Equal Employment v. INTERN. BROTH. OF ELEC. WKRS.

• Decision Date: 13 September 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 77-3675-G.
• Citation: 476 F. Supp. 341
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. The INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS (I. B. E. W.) and its Local 103, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

476 F. Supp. 341

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. The INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS (I. B. E. W.) and its Local 103, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 77-3675-G.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

September 13, 1979.

Lanier E. Williams, EEOC Phila. Reg. Office of Gen. Counsel, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Elihu I. Leifer, Terry R. Yellig, Sherman, Dunn, Cohen & Leifer, Washington, D. C., for Carl Goodman.

Wallace W. Sherwood, Boston, Mass., for Local 103.

John P. Flynn, Murphy, Lamere & Murphy, Braintree, Mass., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

GARRITY, District Judge.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") brought this Title VII enforcement proceeding against the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (hereinafter "International") and IBEW Local 103 (hereinafter "Local 103") to redress retaliation in violation of Section 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The individual aggrieved by the alleged retaliation, Carl Goodman, was allowed to intervene, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and he filed his own complaint claiming that the International and Local 103 violated Title VII, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1988¹ and, basing jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. and the special jurisdictional grant in Title VII. Now before the court is the International's motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment against the EEOC. The International argues that Goodman's failure to name the International in his charge, the EEOC's failure to include the claims against the International, as well as the International itself by name, in the Reasonable Cause Determination contained in its Letter of Determination and to notify the International of the charge, and the total lack of any efforts on the part of the EEOC to conciliate with the International before bringing suit deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim against the International.²

Upon consideration of lengthy briefs and oral argument we grant the International's motion. Since affidavits have been filed, we treat the motion as for summary judgment and find that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning the involvement of the International with the actions of which the EEOC complains and concerning the steps taken by the EEOC with respect to the International before bringing this lawsuit. We conclude that the International is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and order that summary judgment be entered in favor of the International.

The factual background is as follows: Carl Goodman, the intervenor, was employed by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (hereinafter "MBTA") as a journeyman electrician, having been referred to the MBTA by his union, Local 103. In September 1974 Goodman was laid off from his job, and on October 2, 1974 he filed a charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (hereinafter "MCAD") protesting racial discrimination by the MBTA and Local 103 in the layoff. On October 7, 1974, the MBTA ordered Goodman back to work over the opposition of Local 103, apparently as an affirmative action measure. After unsuccessful efforts to convince Goodman voluntarily to resume his layoff status in the order of his seniority, Local 103 then notified Goodman on November 8, 1974 that he must appear before Local 103's Trial Board to answer charges filed by Local 103's business agent. These charges included violations of the Building Trades and MBTA Agreement, Article XVI; the L.U. 103 IBEW and NECA Agreement, Fundamental Principles (sec. 11), Article V, secs. 1, 3, 5; the L.U. 103 Bylaws, Article XIV, sec. 8, and, of particular importance for the instant case, the IBEW Constitution, Article XVII, sec. 1 (requiring exhaustion of intra-union remedies by a local union), Article XXII, sec. 4 and Article XXVII, sec. 1, subsecs. 1, 3, 8, 9, 11 (quoted infra).³ On December 6, 1974, after a hearing before Local 103's Trial Board, Goodman was convicted of all charges and fined $1000. Thereafter, according to the EEOC Letter of Determination, Local 103 once again tried to convince Goodman to accept layoff status, offering to suspend the fine if he did so.

On March 5, 1975, Goodman filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC based on violations of Section 704(a) of Title VII against Local 103 only, not naming the International. He alleged that the $1000 fine was imposed in retaliation for his having filed the original charge with MCAD. The EEOC on March 19, 1975 sent a Notice of Charge, again only to Local 103. Following an investigation, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination on May 27, 1976 finding reasonable cause to believe that the charge was true. The Letter of Determination named Local 103 as the only respondent and cited only Local 103's actions in fining Goodman and offering to suspend the fine. Subsequent efforts to conciliate with Local 103 were attempted, without success. A 29 CFR 1601.23 Notice, notifying the respondent of the Commission's decision to end its unsuccessful conciliation efforts unless the respondent requests resumption of conciliation within ten days, issued, addressed to Local 103 only, and on December 5, 1977 this lawsuit was commenced.

All parties agree that the International first acquired knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Goodman's charge and the EEOC efforts on Goodman's behalf only after the EEOC filed its complaint with this court. See, Affidavit of John E. Flynn, June 28, 1978, at ¶¶ 5-8. The International then requested a conference with the EEOC to discuss the allegations, a conference that the EEOC now characterizes as a post-complaint attempt at conciliation.

The EEOC asserts as against the International that Article XXVII, sections 1(1), 1(8) and 1(11) of the IBEW Constitution amount to a per se violation of Title VII. Article XXVII, § 1 reads in relevant part:

Sec. 1. Any member may be penalized for committing any one or more of the following offenses:

(1) Resorting to the courts for redress of any injustice which he may believe has been done him by the I.B.E.W. or any of its Local Unions without first making use (for at least a four-month period in the United States) of the process available to him under the I.B.E.W. Constitution including any appeal or appeals from any decision against him.

. . . . .

(8) Sending letters or statements, anonymous or otherwise, or making oral statements, to public officials or others which contain untruths about, or which misrepresent a L.U., its officers or representatives, or officers or representatives of the I.B.E.W.

. . . . .

(11) Slandering or otherwise wronging a member of the I.B.E.W. by any wilful act or acts.

Section 1 further sets out the punishments as follows:

Any member convicted of any one or more of the above-named offenses may be assessed or suspended, or both, or expelled.

In case of conviction of violation of subsection (1) above, the member may be assessed an amount equal to the reasonable attorneys' fees and cost incurred by the I.B.E.W. or L.U. as a result of said violation in addition to, or in lieu of, any other penalty.

The EEOC focuses in particular on Section 1(1) which requires a four month exhaustion of internal union remedies before resort to the "courts". Reasoning that "courts" includes administrative agencies, the EEOC contends that this provision contravenes Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) by discriminating against an individual for filing a charge with the EEOC or other relevant state or local agency before completion of the four month exhaustion period. Presumably, the EEOC also contends that the other two sections, 1(8) and 1(11), amount to a per se violation because they expose a member to punishment for filing what turns out to be a groundless charge. The EEOC does not claim that the International had any relationship with the events surrounding Goodman's being charged and subsequently fined other than the maintenance of these challenged constitutional provisions.⁴

The International insists that it has always interpreted its constitution consistent with all legal requirements, including Title VII, and in particular that the word "courts" in Article XXVII, § 1 was never intended to include administrative agencies like MCAD. Supplemental Affidavit of Marcus L. Loftis, 11/10/78, at ¶¶ 6, 7. It specifically disavows any interest in the subject matter of this controversy and notes that any disciplinary action against Goodman based on Goodman's having filed a charge with MCAD would be contrary to the IBEW constitution and IBEW policy. Supplemental Affidavit of Marcus L. Loftis, supra, at ¶ 13. With this background in mind, we now turn to an analysis of the issues presented by this motion.

Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, creates an administrative system for extra-judicial enforcement of Title VII's equal employment opportunity mandate. Because of its importance in the overall administrative enforcement scheme, compliance with certain of the procedures set forth in Section 706 has been treated by most courts as a jurisdictional condition precedent to commencement of a civil suit. Among the jurisdictional requirements of an EEOC-initiated enforcement action⁵ are: (1) the naming of the defendant as a respondent in the original charge filed with the EEOC, e. g., Equal Emp. Op. Com'n v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 6 Cir. 1974, 503 F.2d 1086, 1095; see, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); (2) inclusion of the defendant and the possibly discriminatory acts for which it is responsible in the reasonable cause determination, e. g., E.E.O.C. v. Sherwood Medical Industries, M.D.Fla.1978, 452 F.Supp. 678, 681-82; see, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-5(b), 2000e-5(f)(1); and (3) efforts at informal settlement and...