Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Balt. Cnty.

• Decision Date: 19 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-2216,16-2216
• Citation: 904 F.3d 330
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, Defendant – Appellee, and Baltimore County Federation of Public Employees, FMT, AFT, AFL-CIO; Baltimore County Federation of Public Health Nurses; Baltimore County Professional Fire Fighters Association International Association Fire Fighters Local 1311-AFL-CIO; Baltimore County Lodge No. 4 Fraternal Order of Police Incorporated; BALTIMORE COUNTY SHERIFF’S Office Fraternal Order of Police/Lodge Number 25; American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local #921, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

904 F.3d 330

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.BALTIMORE COUNTY, Defendant – Appellee,andBaltimore County Federation of Public Employees, FMT, AFT, AFL-CIO; Baltimore County Federation of Public Health Nurses; Baltimore County Professional Fire Fighters Association International Association Fire Fighters Local 1311-AFL-CIO; Baltimore County Lodge No. 4 Fraternal Order of Police Incorporated; BALTIMORE COUNTY SHERIFF’S Office Fraternal Order of Police/Lodge Number 25; American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local #921, Defendants.

No. 16-2216

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 26, 2017

Decided: September 19, 2018

ARGUED: Paul D. Ramshaw, Office of General Counsel, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. James Joseph Nolan, Jr., BALTIMORE COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James L. Lee, Deputy General Counsel, Jennifer S. Goldstein, Associate General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael E. Field, County Attorney, Paul M. Mayhew, Assistant County Attorney, BALTIMORE COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KEENAN, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) appeals the order of the district court denying its request under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq ., for retroactive monetary relief from Baltimore County, Maryland (the County). For the following reasons, we vacate and remand.

I.

This case is now before us for a third time.¹ In the first appeal, we reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the County and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the contribution rates of the County’s age-based employee retirement benefit plan (the plan) were permissible based on financial considerations or whether they violated the ADEA. See E.E.O.C. v. Balt. Cty. , 385 F. App’x 322 (4th Cir. 2010). On remand, the district court concluded that the County violated the ADEA by imposing disparate plan contribution rates based on age. See E.E.O.C. v. Balt. Cty. , 747 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 2014). The district court awarded partial summary judgment in favor of the EEOC on the issue of liability. Id. In the second appeal, we affirmed the award of summary judgment to the EEOC and remanded for consideration of damages. See id.

The parties later approved a strategy for the gradual equalization of contribution rates under the plan and entered into a Joint Consent Order Regarding Injunctive Relief, which the district court approved. The order did not resolve claims for monetary relief and expressly indicated that the availability of such relief would be addressed by the court at a later date.

The court ultimately denied the EEOC’s motion for retroactive monetary relief, in the form of back pay, and closed the case.² The court concluded that it had the discretion under the enforcement provision of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), to wholly deny back pay. Alternatively, the court stated that, even if back pay were a mandatory remedy, the court would deny the relief pursuant to its equitable powers because of the EEOC’s years-long delay in bringing the action. The EEOC now appeals.

II.

The County argues that the district court properly exercised its discretion under the ADEA, 28 U.S.C. § 626(b), in denying the EEOC an award of back pay.³ In the County’s view, the ADEA grants courts broad authority "to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate," including the denial of back pay. 29 U.S.C § 626(b). In contrast, the EEOC points to the incorporation into the ADEA of certain provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which mandate that violators "shall be liable" for back pay. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b). In light of this language, and because back pay is a mandatory, legal remedy under the FLSA, the EEOC urges us to adopt the same interpretation of the ADEA. Accordingly, the EEOC contends that the district court lacked the discretion to decline to award back pay. We agree with the EEOC, and conclude that a retroactive monetary award of back pay under the ADEA is mandatory upon a finding of liability.

We review this issue of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Ide , 624 F.3d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 2010). "Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). If the statute is unambiguous, "our inquiry into Congress’ intent is at an end, for if the language is plain and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, we need not inquire further." William v. Gonzales , 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007).⁴ "[I]n looking to the plain meaning, we must consider the context in which the statutory words are used because ‘[w]e do not ... construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.’ " Ayes v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs , 473 F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Morton , 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984) ).

With this rule in mind, we turn to the plain language of the statute. The ADEA enforcement provision reads, in relevant part:

The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this section. Any act prohibited under section 623 of this title shall be deemed to be a prohibited act under section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided , That liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.

29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Additionally, Section 216 of the FLSA, which Congress incorporated into the ADEA’s enforcement provision, provides:

Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

As an initial matter, we observe that the ADEA is a remedial statute enacted"to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) ; see Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co. , 105 F.3d 1529, 1541 (3d Cir. 1997) ("It is impossible to view the ADEA as anything other than a federal remedial statute."). As a remedial statute, we employ a "standard of liberal construction [to] accomplish [Congress’] objects." Urie v. Thompson , 337 U.S. 163, 180, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949).

Because Congress adopted the enforcement procedures and remedies of the FLSA into the ADEA, we construe the ADEA consistent with the cited statutory language in and judicial interpretations of the FLSA. Back pay is, and was at the time Congress passed the ADEA, a mandatory legal remedy under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("Any employer who violates the [FLSA] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation." (emphasis added) ); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil , 324 U.S. 697, 711, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) ("[U]pon violation of [the FLSA for failure to pay overtime compensation], the employer shall be liable for statutory wages." (emphasis added) ). And we presume that Congress was aware of judicial interpretations of the FLSA when drafting associated provisions of the ADEA. See Santoro v. Accenture Fed. Servs., LLC , 748 F.3d 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2014) ("Congress is presumed to act with awareness of a judicial interpretation of a statute."). Accordingly, in enacting the ADEA, Congress would have been aware that retroactive monetary damages, such as back pay, were mandatory remedies under the FLSA, and intended to incorporate such mandatory remedies into the ADEA. See id. ; see also Maxfield v. Sinclair Int’l , 766 F.2d 788, 794 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[U]nlike Title VII, backpay under the ADEA is not discretionary, since it incorporates the provision of the [FLSA], making backpay a mandatory element of damages.").

The Supreme Court has applied a similar analysis in interpreting a different portion of the ADEA. In Lorillard v. Pons , the Court was presented with the question whether ADEA plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial. 434 U.S. 575, 577, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). In answering this question, the Court first looked to the procedural provisions of the statute and noted that Congress directed "that the ADEA...