intervene in the EEOC's enforcement action. Nonetheless, the district court denied the motion to intervene based on the court's determination that Mr. Bonn had to arbitrate his claim against Papa John's. That ruling was erroneous.

A. We have appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the denial of Mr. Bonn's motion to intervene as of right, and our review is de novo.

We have appellate jurisdiction over the denial of Mr. Bonn's motion to intervene. See Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Cts. for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep't of the Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir.1996)

(“An order denying intervention is final and subject to immediate review if it prevents the applicant from becoming a party to an action.”); Arney v. Finney, 967 F.2d 418, 421 (10th Cir.1992) ([A]n absolute denial of intervention is a collateral order and, therefore, is appealable immediately.”).

Exercising this jurisdiction, we review de novo the denial of Mr. Bonn's motion to intervene as a matter of right. See Tri–State Generation and Transmission Ass'n v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 787 F.3d 1068, 1071 (10th Cir.2015)

(stating that [w]e review de novo the denial of a motion to intervene as of right” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) ).2

B. Mr. Bonn had an unconditional statutory right to intervene in the EEOC's action regardless of whether Mr. Bonn's claim against Papa John's was subject to arbitration.

The district court acknowledged that Mr. Bonn had “a right to intervene in the EEOC's lawsuit,” but then denied Mr. Bonn's motion to intervene without explanation. Appellant's App'x at 71–72. The court apparently assumed that Mr. Bonn could not intervene because his claim against Papa John's was subject to the arbitration agreement.3 We respectfully disagree with the district court, for the court's reasoning lacks support in the text of the two provisions governing Mr. Bonn's intervention as a matter of right: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1)

and Title VII.

Rule 24(a)(1)

states that a district court “must permit anyone to intervene who ... is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(1). Thus, in reviewing the denial of the motion to intervene, we determine whether Mr. Bonn had an unconditional statutory right to intervene. If Mr. Bonn had this right, the district court was obligated to allow intervention under Rule 24(a)(1). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(1) ; see also

Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 531, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947) (holding that if a party has an unconditional statutory right to intervene, that party's “right to intervene [under Rule 24(a)(1) ] is absolute and unconditional”).

We conclude that this right existed under Title VII. The enforcement provision of Title VII states that “the person ... aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1)

. This language unambiguously gives employees an unconditional right to intervene in EEOC enforcement actions. EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 479 F.3d 561, 568–69 (8th Cir.2007) ; Willis v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 80 Fed.Appx. 63, 66–67 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished); 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1906 (3d Ed.2015). Thus, as the aggrieved employee in the EEOC's civil enforcement action, Mr. Bonn enjoyed an unconditional statutory right to intervene.

Because Title VII gave Mr. Bonn an unconditional statutory right to intervene, the text of Rule 24(a)(1)

required the district court to grant Mr. Bonn's motion. Once it is established that a party enjoys an unconditional statutory right to intervene, the language of Rule 24(a)(1) does not allow the district court any discretion to deny intervention even if the party would ultimately need to go to arbitration.4

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(1) ; Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 331 U.S. at 531, 67 S.Ct. 1387.5

Mr. Bonn had an unconditional statutory right to intervene in the EEOC's action; thus, the district court lacked authority under Rule 24(a)(1)

to deny the motion to intervene based on the arbitrability of Mr. Bonn's claim. In these circumstances, we reverse the denial of Mr. Bonn's motion to intervene.

III. We lack appellate jurisdiction over the district court's order compelling Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim.

Mr. Bonn also challenges the order compelling him to arbitrate his claim against Papa John's. According to Mr. Bonn, his mother lacked authority to execute the arbitration agreement. We cannot consider this argument because we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the order compelling arbitration. See Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. City of Glenpool, 698 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.2012)

(“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they must have a statutory basis for their jurisdiction.” (quoting Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir.1994) )).

For appellate jurisdiction to exist, the order compelling arbitration must constitute a “final decision,” which is a decision that disposes of all claims by all parties in the underlying action. Because the EEOC's claim against Papa John's remains ongoing in district court, the order compelling arbitration did not dispose of all claims by all parties in the...

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