Equal Employment Op. Com'n v. Union Oil Co. of Cal.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 73-666.
• Citation: 369 F. Supp. 579
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

369 F. Supp. 579

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 73-666.

United States District Court, N. D. Alabama, S. D.

January 15, 1974.

William A. Carey, for plaintiff.

A. H. Gaede, Jr. and James P. Alexander, Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

POINTER, District Judge.

The EEOC filed this action against Union Oil for alleged unlawful employment practices proscribed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, premising its standing upon the amendments to Section 706 thereof by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-261; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5). The Company has moved for summary judgment on the basis of the following undisputed sequence of events pertinent to this litigation:

                Dec.  12, 1968   John Runner discharged by company
                Jan.   3, 1969   Charge filed by Runner with EEOC
                Apr.  21, 1969   Charge perfected by sworn statement1
                Apr.  25, 1969   Charge served on company
                Jan.  25, 1972   Last Conciliation conference
                Mar.  24, 1972   Effective date of P.L. 92-261
                Mar.  30, 1972   Notice by EEOC to company of inability
                                   to obtain voluntary compliance
                                   right-to-sue letter mailed
                                   by EEOC to Runner
                Apr.  28, 1972   Suit filed by Runner for self and
                                   class
                Jul.  16, 1973   Suit filed by EEOC
                

Three alternative arguments are urged by the Company in support of its motion: (1) the EEOC's right to sue terminated or became barred on the expiration of 180 days after Runner's charge was filed.² (2) The EEOC's right to sue terminated on the filing of Runner's own suit for himself and his class.³ (3) The action is barred by Alabama's one year statute of limitations.

The court, after considering at length and in detail the contention of the parties on each of these issues, has concluded — though not without some doubt — that the company is correct on each point. While a conclusion favorable to the company on any one of them would have been decisive on the summary judgment motion, the court, at the request of the EEOC, has chosen to address itself to all three to enable a more meaningful appellate resolution of these problems.

I. 180-DAY ISSUE.

The Company contends that the following language from the amended act requires the EEOC to file suit, if at all, within 180 days from the filing of a charge with it:

If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission * * *, the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent * * * named in the charge. * * * The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission * * *. If * * * within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge * * * the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section * * * or and — ? the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission * * * shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice. * * * Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Commission * * * to intervene in such civil action upon certification that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending * * * further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance. § 706 (f)(1).

To date, this issue has been dealt with by seven other district courts, one court⁴ agreeing with the company's position and six⁵ ruling with the EEOC. Meritorious arguments can be made on both sides.

Arguments⁶ supportive of the EEOC's position can be summarized as follows:

(1) The amendment gives the EEOC the right to sue without any explicit maximum limitation or cut-off date. The only restriction on its right to sue is satisfaction of a condition precedent; namely, the inability to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement within thirty days after the charge is filed.

(2) Congress obviously knew how to phrase a cut-off restriction if one was intended, for in the very same subsection of the amendment, it placed such an explicit limitation on an individual's right to sue.

(3) To imply a limitation would be contrary to the purpose for the amendment. The stated purpose as shown in the title of the amendment, was to "further promote equal employment opportunities". Numerous references in the legislative history clearly demonstrate Congress' desire for more complete progress in achieving this objective, and its belief that individual lawsuits were inadequate vehicles to attain such goals. The legislative hope "that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of the EEOC", 118 Cong. Rec. H1863 (Mar. 8, 1972), made with the awareness of the massive number of complaints then pending before the EEOC, would be frustrated by an interpretation which would, as a practical matter, require any litigation on most of these charges to be instituted, if at all, by private parties.

(4) The interest of Congress in speed was essentially directed at the plight of aggrieved parties whose charges were bogged down in administrative backlogs. This concern is satisfied by the change which gives a frustrated employee a right to sue after 180 days without having to wait for the Commission to give up its efforts, as was previously the situation.

(5) The amendment recognized that speed was not always possible. Thus, in amended section 706(b) the Commission was to make its determination on reasonable cause "as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than" 120 days after filing of the charge. With Congress recognizing that in some cases the determination as to reasonable cause could not be made until after 120 days from filing, it certainly would not have intended that in such cases the Commission would have less than sixty days to "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal conference, conciliation, and persuasion" and then to file its lawsuit if no acceptable agreement were secured.

(6) Speed was only one concern; effectiveness of the procedures had at least as great a priority. The granting to individuals of an opportunity to sue should not be seen as automatically curtailing the EEOC's powers; rather this should be construed as an additional option for correction of unlawful practices. According to the Conference Report, "it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief" and the retention of the private right of action allows "the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy under this title in the courts where there is agency inaction, dalliance or dismissal of the charge, or unsatisfactory resolution". 118 Cong.Rec. H1862-63 (Mar. 8, 1972) (emphasis added). If there were no longer any power in the EEOC to sue after the 180 days, it would hardly be an "election" on the part of the aggrieved party whether to pursue personally his remedy — it would have been the only remedy left.

(7) The suggestion that new charges could be filed to reactivate a continuing case of discrimination would result in still further delays during administrative processing and, insofar as the procedure for charges filed by a member of the Commission itself, is impractical in view of its workload.

(8) Under the company's contention all suits would have to be brought within 570 days (where a local anti-discrimination law) or 450 days (where no local law) from the date of the unlawful employment practice. See Section 706(e)(f). Such a requirement would render unnecessary and meaningless the provision in Section 706(g) which limits back pay to a period of not more than two years prior to the filing of a charge.

(9) Earlier drafts of the legislation (involving possible administrative proceedings before the EEOC) had provided a similar time sequence but had additionally contained language — not found in the final version — which explicitly would have cut off the EEOC's powers under certain circumstances after the 180 day period had run. Thus, the mere presence of a time sequence was not considered as automatically imposing a cut-off on the EEOC's jurisdiction.

According to the company the 180 day restriction need not meet the more stringent legal requirements for construction as a statute of limitations. Rather, it is a restriction built into a statute which creates an action unknown at common law and is therefore an indispensable condition of the action which it permits. Simon v. United States, 244 F.2d 703, 705 (CA5 1957); United States v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 162, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893 (1914). Arguments supportive of the company's construction of the amendment can be summarized as follows:

(1) Such a restriction is implicit from the statutory scheme which establishes consecutive controlled time frames and cross rights of intervention. The individual, whose "rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of Title VII," 118 Cong.Rec. H1863 (Mar. 8, 1972), is certainly limited in the time to bring suit. Genovese v. Shell Oil Co., 488 F.2d 84 (1973). Congress would hardly have intended for a secondary interest to have greater protection than the primary interest.

(2) A time limitation is needed to assure speedy disposition of charges of discrimination, a goal repeatedly expressed in the legislative history and manifested in the act

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