Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S. v. McKay
Decision Date | 30 August 1988 |
Docket Number | CV-84-1356-FR |
Citation | 760 P.2d 871,306 Or. 493 |
Parties | The EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. Harlan David McKAY, Jr., Dana Williford, and Marjorie N. McKay, as guardian for Sean Michael McKay, Oregon residents, Defendants/Appellees, and Carolyn McKay, a Washington resident, Defendant/Appellant. USDC Civil; 9th Cir. 86-3614; SC S34788. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
James A. Trujillo, Bellevue, Wash., argued the cause on behalf of defendant/appellant Carolyn McKay. With him on the brief was Trujillo & Peick, P.C., Bellevue, Wash.
Daniel E. McCabe, Aloha, filed the brief and argued the cause on behalf of defendants/appellees.
Pursuant to ORS 28.200 to 28.230, this court accepted certification of the following question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: "Under Oregon law, is the Washington Deadman's Statute, Wash.Rev.Code § 5.60.030, substantive or procedural?" With the explanation that follows, we answer that this court would regard the Washington statute as "procedural."
This case originated as an interpleader action in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Equitable Life Assurance Society filed the action to settle conflicting claims to the proceeds of two life insurance policies issued to David McKay, Sr., who died on November 17, 1983. The complaint named as defendants the decedent's widow and his children from a previous marriage. Although the policies themselves named the decedent's children as the sole beneficiaries, the widow claimed that the decedent actually had intended that she be named as the beneficiary. The record suggests that the only evidence to support her claim was her own testimony and that of the insurance agent concerning transactions with the decedent.
The district court granted the children's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Washington's "Deadman's Statute" precluded the widow and the insurance agent from testifying about their transactions with the decedent. 1 The parties had stipulated that Washington's "substantive" law applied to the action. The district court found that the Washington statute in question was "substantive" in nature and, therefore, that it applied to this action.
The widow appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 837 F.2d 904. As noted above, that court requested a determination whether, under Oregon law, the statute in question is considered "substantive" or "procedural." We understand the question to be a shorthand way of asking whether a trial court in this state would apply Oregon law to the issue of a witness' competency to testify to a decedent's transactions or statements, even though Washington law governs other issues in the case. We rephrase the question to make it clear that characterizing a statute as "substantive" or "procedural" merely states a conclusion. There is no litmus test for determining into which category a statute falls. See e.g., Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale LJ 333 (1932). The determination whether another state's laws should be applied in this state's courts requires more than a classification of those laws as "substantive" or "procedural."
The earlier case was McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Or. 422, 280 P. 508, 285 P. 208 (1930), in which this court applied Montana law to a mortgage executed in Montana. This court said concerning the problem we face today:
Id. at 443, 280 P. 508, 285 P. 208.
As already noted, while both of our former cases dealt with matters which the courts in each case regarded as "substantive," both also purported to place questions of evidence--of what was admissible and through whom--in the category of matters governed by the lex fori.
The rule found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) accords with the dicta in the two Oregon cases. Under the Restatement rule, matters concerned primarily with judicial administration are governed by the law of the forum state. Section 122 of the Restatement states:
"A court usually applies its own...
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