Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Magneti Marelli of Tenn., LLC
| Decision Date | 26 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cv-00074,1:18-cv-00074 |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. MAGNETI MARELLI OF TENNESSEE, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
This case began with an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Commission" or "EEOC") charge that Jamil Degraffenreid, a production supervisor at a Magneti Marelli of Tennessee LLC ("Magneti") manufacturing plant, sexually harassed a class of female employees—Rebecca Crouch, Ariana Baker, Amanda Huckaba Campbell, and Christy Parson (collectively "claimants")—working on assembly lines that he oversaw. Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The EEOC has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Magneti's defense that the EEOC failed to meet its statutory duty of conciliation. (Doc. No. 26). Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for dismissal. (Doc. No. 29). Both motions have been fully briefed by the parties. (Doc. No. 27, 30, 35, 37, 43, 46, 49). For the following reasons, Magneti's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied, and the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be granted.
The EEOC presents evidence replete with examples of Degraffenreid's behavior that the EEOC claims made the assembly lines under his supervision a difficult environment to work. He constantly told female employees to call him "Big Daddy." (Doc. No. 31 ¶ 32; Baker Dep. at 24; Campbell Dep. at 21, 27; Crouch Dep. at 31-33, 97; Parson Dep. at 37-38; Wallace Dep. at 27). Frequently, he "massaged" women's shoulders and down their backs. (Baker Dep. at 18-19; Crouch Dep. at 28; Parson Dep. at 60; see Doc. No. 31 ¶ 32). About a dozen times when "massaging" Parson, Degraffenreid whispered "you know you like that" into her ear. (Parson Dep. at 60). He loudly sang sexually explicit song lyrics—and apparently only explicit lyrics—referencing female anatomy and directed at specific female employees. (Id. at 38, 97; Baker Dep. at 23; Crouch Dep. at 25-27, 97; Wallace Dep. at 18).
Generally, Degraffenreid's comments about female employees' appearance made them uncomfortable to bend or stand at work. (Parson Dep. at 66). Parsons recalled that Degraffenreid commented on her butt 8 or 9 times each day (id.), asked her more than 50 times if she thought that it was ok for a supervisor to sleep with his employees (id. at 26-28), and told her more than 25 times that he "knew what she wanted," with a sexual implication (id. at 67-68). Into Campbell's ear Degraffenreid once whispered that he was going to whip her with his belt. (Campbell Dep. at 20-21, 28; see Doc. No. 31 ¶ 32). He smelled Baker twice a day, and occasionally ran his fingers through her hair. (Baker Dep. at 16-19). Once, Degraffenreid used his finger to draw a circle inthe palm of Baker's hand. When she didn't know what that meant, he indicated it symbolized that he wanted to sleep with her. (Baker Dep. at 17, 22). This recitation omits some even more egregious comments and behavior alleged against Degraffenreid. (See, e.g., Parson Dep. at 29-31, 36, 40, 67, 69; Wallace Dep. at 20-22, 33-35).
The environment was so toxic that women shared amongst each other what Degraffenreid had said to them or what they had heard him say to another. (Crouch Dep. at 34, 38-39, 71; Parson Dep. at 36; Campbell Dep. at 41-42; Wallace Dep. at 12, 20-21, 62-63). The parties dispute whether Degraffenreid's alleged harassment impacted the claimants' ability to perform their jobs. (Doc. No. 36 ¶¶ 22, 24, 27, 30). Crouch twice reported Degraffenreid's behavior to human resources, although she abruptly resigned several days after her second report in March 2016 when Degraffenreid remarked on how she handled assembly parts and asked "do [you] handle things like that in the bedroom?" (Crouch Dep. at 36, 44-48). Baker reported Degraffenreid's hand symbol and was terminated two days later because Degraffenreid "said that [she] no longer needed to work there."2 (Baker Dep. at 10, 27-31, 50-51). Some employees did not file formal reports with management for fear of suffering backlash. (Parson Dep. 32, 43-44). Others took their complaints to Jessica Wallace, a "team lead" employee on the assembly line, who relayed them to human resources, but Degraffenreid's behavior continued, possibly reflecting that he was not disciplined. (Wallace Dep. at 29-30, 44-45).
Magneti's employee policy forbids sexual harassment. A copy of the sexual harassment policy was in the employee handbook given to each employee during new hire orientation, andeach employee had to sign an acknowledgement of receiving the handbook. (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 3; Hodges Dep. at 34). However, the parties dispute whether new hire training occurred regularly. (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 6). Several claimants reported not having attended such a training, and, according to Degraffenreid, the sexual harassment training consisted only of reading and signing a form that "explain[ed] about sexual harassment" with no discussion. (Id.; Degraffenreid Dep. at 29).
Degraffenreid affirmed that his manager, Elvin Powell, gave him the "responsibility" to hire and promote employees, but "[he] had to run it through" Powell. (Degraffenreid Dep. at 22-23, 28). While he consulted with Powell when he promoted employees to the "team lead" position, there "was really no process" for promoting workers, he just let Powell know that the employee was ready for the promotion. (Id. at 23-26; see Wallace Dep. at 25, 54). He promoted Wallace to team lead, and she testified that while there was "supposed" to be a process for it, she did not have to go through any process or interview to obtain the promotion. (Wallace Dep. at 54). Wallace also suggested that Degraffenreid effectively had the authority to fire someone, because if he "said this one is done, that one was done, you wouldn't see them the next day." (Id. at 65-66).
On the other hand, members of Magneti management testified that a production supervisor like Degraffenreid could not hire and fire employees. According to Hannah McMahon, a human resources coordinator, line supervisors "do not have the authority to hire, fire, promote, transfer, or make any other tangible employment decisions over line employees," and can only "suggest tangible employment actions, but their recommendations have no binding weight." (McMahon Decl. at 1). Another employee remarked that, although Degraffenreid could not hire and fire someone, he could make that request. (Andrea Corino Dep. at 44).
On December 30, 2016, Crouch filed an EEOC charge over Degraffenreid's conduct. (Doc. No. 27-1 at 5-6). The Commission notified Magneti that Crouch had charged sexual harassment and discrimination based on sex (Id. at 7-8) and later, on August 15, 2018, concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that Degraffenreid sexually harassed Crouch and a class of female employees assigned to his assembly lines (Id. at 9-10). The EEOC notified Magneti that:
Evidence obtained during the investigation establishe[d] the supervisor subjected Charging Party, and a class of female employees to a sexually hostile work environment. The harassment consisted of requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature and the supervisor's conduct affected their employment and created a hostile, or offensive work environment. The evidence further revealed Respondent's supervisor offered promotions to female employees in exchange for sex. Evidence indicate[d] that Respondent's supervisor threatened employees with termination if they made a complaint and discharged employees who rejected his advances.
(Id.). The letter plainly identified Crouch as the "Charging Party." (Id.).
Conciliation efforts began on August 15, 2018. (Id. at 10-11). The EEOC issued a notice of conciliation failure on September 20, 2018 and followed with this suit on September 28, 2018. (Id. at 12; Doc. No. 1).
The standard for reviewing motions for summary judgment provides that it is appropriate only where there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A summary judgment motion may be made against a claim or an individual defense. Id. In reviewing a motion, the Court must review all the evidence, facts, and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
"The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts." Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). After this initial burden is satisfied, the nonmoving party has the burden of showing that a "rational trier of fact [could] find for the non-moving party [or] that there is a 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient to survive summary judgment. Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 595. Rather, there must be evidence on which a trier of fact could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Id.; Hill v. White, 190 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1999).
In its motion for summary judgment, Magneti argues that the EEOC has not established that the claimants were subject to sexual harassment that created a hostile work environment because Degraffenreid's conduct was insufficiently severe or pervasive. (See Doc. No. 30 at 2). It also argues that it cannot be liable for his conduct because Degraffenreid was not a "supervisor," so it was not negligent. (See id.). The Commission's partial motion for summary judgment is based on Magneti's defense that the Commission did not...
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