Equal Rights Center v. Equity Residential

• Decision Date: 13 April 2007
• Docket Number: CIV. No. AMD 06-1060.
• Parties: The EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER, Plaintiff v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

483 F.Supp.2d 482

The EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER, Plaintiff v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL, et al., Defendants.

CIV. No. AMD 06-1060.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

April 13, 2007.

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Donald Lee Kahl, Isabelle Marie Thabault, Washington Lawyers Comm for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, Andrew Stuart Wein, Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Charles O. Monk, II, Dan Friedman, Edward Joseph Baines, Saul Ewing LLP, Baltimore, MD, Melissa S. Skilken, Amanda A. Berndt, Beth L. Fancsali, Craig M. White, Wildman Harrold Allen and Dixon LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVIS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Equal Rights Center ("ERC") is a Washington D.C.-based non-profit organization, having approximately 150 individual members. ERC's mission, inter alia, is to protect the rights of persons with disabilities through "education, counseling, advocacy, enforcement, and referral services." Many of its members are persons with disabilities. ERC instituted this action for injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages, against defendants Equity Residential, a real estate investment trust organized under the laws of Maryland (which describes itself as "one of the largest owners [of apartment buildings] in the United States") and ERC Operating Limited Partnership, an Illinois limited partnership owned and controlled by Equity Residential. Plaintiff alleges two claims. First, plaintiff sues under the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, as amended (hereinafter the "Fair Housing Act" or "FHA"). The gravamen of this claim is that defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of violating the FHA in that they have "repeatedly and continually ... failed to design and construct" properties subject to prescriptions of the FHA, i.e., multi-family properties containing the minimum number of units and relevant features, so as to render the properties accessible to persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1), (0)(2), (f)(3). Similarly, in count two, plaintiff sues under the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq., contending that the properties at issue do not contain, in areas comprising "public accommodations," e.g., leasing offices, parking lots, sidewalks, and restrooms, certain features of minimum accessibility and adaptable design as required by law.

Defendants responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (that is, asserting that plaintiff lacks standing) and for improper venue. Defendants sought, in the alternative, a "severance" of what they assert are "multiple claims" and a "transfer of venue" of such severed claims to the numerous districts where the challenged properties are located. By order entered on March 12, 2007, I denied the motion. This Memorandum Opinion sets forth the reasons for that Order.

I.

It is well settled that, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and construe all facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir.1997). The court need not, however, accept conclusions of law or unwarranted deductions of fact. See Mylan Lab., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F.Supp. 1053, 1059 (D.Md.1991). I remain mindful that "[t]he purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of a complaint," and not to resolve contests regarding facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999). Accordingly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).¹

II.

For purposes of the defendants' motion, the facts alleged in the complaint, together with the reasonable inferences therefrom, are taken as true.

Through various joint ventures, defendants develop, design, own, operate and/or manage certain multifamily housing dwellings nationwide, 300 of which comprise what plaintiff describes as the "Subject Properties" at issue in this action.² During 2005 and 2006, plaintiff inspected and tested 61 apartment complexes (referred to by the parties as the "Tested Properties") owned by Equity in seven states.³ The inspections revealed violations at every Tested Property.

The "Subject Properties" share various combinations of design elements utilized in defendants' properties located in at least 15 other states.⁴ These elements run the gamut in design and construction features and, plaintiff alleges, these features limit accessibility to persons with disabilities.⁵ For example, according to the complaint: (1) interior doorways are too narrow to allow passage to persons in wheelchairs; (2) routes into and through units, kitchens and bathrooms are insufficiently spacious to allow wheelchair movement; (3) environmental controls and electrical outlets installed in living units are inaccessible; (4) slope grades of ramps hinder access to persons using wheelchairs; and (5) the properties contain inaccessible public spaces and common areas. Thus, plaintiff has alleged, in but two claims, a nationwide pattern and practice by defendants, which is allegedly on-going, in building and causing to be built, and owning and operating, properties whose design, construction and operation violate numerous prescriptions imposed by federal law.

Defendants, understandably wishing not to litigate a pattern and practice case that is nationwide in scope, filed their motion to dismiss, for severance, and to transfer venue, in which they (1) challenge the constitutional and statutory standing of plaintiff in the first instance, and, (2) alternatively, seek to defeat the litigation of plaintiff's pattern and practice claims.

III.

I first consider the issue of plaintiff's standing. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate: (1) the existence of a "concrete and particularized" injury-infact; (2) a causal connection between the injury suffered and the conduct complained of; and (3) that a favorable adjudication would redress the alleged injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Fundamentally, it is a pleading burden, see FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990), although the court must be satisfied at all times that the requirement is met. Organizational standing under the FHA exists to the limits of constitutional "case or controversy" limits; prudential considerations play no role. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982).

Thus, to allege a redressable injury-in-fact caused by defendants under the FHA, plaintiff need only allege facts that demonstrate that the defendants' actions either have caused the organization to divert resources to identify and counteract the defendants' unlawful practices, or that the challenged actions have frustrated plaintiff's mission. Id. at 378-79, 102 S.Ct. 1114.⁶ Here, plaintiff has plainly alleged such facts.

Nonetheless, defendants challenge plaintiff's standing, relying on the following contentions as indicia of an absence of plaintiff's standing: (1) plaintiffs mission is too generalized for plaintiff to suffer a cognizable injury; (2) as a matter of law, plaintiff does not and cannot suffer a cognizable injury outside of the "Greater Washington Area;" and (3) plaintiff will not be entitled to relief on a nationwide basis.

None of these assertions defeat plaintiffs standing. First, plaintiff has amply alleged facts showing a causal connection between plaintiff's injury and defendants' conduct. Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, defendants own and/or operate 300 properties which, in one or more ways, limit access to persons with disabilities and thus violate federal law. Specifically, through its investigation over a period of two years, plaintiff has found "design and construct" violations in 61 of defendants' properties. Moreover, because, as plaintiff alleges, the tested properties share various combinations of common design elements with the untested properties, plaintiff may permissibly and reasonably allege on "information and belief' the existence of violations at each of the properties named in the complaint. Plainly, plaintiffs allege facts that demonstrate that the defendants' actions "have caused the organization to divert resources to identify and counteract the defendants' unlawful practices," and thereby impede and frustrate its core mission, which is, through "education, counseling, advocacy, enforcement, and referral services to aid protected individuals."

Defendants' assertion that plaintiff has suffered no injury because it is merely a "regional" organization with a mission that is "too generalized" is unavailing. Manifestly, ERC is an organization with a mission that is national in scope and breadth. This is true notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff is the successor organization of several District of Columbia-area fair housing and fair employment organizations. Indeed, defendants' argument that plaintiff is merely a "regional" entity is quaintly nostalgic in this "Age of the Internet;" defendants seem not to appreciate the irony inherent in their citation to plaintiffs website in arguing that it is an organization with only parochial, "inside-the-beltway" interests. To the contrary, the national policies in favor of equal housing opportunity which animate plaintiff's mission as it works to eradicate housing discrimination (and/or inaccessibility) against persons with disabilities evidence its core mission: to...