Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Aurora Health Care Inc.

Decision Date20 March 2013
Docket NumberCase No. 11–C–770.
Citation933 F.Supp.2d 1079
PartiesEQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. AURORA HEALTH CARE INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Camille A. Monahan, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Milwaukee, WI, Jean P. Kamp, John C. Hendrickson, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago, IL, Jessica A. Palmer Denig, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff.

Judith A. Williams–Killackey, Mary Pat Jacoby, Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

RUDOLPH T. RANDA, District Judge.

This Decision and Order addresses Defendant Aurora Health Care Inc.'s (Aurora), summary judgment motion, brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Civil Local Rule 56.1, for dismissal of the race discrimination and retaliation claims and this entire action, and award of costs. (ECF No. 17.) The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) filed this action on behalf of LaRhonda Tatum (“Tatum”), who was employed as an administrative assistant by Aurora from May 7, 2007, through October 2, 2009. The EEOC alleges that from at least April 2009, through October 7, 2009, Aurora discriminated against Tatum on the basis of her race (black), in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by subjecting Tatum to different terms and conditions of employment, terminating her employment, and retaliating against her for filing internal complaints and complaints with the EEOC. (ECF No. 1.)

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Some preliminary issues regarding the parties' summary judgment filings require discussion. In Aurora's reply to the EEOC's responses to its proposed findings of fact (“PFOF”), Aurora objects to those responses as exceeding the 100 additional proposed findings of fact allotted to the EEOC and requests that they be stricken.( See ECF No. 42.) Examples of the objections are found in paragraphs 4, 9, and 14 of Aurora's reply.

Civil Local Rules 56(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) (E.D.Wis.) provide in relevant part:

Each party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file ...

a concise response to the moving party's statement of facts that must contain:

(i) a reproduction of each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement of facts followed by a response to each paragraph, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, declarations, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon, and

(ii) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, declarations, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts described in that paragraph. A non-moving party may not file more than 100 separately-numbered statements of additional facts; ...

Aurora is melding the two subsections of Civil Local Rule 56(b)(2)(B) together. However, Civil Local Rule 56(b)(2)(B)(i) does not contain a numeric limit for an opposing party's response to a proposed finding of fact. Rather, it requires a reproduction of each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement of facts followed by a response to each paragraph, including, in the case of any disagreement, “specific references to the affidavits, declarations, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” Id. The EEOC's response to Aurora's proposed findings of fact does not violate Civil Local Rule 56(b)(2)(B)(i). Aurora's objection does not provide a basis for striking the EEOC's response to its proposed findings of fact.

Aurora has also objected to some of the EEOC's supplemental findings of material fact (“SMF”) as compound, stating that a proposed material finding of fact has two separate findings of fact. ( See Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 23, 28, 31, 33, 34.) (ECF No. 41.) Aurora's objections are correct and noted.

Summary Judgment Standards

An initial question is whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact precluding resolution of this action upon summary judgment. In making that determination, the Court applies the following criteria to Aurora's PFOF and supplemental proposed findings of fact (“SPFOF”), and the EEOC's SMF.

Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim ... on which summary judgment is sought.” This Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, resolving all evidentiary conflicts in her favor and according her the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record. See O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2011).

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Put another way, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine factual issues that could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Although the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, it may satisfy its burden by simply showing or pointing out to the Court that there is an absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits or a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). But if it is clear that the non-movant will be unable to establish an essential element of his claim, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

Relevant Facts1

Aurora is a health care provider, doing business in the State of Wisconsin, and has continuously had at least 15 employees. The metropolitan Milwaukee area of Aurora's Hospital System includes the following hospitals: Aurora St. Luke's Medical Center (Aurora St. Luke's”), Aurora Sinai Medical Center (Aurora Sinai), Aurora St. Luke's South Shore and Aurora West Allis Medical Center.

Aurora has an Administrative Manual that addresses employee conduct and discipline. It states in pertinent part:

An employee who engages in conduct that is contrary to the rules of common sense or decency, or an act which violates Aurora Health Care policies or procedures, should expect to be disciplined. The nature of the discipline will depend on the nature of the violation and the surrounding circumstances.

* * * * * * The purpose of the discipline procedure is to encourage employees to take corrective action and to make improvement in their work performance or work habits. Ordinarily, discussion with an employee, to point out what is expected or to tell the employee how he or she is doing, should be enough. There are times, however, when these corrective actions are not enough and more severe discipline is required. Such discipline may include verbal counseling, written warnings, suspensions without pay (subject to applicable limitations for exempt employees) or discharge. It should be emphasized that the employee's discipline need not go through each of the steps involved in, the disciplinary procedure. Discipline may begin at any step in the procedure, including discharge, and steps in the procedure may be skipped, depending upon the seriousness of the matter or the offense committed and the surrounding circumstances.

(Ex. 35, EEOC000056.) (Emphasis added). (ECF No. 33–5).

The Manual also states:

[s]ome work performance or conduct issues are better addressed through a developmental plan rather than through the disciplinary process. In such instances, your supervisor may establish a developmental plan for you, which may involve your input. The developmental plan will state your supervisor's legitimate expectations of you, with deadlines for achieving the stated expectations. Failure to meet the terms of the developmental plan will result in the consequences stated in the plan.

( Id. at EEOC000058.)

In 2007 to 2009, Aurora's discipline policy and Aurora's Service Standards and Values of accountability, teamwork, and respect applied to all employees regardless of job title or work location and applied equally to chaplain residents (sometimes referred to as resident chaplains). In 2009, Aurora had a disciplinary policy, which applied principles of fairness and justness to ensure that the correct level of discipline was given.

Iris Lowery (“Lowery”), a Human Resources Director at Aurora Sinai, has expertise in human resources and has trained others in the investigation of discrimination complaints. According to Lowery, fairness and justness meant that Aurora would look at the individual's situation and the surrounding circumstances and determine, based on the information and the options available as an organization, what was appropriate and what was fair and just. Aurora wanted to ensure that discipline was given in a consistent manner in similar situations. “There was an assumption that there was—[Aurora] had a progressive [discipline system], but we did not.” (App. EEOC, Ex. 5 (Apr. 20, 2012, Lowery Dep.) 26:22–24.) (ECF No. 29–5.)

Aurora has a Spiritual Care Department (the Department), which as reflected by its name, provides spiritual guidance...

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