Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Cecil Brown

• Citation: 187 U.S. 308,47 L.Ed. 190,23 S.Ct. 123
• Decision Date: 01 December 1902
• Docket Number: No. 320,320
• Parties: EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err. , v. CECIL BROWN, Administrator of the Estate of David B. Smith, Deceased
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

187 U.S. 308

23 S.Ct. 123

47 L.Ed. 190

EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err.,

v CECIL BROWN, Administrator of the Estate of David B. Smith, Deceased.

No. 320.

Submitted October 20, 1902.

Decided December 1, 1902.

Mr. Allan McCulloh for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Cecil Brown for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

The questions for decision arise on a motion to dismiss or affirm this writ of error which is prosecuted to a judgment of the supreme court of the territory of Hawaii. The act of April 30, 1900, providing a government for the territory of Hawaii (31 Stat. at L. 141, chap. 339), enacts (§ 86) that 'the laws of the United States relating to appeals, writs of error, removal of causes, and other matters and proceedings as between the courts of the United States and the courts of the several states, shall govern in such matters and proceedings as between the courts of the United States and the courts of the territory of Hawaii.' It follows that the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the courts of the territory of Hawaii is more restricted than is the jurisdiction to review the judgments of the courts of other organized territories, and is to be measured by the power conferred upon this court to review judgments of state courts. Rev. Stat. 709 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 575]. In Ex parte Wilder's S. S. Co. 183 U. S. 545, 46 L. ed. 321, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225, the distinction made by the law in question between Hawaii and other territories was pointed out.

The case, as stated below, and as substantially admitted by both parties in their printed argument, is as follows:

David B. Smith, died, intestate, on December 24, 1899, in the city of San Francisco. Long prior to and at the time of his death he was domiciled in Honolulu, in the territory of Hawaii. He there applied to the plaintiff in error, a New York corporation, for a policy on his life payable to his estate. The policy was issued, was delivered to Smith in Honolulu, and was found among his effects in Honolulu after his death. At the instance of the daughter of the deceased, who was his legal heir, the defendant in error was appointed administrator of the estate of Smith by a Hawaiian court having jurisdiction to that end, and the administrator took possession of the policy and made the requisite proof of death. After the appointment of the Hawaiian administrator and the making by him of the proof of death, a relative of the deceased made application to a court in the city of New York for letters of administration upon the estate of Smith, which were issued. Prior to any attempted action by the New York administrator to enforce the policy in question, in consequence of the refusal of the insurance company to pay the loss, the Hawaiian administrator brought suit in a court in Hawaii having jurisdiction, to recover the amount of the insurance. Service of process in this action was made on the general agent of the insurance company in Hawaii, which agent, the supreme court of the territory declared in its opinion rendered in this cause, 'we presume, is the person designated for such purpose by the defendant under the statute. Civil Laws, chap. 130, since amended, Laws of 1898, act 45. At any rate, the defendant answered generally, and did not question the validity of the service.' Before the trial of the cause in the courts of Hawaii the administrator appointed in New York instituted an action upon the policy against the insurance company in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. When the suit came to trial in the Hawaiian court, no judgment having been rendered in the suit brought in New York, the defendant corporation, to support its contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, claimed the benefit of the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States, and to sustain this asserted right offered proof of the appointment of the New York administrator and tendered an exemplification of the record of the proceedings had in the action, brought by the New York administrator in the Federal court in that state. The trial court rejected the evidence, and exceptions were duly taken. A verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount sued for. The case having been taken to the supreme court of the territory, the judgment was affirmed, the court expressly deciding that the right asserted under the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States was without merit. From the foregoing it results that a claim under the Constitution and laws of the United States was made and decided in the court below, and if the fact that such a claim was formally made and disposed of below without reference to its substantial foundation determines the question of jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss must be denied. But it is settled that not every mere allegation of a Federal question will suffice to give jurisdiction. 'There must be a real substantive question on which the case may be made to turn,' that is, 'a real, and not a merely formal, Federal question is essential to the jurisdiction of this court.' Stated in another form, the doctrine thus declared is, that although, in considering a motion to dismiss, it be found that a question adequate, abstractly considered, to confer jurisdiction was raised, if it likewise appear that such question is wholly formal, is so absolutely devoid of merit as to be frivolous, or has been so explicitly foreclosed by a decision or decisions of this court as to leave no room for real controversy, the motion to dismiss will prevail. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 345, 46 L. ed. 936, 941, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 691, and authorities there cited. The power, however, to dismiss because of the want of substantiality in the claim upon which the assertion of jurisdiction is predicated, does not apply to cases where the subject-matter of the controversy is per se and inherently Federal. Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487, 493, 46 L. ed. 1005, 1008, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 783. It has also been decided by this court that even where the motion to dismiss is denied, and where such motion should be treated as without color, considering alone the formal making of such question, yet notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 5 of rule 6, the power to consider and sustain a motion to affirm obtains where the assignments of error on the merits are obviously and unquestionably frivolous, or when it is patent that the writ of error has been prosecuted for mere delay, or where it is evident on the face of the record that the question on the merits is not open to possible contention because it has previously been so specifically and adversely ruled on by this court as to sbsolutely foreclose further contention on the subject. Chanute...