Equitable Life AS v. Mercantile-Commerce B. & T. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 July 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 13167.,13167. |
| Parties | EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES v. MERCANTILE-COMMERCE BANK & TRUST CO. et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Lon O. Hocker and Orville Richardson, both of St. Louis, Mo. (James C. Jones and James C. Jones, Jr., both of St. Louis, Mo., L. D. Fitzgerald, of New York City, and Jones, Hocker, Gladney & Grand, of St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.
William H. Armstrong, of St. Louis, Mo. (Thomas H. Cobbs and Cobbs, Logan, Roos & Armstrong, all of St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.
Before GARDNER, JOHNSEN, and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.
The action is by an insured's executors, on two life-insurance policies, under Missouri law, to recover payment of benefits from March, 1932, to April, 1939, for the insured's total and permanent disability, and return of premiums for that period, which he was entitled to have had waived. From a judgment for the amount of the benefits and the premiums, D.C., 59 F.Supp. 787, the insurer has appealed.
The case has been here on a previous appeal, 143 F.2d 397, in which we upheld a finding by the trial court that the insured had been totally and permanently disabled during the period involved. Other findings and conclusions not of present importance were also sustained, but we reversed and remanded the case for findings, conclusions, and resulting judgment, on the question whether the proof of disability submitted by the insured in 1930, after his total and permanent disability began, and which the insurer had accepted and recognized as sufficient for benefit-payments and premium-waivers from 1930 to March, 1932, would support his right to such payments and waivers for his continuing disability through the period in suit. The trial court had not passed upon that question but had disposed of the case on another theory, which we regarded as erroneous.
It is necessary here only to discuss the insurer's contention that the holding of the trial court after the remand, that the initial proof was legally sufficient to support the insured's right to continued payments and waivers, is clearly erroneous. The basis of the insurer's argument is that the proof did not show that the disability was reasonably certain to continue for the remainder of the insured's life and hence was insufficient.
The proof of 1930 consisted of forms furnished by the insurer and executed by the insured and his attending physicians. To the inquiry "State date you expect to resume some business duties," the insured had answered "Have no idea." To a similar question in the medical forms as to when the insured would be "able to resume any business," his two doctors had both answered "Do not know." To the question whether the total disability was only temporary, one doctor had answered "Probably" and the other "Don't know." To the further question "Is it possible that he will be prevented for life from following ANY occupation?" one doctor had answered "Possibly" and the other "Yes." The proof also contained the information that the insured had had a complete heart-block ever since 1917 and that at the time of his disability in 1930 he had developed Adams-Stokes attacks. The insurer in fact had known of the existing heart-block from the time it wrote the policies, because it originally rejected the insured's application for that reason but later agreed to issue the insurance on a higher-premium basis.
It will be noted that the proof did not purport to fix a date beyond which the disability would not extend (if the fixing of such a date could at all have had any significance except as an expression of medical opinion). Nor was there anything else in the proof from which the insurer could then say that the disability would cease at a certain time. And when the insurer accepted and recognized the proof as establishing a covered disability under the policies, it could not nor did it declare that March, 1932, would mark the limit of its liability on the proof submitted. Again, when the insurer cut off benefit-payments and premium-waivers in 1932, it did not do so on the basis that this date was as far as the proof legally could support the disability, but the cut-off was made only because the insured, under the erroneous impression that if he performed any of his former duties his right to disability-benefits ceased, fair-mindedly informed the insurer that he was attempting to carry on part of his previous work and indicated that he assumed that he therefore was not entitled to receive further benefits.
The point that is here important is that the...
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