Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Stinnett

• Citation: 13 F.2d 820
• Decision Date: 09 June 1926
• Docket Number: No. 4443.,4443.
• Parties: EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF THE UNITED STATES v. STINNETT.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

13 F.2d 820 (1926)

EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF THE UNITED STATES v. STINNETT.

No. 4443.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 9, 1926.

Wm. Marshall Bullitt, of Louisville, Ky. (John E. Tarrant, of Louisville, Ky., on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

E. B. Anderson, of Owensboro, Ky., for defendant in error.

Before DENISON, DONAHUE, and KNAPPEN, Circuit Judges.

DONAHUE, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

It is insisted on the part of the Assurance Society that the court erred in rejecting a certified copy of the death certificate, filed as required by the law of Kentucky, in the bureau of vital statistics of that state. Section 2062a8 of Carroll's Statutes provides that, where death occurs without a physician in attendance, it shall be the duty of the undertaker to notify the registrar of such death, who shall in turn notify the local health officer and refer the case to him for immediate investigation and certification, prior to issuing a burial permit, and that, if the circumstances of the case render it probable that the death was caused by unnatural or unlawful means, the registrar shall then refer the case to the coroner for his investigation and certification. It is further provided that any coroner, whose duty it is to hold an inquest on the body of any deceased person and make the certificate of death required for a burial permit, shall state in his certificate the nature of the disease, or the manner of death, and "if from external causes of violence whether (probably) accidental, suicidal or homicidal and in either case furnish such information as may be required by the state registrar to properly classify the death," and section 2062a21 provides that a certified copy of this record shall be prima facie evidence in all courts and places of the facts therein stated.

It appears from the certified copy of the record offered in evidence that the certificate in reference to essential statistical particulars as to sex, color, age, occupation, birthplace of the deceased, and other facts of like character, is signed "Robert Lory, Registrar." Following this is what purports to be a medical certificate of death, wholly blank, except for the words "the cause of death was as follows, suicide, drowning." This is signed by Emmett Watts, coroner. The court excluded from the jury that portion of the certificate reading as follows: "Suicide," which appears immediately before the word "drowning." Counsel for defendant excepted to this ruling, and further stated that, if he could not read the entire certificate, he would not read any part thereof.

It does not appear that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has construed this statute in reference to the admissibility of such a certificate in an action involving private rights only. That court, however, held in Etna Life Insurance Co. v. Milward, 118 Ky. 716, 82 S. W. 364, 68 L. R. A. 285, 4 Ann. Cas. 1092, that the verdict of a coroner's jury is not admissible on the issue as to cause of death, in an action on an accident insurance policy. It also held, in Andricus v. Pineville Coal Co., 121 Ky. 724, 90 S. W. 233, that a certified copy of the report of the inspectors of mines might be received in evidence as prima facie proof of the condition of the mine when the inspection was made. The decisions of the courts of other states upon this question are in such direct conflict that they are not helpful.

However, the question whether a certified copy of a record of a death certificate made and filed as directed by the statute is admissible in evidence is not presented by the record in this case. Section 2062a8 authorizes the coroner, whose duty it is to hold an inquest on the body, to make the certificate of death required for a burial permit, but there is nothing in this record indicating that the local registrar referred this case to the coroner, or tending to prove that the coroner held an inquest or examined any witnesses to ascertain and determine the cause of death. That, however, may not be important. If the coroner had authority to make this certificate, without holding an inquest to determine the cause of death, this certificate was not made in conformity with the statute, which requires him to state the nature of the disease, or the manner of death, and, if from external causes of violence, "whether (probably) accidental, suicidal or homicidal." The cause of death was drowning. That was a fact to be stated in the certificate, but whether the drowning was occasioned by accident, suicide, or homicide was not a fact to which the coroner was authorized to certify unqualifiedly, but on the contrary, only as to the probability.

This provision of subdivision 8, considered in connection with subdivision 21, carefully distinguishes between "cause of death," which is a fact to be certified without any qualifications whatever, and the physician's or coroner's opinion, surmise, or conjecture as to the probability of whether this cause was occasioned by the intentional act of the deceased or by accident or homicide. The statute provides that a certified copy of the...