Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Stone Pony Pizza, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 March 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13–CV–92–SA–JMV
• Citation: 172 F.Supp.3d 941
• Parties: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff v. Stone Pony Pizza, Inc., Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

172 F.Supp.3d 941

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff

v.Stone Pony Pizza, Inc., Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13–CV–92–SA–JMV

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division.

Signed March 28, 2016

Faye A. Williams, Joseph M. Crout, Markeisha Katara Savage, Gerald L. Thornton, Kelley R. Thomas, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

Craig M. Geno, Law Offices of Craig M. Geno, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS, Tujuana S. McGee, Vikki J. Taylor, Gibbs Whitwell & Travis PLLC, Jackson, MS, for Defendant.

Melvin David Miller, II of Pittman Law Office, PLLC, for Intervenors.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Sharion Aycock, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this case alleging that Stone Pony Pizza, Inc., engaged in racially discriminatory employment practices. Specifically, the EEOC contends that Stony Pony failed to hire job applicants because of their race, maintained a racially segregated workforce, and failed to retain records as required by Title VII. Eleven individual Plaintiffs, all prospective or past employees of the Defendant, intervened in this case.

Stone Pony filed a motion for summary judgment [219] to which the Intervenors and the EEOC responded [230, 236], and Stone Pony replied [243]. The EEOC also filed a motion for summary judgment [217], to which the Defendant responded [231].

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Opened in 2009, Stone Pony Pizza, Inc. is a restaurant in Clarksdale, Mississippi that employs workers in the back-of-house positions of cook and dishwasher, and front-of-house positions of server, bartender, and host, as well as delivery drivers.

Chendra Johnson–Hampton filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on March 17, 2011, alleging that she was denied a position as a server at Stone Pony in September of 2010 because she is black, and that white females were hired for open server positions instead.

Pursuant to Johnson–Hampton's charge, the EEOC opened an investigation. Based on the investigation, the EEOC made a reasonable cause determination that Stone Pony discriminated against Johnson–Hampton and two other black applicants by denying them the opportunity to work in server positions because of their race. The EEOC also determined that Stone Pony maintained a racially segregated workforce, and failed to retain employment applications for a period of at least one year as required by Title VII. The EEOC informed Stone Pony of its determination by letter dated June 29, 2012, and invited Stone Pony to engage in conciliation discussions. Stone Pony responded with a wholesale denial of the EEOC's findings.

Based on Stone Pony's response and denial, the EEOC reopened the inquiry. On September 26, 2012, the EEOC issued a new determination letter with the additional finding of class-wide discrimination against African Americans as a class. In October of 2012, the EEOC invited Stone Pony to engage in a face-to-face conciliation conference and issued a proposed conciliation agreement that provided specific relief for individuals as well as class-wide relief including the establishment of a claimant fund for as-yet unidentified class members. Stone Pony rejected the proposed conciliation agreement and the EEOC's offers to participate in a conciliation conference or in person negotiations by letter on October 31, 2012, and again on February 15, 2013. The EEOC filed this case on May 17, 2013.

Johnson–Hampton, Wylinda Gregory, and Youmeka Simpson were permitted to intervene in this suit on August 2, 2013 by Magistrate Judge Order [5]. Cecily Allen, Stephanie Clay, Shameika Cooper, Faith Holmes, Regina Moton, Crystal Peeler, Lashunda Ranson, and Jasmine Washington were permitted to intervene on January 8, 2014 using the same procedure [56]. All of the Intervenor Plaintiffs allege that Stone Pony failed to hire them for front-of-house positions because they are black.

Stone Pony now moves for summary judgment on all of the Plaintiff and Intervenors' claims on both procedural and substantive grounds. The EEOC requests summary judgment on four of Stone Pony's affirmative defenses.

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the non-movant, “but only when ... both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the Court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.2002) ; SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir.1993) ; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

III. Stone Pony Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Stone Pony argues five separate issues for summary judgment in its favor. First Stone Pony challenges the EEOC's ability to sue on behalf of individuals that never filed EEOC charges. Second, Stone Pony challenges the ability of individuals that never filed EEOC charges to intervene in a case brought by the EEOC on their behalf. Third, Stone Pony argues that this case should be dismissed because the EEOC failed to conciliate in good faith. Fourth, Stone Pony argues that Plaintiffs' Section 1981 claims fail as a matter of law because the Plaintiffs have failed both to establish prima facie cases of discrimination, and to rebut Stone Pony's stated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse actions against the Plaintiffs. Finally, Stone Pony argues that there is no basis for the Plaintiffs' claim that Stone Pony failed to comply with the record keeping requirements of Title VII.

The Court will first lay out a few general principles relevant in Title VII suits, and then address each of the issues raised by Stone Pony.

A. Title VII Suits Generally

Title VII authorizes private actions by individual employees subjected to certain types of discrimination, and public suits by the EEOC and the Attorney General. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq . In general, plaintiffs bringing claims under Title VII are required to file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the occurrence of the discriminatory or retaliatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e).

The filing of the charge sets in motion “an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure” that culminates in the EEOC's authority to bring a civil suit in federal court. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) ; EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 287, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002). After the employee files a charge, the EEOC must serve notice of the charge on the employer. Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 359–60, 97 S.Ct. 2447 ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5. The EEOC is then required to investigate the charge and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that it is true. Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 359–60, 97 S.Ct. 2447 ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5.

If the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause, it “shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Id. If the EEOC is unable to reach an acceptable conciliation agreement, the EEOC may bring a civil suit. Id. When the EEOC decides to sue, the employee has no independent cause of action, although the employee may intervene in the EEOC's suit. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291, 122 S.Ct. 754 ; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1).¹

If the EEOC does not find reasonable cause, or does not act, it issues a right to sue letter, and the complaining party has ninety days to file a private suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). A Title VII plaintiff is required to follow this procedure in order to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a civil suit. Cole v. First Warren Corp., No. 3:14–CV–844, 2015 WL 5943372, at *2 (S.D.Miss. Oct. 13, 2015) (citing EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., LLC, 731 F.3d 444, 466 (5th Cir.2013) ); see also Price v. Choctaw Glove & Safety Co., 459 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir.2006) ; Wheeler v. Am. Home Prods., Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 897 (5th Cir.1977). A “carefully limited exception” to this exhaustion requirement, the “single filing rule,” allows parties to “opt-in to a suit filed by any similarly situated plaintiff [without filing their own EEOC charges] under certain conditions.” Id. (quoting Bettcher v. Brown Sch., Inc., 262 F.3d 492, 493–94 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Anson v. Univ. Texas Health Science Ctr., 962 F.2d 539, 540 (5th Cir.1992) )).

Federal courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have expressly adopted the single filing rule in suits brought by individuals. See ...