Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Bloomberg L.P.

• Citation: 967 F.Supp.2d 816
• Decision Date: 09 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 07 Civ. 8383(LAP).,07 Civ. 8383(LAP).
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. BLOOMBERG L.P., Defendant. Jill Patricot, Tanys Lancaster, Janet Loures, Monica Prestia, Marina Kushnir and Maria Mandalakis, Plaintiffs–Intervenors, v. Bloomberg L.P., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

967 F.Supp.2d 816

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,

v.BLOOMBERG L.P., Defendant.

Jill Patricot, Tanys Lancaster, Janet Loures, Monica Prestia, Marina Kushnir and Maria Mandalakis, Plaintiffs–Intervenors,

v.Bloomberg L.P., Defendant.

No. 07 Civ. 8383(LAP).

United States District Court,

S.D. New York.

Sept. 9, 2013.

Elizabeth Anne Grossman, Raechel Lee Adams, Robert David Rose, Ana Consuelo Martinez, Christine Jiyeun Back, Konrad Batog, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, New York, NY, Justin Mulaire, Kam Sau Wong, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Milo Silberstein, William J. Dealy, Dealy Silberstein & Braverman, LLP, Richard Alan Roth, The Roth Law Firm, PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs–Intervenors.

Eric S. Dreiband, Hannah M. Breshin, Sherron Thomas McClain, M. Carter DeLorme, Stephanie Holmes, Tonya M. Osborne, Jones Day, Washington, DC, Thomas H. Golden, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Vicki Renee Walcott–Edim, Jones Day, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

LORETTA A. PRESKA, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), filed this action against Defendant Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”) after several current and former employees had filed charges with the EEOC alleging sex/pregnancy discrimination and retaliation ¹ in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e–2. (Second Amended Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6.) Generally, the complaint alleged that Bloomberg had discriminated and/or retaliated against the claimants and other similarly situated employees after they had announced their pregnancies and had returned to work following maternity leave. ( Id. ¶ ¶ 7, 9.) Subsequently, Plaintiffs Jill Patricot, Tanys Lancaster, Janet Loures, Monica Prestia, Marina Kushnir, and Maria Mandalakis (collectively, the “Plaintiff–Intervenors”) intervened in this action on their own behalf.

Before the Court is a motion brought by Bloomberg seeking summary judgment on claims asserted by the Plaintiff–Intervenors [dkt. no. 322]. As set forth below, Defendant's motion with respect to the Plaintiff–Intervenors is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.²

I. BACKGROUND

The basic allegations and procedural history of this case as it pertains to the claims brought by the EEOC on behalf of the Non–Intervenor Plaintiffs are stated adequately in the Court's prior opinions, with which the Court assumes the parties' familiarity. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. ( Bloomberg IV ), [dkt. no. 557], 967 F.Supp.2d 802, 2013 WL 4799150 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. ( Bloomberg III ), 778 F.Supp.2d 458 (S.D.N.Y.2011); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. ( Bloomberg II ), 751 F.Supp.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y.2010); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. ( Bloomberg I ), No. 07 Civ. 8383, 2010 WL 3466370 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010). Plaintiff EEOC brought a case on behalf of a class of similarly situated women who were pregnant and took maternity leave (“Class Members”), asserting that Defendant Bloomberg engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of the Class Members' sex and/or pregnancy. The EEOC alleges that Bloomberg reduced pregnant women's or mothers' pay, demoted them in title or in number of directly reporting employees (also called “direct reports”), reduced their responsibilities, excluded them from management meetings, and subjected them to stereotypes about female caregivers, any and all of which violated the law because these adverse employment consequences were based on class members' pregnancy or the fact that they took leave for pregnancy-related reasons. The Court has dismissed all claims brought by the EEOC. ( See Bloomberg IV.) The only remaining claims are those brought by the Plaintiff–Intervenors.

Consistent with their rights, the Court permitted Jill Patricot, Tanys Lancaster, Janet Loures, Monica Prestia, Marina Kushnir, and Maria Mandalakis to intervene in this action as plaintiffs to pursue claims on their own behalf. ( See [dkt. nos. 6, 9, & 50].) In addition to claims brought under Title VII, the Plaintiff–Intervenors assert claims under Section 296(1) of the New York Executive Law (the “New York State Human Rights Law” or “NYSHRL”) and Section 8–107 of the New York City Administrative Code (the “New York City Human Rights Law” or “NYCHRL”).

The Opinion that follows proceeds in two principal parts. First, the Court sets forth the legal standards relevant to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiff–Intervenors' claims. Then, the Court analyzes the instant motion as it relates to each of the Plaintiff–Intervenors, one-by-one. In so doing, the Court defers setting forth additional background specific to each individual Plaintiff–Intervenor's claims until the portion of this opinion discussing that person's claims.³

II. LEGAL STANDARDSA. Summary Judgment Standard

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court resolves all ambiguities and draws all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Lindsay v. Ass'n of Prof'l Flight Attendants, 581 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.2009). “Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Kwan v. Schlein, 634 F.3d 224, 228 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Lindsay, 581 F.3d at 50. “The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Rule 56 mandates summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted). In the face of insufficient evidence, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

“[E]ven in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases,” “[i]t is now beyond cavil that summary judgment may be appropriate.” Abdu–Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.2001), cert. denied,534 U.S. 993, 122 S.Ct. 460, 151 L.Ed.2d 378 (2001); see also Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 40 (2d Cir.2000) (instructing that “trial courts should not ‘treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact’ ” (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000))). Accordingly, a plaintiff alleging discrimination claims “cannot escape summary judgment merely by vaguely asserting the existence of some unspecified disputed material facts ... or defeat the motion through mere speculation or conjecture.” Jones v. Hirschfeld, 348 F.Supp.2d 50, 59 (S.D.N.Y.2004).

Finally, in accordance with Local Rule 56.1, Bloomberg submitted a statement of material facts as to which it contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. ( See generally Bloomberg 56.1.) Plaintiff–Intervenors, collectively, submitted a statement in opposition, ( see generally Pl.-Intv'rs 56.1), and Bloomberg then submitted a reply thereto, ( see generally Reply 56.1). To the extent any of these filings is not in total compliance with the local rules,⁴ the Court retains “broad discretion to accept [it], even if it does not comply strictly with the Rule's requirements.” Primmer v. CBS Studios, Inc., 667 F.Supp.2d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citing Photopaint Techs., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 155 n. 2 (2d Cir.2003); Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir.2001)).

B. Statutes of Limitations

Title VII provides a limitations period of 300 days for a claimant to file an administrative charge with the EEOC. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). Although Title VII sets forth an individual filing rule, a “single-filing” or “piggybacking” exception to the rule might apply. Under such an exception, claims by all individuals arising out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame are deemed timely as of the date of the first-filed complaint with the EEOC. Snell v. Suffolk Cnty., 782 F.2d 1094, 1100 (2d Cir.1986). An individual who has previously filed her own EEOC charge, however, cannot invoke the exception. See Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 564 (2d Cir.2006).

In rare cases, a “continuing violation” exception may be observed under which, “if a Title VII plaintiff files an EEOC charge that is timely as to any incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of acts of discrimination under that policy will be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone.” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir.2004). The doctrine, however, clearly does not apply to “[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, [or] denial of transfer.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536...