Equal Employ. Opportunity Com'n v. Bell Helicopter Co.

• Decision Date: 06 December 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. CA 4-75-249.
• Citation: 426 F. Supp. 785
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. BELL HELICOPTER COMPANY and Local 218, United Automobile Workers.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

426 F. Supp. 785

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. BELL HELICOPTER COMPANY and Local 218, United Automobile Workers.

Civ. A. No. CA 4-75-249.

United States District Court, N. D. Texas, Fort Worth Division.

December 6, 1976.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sylvian R. Roybal, Trial Atty., EEOC, Denver Regional Litigation, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

Beale Dean, Brown, Herman, Scott, Dean & Miles, Fort Worth, Tex., for Bell Helicopter.

Catherine C. Harris, Youngdahl & Larrison, Little Rock, Ark., for United Automobile.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MAHON, District Judge.

There is now before the Court the "Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, and for a Stay of Proceedings" filed by Defendant Bell Helicopter Company hereinafter "Defendant Bell" on 18 November 1975. After thorough briefing by both Defendant Bell and Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hereinafter "EEOC" or "Commission", a hearing on oral argument was held on 11 May 1976. After this hearing, and while Defendant Bell's motion was still pending before the Court, this Court became aware of the recent decision in EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F.Supp. 1002 (N.D.Ga.1976). Considering the Moore Group decision to be particularly relevant to this proceeding, the Court, on 8 October 1976, ordered new briefs on the issues raised in that case. Both parties have now filed those supplemental briefs.¹

I. THE NATURE OF THE CASE

In its complaint, the EEOC has charged Defendant Bell with violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. hereinafter "the Act", by intentionally engaging in the following practices at Bell's facility in Hurst, Texas:

(1) Discriminating against females because of their sex by failing to treat maternity benefits on the same basis as it treats other temporary disabilities;

(2) Discriminatorily discharging Spanish-surnamed Americans because of their national origin;

(3) Failing to hire Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans because of their race and national origin;

(4) Failing to promote Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans because of their race and national origin;

(5) Discriminating against Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans because of their race and national origin by initially assigning them to low paying and low classified jobs and thus denying them equal employment opportunities; and

(6) By allowing its officials to use derogatory language against Spanish-surnamed Americans and thus denying them equal terms and conditions of employment because of their national origin.

The EEOC has prayed for injunctive relief prohibiting these alleged discriminatory practices, injunctive relief requiring nondiscriminatory practices, "make-whole" relief (back pay, etc.), any and all other equitable relief to which it might be entitled, and its costs of action.

Local 218, United Automobile Workers hereinafter "Defendant Local", was named as a Defendant by the EEOC pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Rule 19(a)(2) "in that it has an interest in the outcome of this action by being a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with the Company at its Hurst facility."

Defendant Local has answered by stating that it is of the opinion that Defendant Bell has engaged in discriminatory practices at its Hurst, Texas, facility, but that Defendant Local has taken no part in such practices, that it has no control over those practices, and that it has fairly represented all minority groups in collective bargaining and grievance procedures.

II. ISSUES NOW BEFORE THE COURT

In its motion to dismiss and/or for other relief, Defendant Bell has claimed that all charges of discrimination against it, except for those concerning maternity benefits, date from the period of 1966 to 1968. Defendant Bell therefore has claimed that the 1966-1968 charges are barred by laches. On supplemental briefing in light of Moore Group, supra, 416 F.Supp. 1002, Defendant Bell has claimed that the 1966-1968 charges should also be dismissed for inexcusable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act. The EEOC, of course, opposes dismissal on either ground.

With regard to the recent maternity benefits charges, the parties had originally agreed that that aspect of this suit should be stayed pending the outcome in the Supreme Court of Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987, 95 S.Ct. 1989, 44 L.Ed.2d 476 (1975). Wetzel however, was subsequently decided by the Supreme Court on procedural grounds. 424 U.S. 737, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976). The parties have now agreed to stay the maternity benefits aspect of this suit until the Supreme Court reaches a decision in Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted 423 U.S. 822, 96 S.Ct. 36, 46 L.Ed.2d 39 (1975), which presents a substantially identical issue of law. Gilbert is still pending before the Supreme Court, Nos. 74-1589 & 74-1590, and has been reargued this term. 45 U.S.L.W. 3296 (19 October 1966).

III. LACHES

There are four recent decisions by the Fifth Circuit on the issue of the applicability of laches to suits brought by the EEOC: Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1975); and EEOC v. Exchange Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976). These decisions are at best ambiguous, and this Court has had great difficulty in reconciling their language. A great deal of the problems created by these cases arise from the fact that they all involve the injection of unnecessary dicta into the substantive decisions of the court.

In Chromcraft, supra, 465 F.2d 745, rev'g 337 F.Supp. 653 (N.D.Miss.1972), the EEOC demanded production of certain evidence pertaining to matters that had been originally sought over a year before, on a charge of discrimination that had been filed with the Commission one year prior to the original request for information. The district court, relying on dictum in the Fifth Circuit's first opinion in Georgia Power, 412 F.2d 462, 467 & n. 10 (5th Cir. 1967), set aside the demand for production on the ground that the Act itself required service upon a respondent within a reasonable time after the receipt of the charge by the EEOC.

Despite the fact that the district court decision was not based on the doctrine of laches, in Chromcraft, the Fifth Circuit stated: "Nor is the equitable doctrine of laches applicable to a governmental agency acting to vindicate a public right." 465 F.2d at 746. While dictum, this statement is supported by a note listing exhaustive indisputable authority — Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions — tracing this rule back to the old English doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi. 465 F.2d at 746-747 n. 2.

In Georgia Power, supra, 474 F.2d 906, an appeal from a final judgment in an employment discrimination suit, the Court held that back pay was available in a suit brought by the United States. In discussing limitations on the recovery of back pay, the Court stated:

Where the government is suing to enforce rights belonging to it, state statutes of limitation are not applicable. . . . However, . . . insofar as the pattern or practice suit constitutes a proper legal conduit for the recovery of sums due individual citizens rather than the treasury, it is a private and not a public action. . . . These personal claims are entitled to no superior status because they are here allowed to be asserted in the Attorney General's suit as well as in the private class action.

474 F.2d at 923. As far as back pay relief is concerned, the Court held that the general rule in private actions of borrowing the state statute of limitations applied. Then, after determining which Alabama statute of limitations applied, the Court added the following dictum:

Additionally, as is true with regard to wholly equitable actions, the doctrine of laches is applicable to such monetary awards.

474 F.2d at 923.

In Griffin Wheel, the Fifth Circuit reiterated the distinction between back pay relief, which it deemed a private action, and equitable relief, which it deemed a public action. That Court, however, then went further, in dictum, to cite Georgia Power for the proposition that the doctrine of laches would "remain" applicable even in suits where the state statutes of limitation were not applicable. 511 F.2d at 459 & n. 5.

Finally, in Exchange Security Bank, supra, 529 F.2d at 1214, in which the EEOC was attempting to enforce a subpoena duces tecum after a 21 month delay in issuance and an 18 month delay in seeking enforcement, the Fifth Circuit, though never speaking directly to the issue of laches, revitalized the Chromcraft decision in allowing the Commission to enforce its subpoena.

The simplest construction of these Fifth Circuit cases is that any relief sought by the EEOC in the form of back wages is a "private" action to which state statutes of limitations and the doctrine of laches apply. On the other hand, all injunctive relief sought by the EEOC is construed as a "public" action to which neither state statutes of limitation nor the doctrine of laches applies, the footnote in Griffin Wheel notwithstanding.

These cases, however, create a substantial doubt as to whether the doctrine of laches should apply at all to cases brought by the EEOC. The discussions of laches in all of these cases are dicta — legal conclusions on issues not raised in the lower courts. The Fifth Circuit has never directly considered the issue of laches in governmental EEOC actions as a substantive issue raised on the record below. When it does, this Court is not assured that it will reach the same conclusion as its dicta in Georgia Power and Griffin Wheel.

Pragmatically, the doctrine of laches has no practical application in cases brought by the EEOC to correct employment discrimination; the doctrine is entirely overlapped by sta...