Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bailey Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 October 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-1045,76-1045 |
| Parties | 15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 972, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7840 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BAILEY COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Abner W. Sibal, Vincent Blackwood, Gen. Counsel, Mollie W. Neal, E.E.O.C., Washington, D. C., Milton C. Branch, Regional Atty., Atlanta Regional Litigation Center, E.E.O.C., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
William N. Ozier, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tenn., for defendant-appellee.
Before WEICK, PECK and ENGEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., alleging that defendant-appellee, The Bailey Company, Inc., had engaged in certain unlawful employment practices, in violation of § 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), with respect to blacks and Seventh Day Adventists. In the district court the EEOC sought to have appellee enjoined from engaging in such unlawful employment practices and to have appellee ordered to institute affirmative action programs to provide equal employment opportunities for blacks and Seventh Day Adventists. Appellee denied that it had engaged in any illegal discriminatory employment practices and asserted further that the allegations of racial and religious discrimination were not properly before the district court because the private party's charge of discrimination, which had triggered the EEOC investigation of appellee's employment practices, had been filed by a white female alleging sex discrimination against women and race discrimination against black women.
The district court agreed with appellee that the EEOC could not bring a lawsuit alleging racial and religious discrimination based on a charge filed by a white woman because the woman did not have standing to charge racial and religious discrimination. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction and awarded attorneys' fees to appellee.
We affirm the portion of the district court order that dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the allegations of religious discrimination. We reverse the portion of the district court order dismissing the allegations of racial discrimination and remand to the district court that part of the case for consideration on the merits. We also reverse the district court award of attorneys' fees to appellee and remand that part of the case for reconsideration in light of the legal principles set forth in this opinion.
Appellee company is a Tennessee corporation engaging in the sale, service, and rental of forklift trucks and other allied material handling equipment. Appellee employed approximately 100 people at the time of the EEOC investigation, of whom fifty-two worked at appellee's principal office and place of business in Nashville, Tennessee, and the remainder in the company's several branch offices. The EEOC's complaint and proof at trial focused solely on the employment practices at the Nashville main office.
The initial charge of discrimination lodged with the EEOC against appellee was filed October 19, 1970, by Mrs. Cecile Wade, a white female working in appellee's Accounting Department. Mrs. Wade charged that she had worked at the appellee company for almost two years, that she had experience and education in bookkeeping, that a man with less education and less experience than she was recently hired and placed in a supervisory position over her at a greater rate of pay, and that she was discharged because of her plans to file a charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC. On January 31, 1972, Mrs. Wade amended her charge to add allegations that the company in general failed "to promote females to supervisory positions because of their sex," that the company failed "to pay equally qualified females the same wages as males," and that the company failed "to recruit and hire Negro females because of their race."
The EEOC investigated the racial and sexual composition of appellee's work force, and on November 13, 1972, the Area Director for the EEOC issued a determination that appellee was not guilty of sex discrimination against Mrs. Wade. The Area Director found that Mrs. Wade was not offered the promotion, which she had complained in her charge about not receiving, because she had an unsatisfactory working relationship with her co-workers and that no evidence supported her allegations as to discharge and discriminatory wages.
The Area Director further determined, however, that there was reasonable cause to believe that appellee had failed to recruit and hire blacks because of their race. The Area Director referred first, to the statistical disparity between the percentage of blacks comprising the Nashville population, about 20% according to the U.S. Bureau of Census figures, and the percentage of blacks comprising the work force at appellee company, about 4% according to the work force data submitted to the EEOC by appellee, and second, to the apparent fact that the blacks who were currently working with appellee held low paying janitorial, utility porter, and utility shop employee positions. In addition, the Area Director determined that appellee company admitted that it had failed to hire a qualified male applicant because of his religion.
Pursuant to Title VII procedures, the EEOC attempted conciliation, but on April 4, 1974, notified appellee that such conciliation efforts were unsuccessful. On November 27, 1974, the EEOC filed this lawsuit. The EEOC complained that appellee had engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Nashville office in violation of § 703(a) of Title VII (1) by failing or refusing to hire blacks on an equal basis with whites because of race; (2) by maintaining departments and job classifications that have been segregated on the basis of race; (3) by otherwise limiting, segregating, and classifying employees in ways that have deprived blacks of employment opportunities; (4) by failing or refusing to hire Seventh Day Adventists on the basis of their religion; and (5) by failing or refusing to take affirmative action to eliminate such alleged discriminatory policies and practices.
Trial was held June 24, 1975. At trial, to prove that appellee's employment practices resulted in racial discrimination, the EEOC took testimony from the principal appellee officers and submitted exhibits during that testimony.
James Bailey, appellee's President, described the company structure. Appellee was divided into separate departments for Sales, Parts, Service, and Accounting, with each department responsible for its own hiring. According to Lurline Yarchever appellee's Vice President-Finance and head of the Accounting Department, applicants for positions with appellee were received through newspaper advertisements, through listings with the State of Tennessee, private employment agencies and vocational schools, and through word-of-mouth. Mrs. Yarchever testified that a high school education was a qualification for most jobs with appellee, but she added that experience outweighed the value of a high school diploma and that the company had deviated from stated qualifications in hiring particular individuals. As to one category of employment, though, Gordon Morrow, appellee Vice President-Marketing and head of the Sales Department, stated that salesmen should have an engineering degree or engineering experience in order to represent competently appellee's product line.
Further examination of Mrs. Yarchever and exhibits presented with the examination showed the following. At the time of trial, two blacks were working at appellee company, one as a truckdriver and the other as a parts clerk. Previously, blacks had been employed only as janitors. No black had ever worked at appellee as an executive, a manager, a salesman, or a mechanic. No black had ever worked in the white collar Sales and Accounting Departments. Blacks had only worked in the blue collar Parts and Service Departments.
EEOC examination of Mrs. Yarchever at trial showed that these facts, suggesting race discrimination, were developed by the EEOC in its investigation of appellee by requests directed to Mrs. Yarchever to go through appellee employment records, which listed past and present employees, and to indicate whether such employee was white or black. Because appellee's regular employment records did not indicate race, Mrs. Yarchever had to comply with the request by using her memory of appellee's employees, and she did so in an effort to co-operate with the EEOC.
Mrs. Yarchever and Mr. Morrow testified, however, as to facts negating the possibility of race discrimination by appellee. They stated that in the Accounting and Sales Departments no black had ever applied and that there was a small turnover in personnel. Mr. Bailey stated that appellee never had any black applicants for any jobs except as truckdrivers and janitors and that appellee had difficulty getting mechanics of any race. Mrs. Yarchever further insisted that, although appellee had no affirmative action program, appellee's policy was to hire blacks if there was an opening.
The EEOC sought to prove individual cases of race discrimination with the testimony of five black men who had been or were then employees of appellee. Of course, appellee denied that these particular cases showed race discrimination.
The first black witness, Wilbur James Crowder, had been a truckdriver for over two years of the five years he had worked at appellee. He had a tenth grade education and no specialized training. Crowder received the truckdriver position by promotion within the company, replacing two whites who had previously held the position jointly, and stated that he thought he had been treated fairly at appellee....
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