Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Am. Flange & Grief

• Decision Date: 26 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21 C 5552
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FLANGE and GREIF, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FLANGE and GREIF, INC., Defendants.

No. 21 C 5552

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

May 26, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

VIRGINIA M. KENDALL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

On January 7, 2022, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants American Flange and Greif, Inc. (together, “Defendants”). (Dkt. 19). The EEOC claims that Defendants violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by refusing to provide reasonable accommodations to a former employee, Marquez Griffin, and by ultimately terminating Griffin's employment. (Id. ¶ 21). Now before the Court is Greif's Motion to Dismiss the FAC for EEOC's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Dkt. 23). For the following reasons, Greif's Motion to Dismiss [23] is denied. In addition, Greif's Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint [14] is dismissed as moot given the EEOC's filing of its FAC.

BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, with all reasonable inferences drawn in the non-moving party's favor, but not its legal conclusions. See Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States, 761 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2014). The following factual allegations are taken from the EEOC's FAC, (Dkt. 19) and are assumed true for purposes of this motion. W. Bend Mut Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016).

American Flange is a wholly owned subsidiary of Greif, and at all relevant times, Greif managed and compensated American Flange's temporary employees. (Dkt. 19 ¶¶ 4-5). As such, Defendants allegedly operate as “a single employer.” (Dkt. 19 ¶ 6). The EEOC asserts that Defendants employed Griffin from September 20, 2019, through October 10, 2019. (Id. ¶ 17; see also id. ¶¶ 16 (noting that Griffin worked as a Material Handler), 19 (clarifying that Griffin held a “temporary to permanent position” with Defendants)). Both Defendants “exerted control over the conduct of Griffin's work” by, for example furnishing Griffin with equipment and supplies; directing his schedule; and providing feedback on his job performance. (Id. ¶ 18).

Griffin called out sick on two occasions within the first month of his employment. First, on September 30, 2019, Griffin experienced symptoms of a seizure and told Defendants he needed the day off for medical reasons. (Id. ¶ 21(a)). Griffin subsequently provided Defendants a doctor's note stating that his absence stemmed from a seizure disorder and requesting that his absence be excused. (Id.). Defendants declined to excuse this absence. (Id.). Second, on October 9, 2019, Griffin again informed Defendants that he could not attend work due to seizure-related symptoms, and again Defendants did not excuse his absence. (Id. ¶ 21(b)). On a third, unspecified date, Griffin left work early for reasons unrelated to his disability, which Defendants similarly did not excuse. (Id. ¶ 21(c)). Defendants ultimately terminated Griffin for these unexcused attendance issues on October 10, 2019. (Id. ¶ 21(c)). Defendants allegedly declined to reconsider their termination decision after being informed that Griffin's absences were due to his seizure disorder. (Id. ¶¶ 21(e)-(f)).

Griffin next filed an EEOC charge against American Flange alleging that his firing violated the ADA. (Id. ¶ 9). Critically, Greif was not named in Griffin's charge. However, the EEOC's investigation revealed that (1) “both Greif and American Flange employed the employees at the American Flange facility, ” and (2) “all temporary employees would be paid and controlled by Greif once they obtained permanent employment.” (Id. (emphasis added)).^[1] The EEOC further alleges that Greif knew or should have known that Griffin's charge concerned Greif's own conduct and employment practices, given Greif's control over American Flange's operations. (Id. ¶ 12).

Thus, on February 12, 2021, EEOC issued a Letter of Determination finding reasonable cause to believe that both Defendants violated the ADA in their dealings with Griffin. (Id. ¶ 10). The EEOC communicated with Defendants and afforded both the opportunity to engage in efforts to remedy the underlying issues and conciliate the matter. (Id. ¶¶ 11 (“EEOC invited both Defendants to join with the Commission in informal methods of conciliation.”), 13 (“The Commission engaged in communications with Defendants to provide each of them the opportunity to remedy discriminatory practices described in the Letter of Determination. Each Defendant had the opportunity to engage in conciliation efforts on its own behalf.”)). Ultimately, on August 4, 2021, the EEOC informed Defendants that the parties failed to reach an acceptable conciliation agreement. (Id. ¶ 14). The EEOC then initiated the present enforcement action on October 19, 2021, (Dkt. 1), and filed its FAC on January 7, 2022, (Dkt. 19). Greif now moves to dismiss the FAC, arguing that Plaintiff's claim against Greif should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (E.g., Dkt. 24 at 2-3).

LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), a complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Adams, 742 F.3d at 728 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[I]t is not enough for a complaint to avoid foreclosing possible bases for relief; it must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief . . . by providing allegations that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.' ” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (emphasis in original). The Court construes the complaint “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept[s] well-pleaded facts as true, and draw[s] all inferences in [his] favor.” Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). “[L]egal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth.” McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678).^[2]

DISCUSSION

A. Administrative Exhaustion

Before a plaintiff files suit under the ADA, he must file an administrative charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting Title VII enforcement procedures for ADA claims); id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (requiring administrative exhaustion before suit is filed); Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182, 189 (7th Cir. 2018) (“An ADA plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC before bringing a court action against an employer.”). The administrative exhaustion rule serves the dual purpose of giving the employer notice of the employee's grievance and providing the EEOC and the employer an opportunity to conciliate the matter short of litigation. E.g., Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp., 914 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019).

A plaintiff may only bring claims in federal court that are originally included in or are “reasonably related” to the allegations set forth in the EEOC charge. Moore v. Vital Prods., Inc., 641 F.3d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Among other things, the charge must “implicate the same individuals” that a plaintiff seeks to hail into federal court. Id. at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Metz v. Joe Rizza Imports, Inc., 700 F.Supp.2d 983, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1989)) (noting that “judicial proceedings are limited by the nature of the charges filed with the EEOC”). Thus, “a party not named as the respondent in the [underlying EEOC] charge may not ordinarily be sued in a private civil action.” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1089 (7th Cir. 2008); Olsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 267 F.3d 597, 604 (7th Cir. 2001); Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 126; see also, e.g., Lugo v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local #134, 175 F.Supp.3d 1026, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Awak v. Heartland All. for Hum. Needs & Hum. Rts., No. 11-cv-4133, 2011 WL 6951821, at *4 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 29, 2011).

There is a narrow exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement where an “unnamed party [1] has been provided with adequate notice of the charge, [2] under circumstances where th[at] party has been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance” (the “Eggleston exception”). Alam, 709 F.3d at 666 (quoting Eggleston v. Chi. Journeymen Plumbers' Loc. Union No 130, U. A., 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir. 1981)); Olsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 267 F.3d 597, 604 (7th Cir. 2001); Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 126; see also, e.g., Summerland v. Exelon Generation Co., 510 F.Supp.3d 619, 627 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (granting motion to dismiss where Eggleston exception did not apply); Kawczynski v. F.E. Moran, Inc. Fire Prot., No. 15-cv-3099, 2015 WL 4871029, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss and applying Eggleston exception). Critically, however, “the fact that one entity [i.e., American Flange] had notice of the charges against it is insufficient to satisfy the Eggleston exception as to a related entity [i.e., Greif] that did not have notice of a charge against it or an opportunity to conciliate that charge.” Alam, 709...