Equitable Trust Co. v. State Commission on Human Relations, 53

• Decision Date: 11 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 53,53
• Parties: , 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,735 EQUITABLE TRUST COMPANY et al. v. STATE of Maryland COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 80

287 Md. 80

411 A.2d 86, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,735

EQUITABLE TRUST COMPANY et al. v. STATE of Maryland COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS.

No. 53.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 11, 1980.

[411 A.2d 87]

Stanley Mazaroff, Baltimore (George W. Johnston and C. Thomas Williamson, III, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants

Risselle Rosenthal Fleisher, Gen. Counsel, Baltimore (Louis A. Young, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH, ^* COLE and DAVIDSON, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

We shall here hold that the Commission on Human

Relations failed to comply with a statutory prerequisite for the filing of a complaint on its own motion. Hence, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in Equitable Tr. v. State of Md. Comm'n, 42 Md.App. 53, 399 A.2d 908 (1979). For the guidance of trial courts, we shall also discuss the alleged burdensomeness of the subpoena which the Commission here sought to enforce

The Commission on Human Relations is created and governed by Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol., 1979 Cum.Supp.) Art. 49B. On its own motion it filed a complaint against The Equitable Trust Company (styled as "Equitable Trust Bank" in the complaint). It was served on Equitable on December 18, 1974. The complaint in question was signed by the chairman and three members of the Commission. ¹ In this instance[411 A.2d 88] there appear to have been no individual complaints similar to the Commission complaint filed against Equitable. Thus, this case is readily distinguishable from Banach v. St. Comm'n on Human Rel., 277 Md. 502, 356 A.2d 242 (1976), where we upheld a subpoena issued in connection with a preliminary investigation pursuant to individual complaints.

In October of 1976, reciting the authority of Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol., 1974 Cum.Supp.) Art. 49B, § 14(d)

(now found in the 1979 Repl. Vol. as Art. 49B, § 11(d)), the Commission issued a subpoena to Equitable directing the production of a number of documents "for the period January 1975 through December 1975 unless otherwise specified." ² When the requested items were not produced, the Commission docketed a suit in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City seeking an order directing the production of the documents. That petition [411 A.2d 89] recited, among other things, that Equitable's activities came "within the purview of Section 11C of Article 49B" (now Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol.) Art. 49B, § 8); that pursuant to what was then Art. 49B, § 12(b) (now § 9(b)) "the Commission ha(d) received reliable information that Defendant is engaged in discriminatory practices within the scope of Section 11C of Article 49B, and a duly authorized preliminary investigation was conducted"; that "(p)ursuant to this investigation, a Commission complaint issued and was served on Respondent on December 18, 1974"; that the information sought was "deemed relevant and necessary to complete promptly an investigation of the aforesaid complaint," and that Equitable had "refused to cooperate with the Commission's investigation of the complaint." Equitable responded with a number of defenses. It filed an affidavit of its executive vice-president (described in the Commission's petition as "the officer in charge and believed to be the custodian of the records sought by the Petitioner") in which he recited the vast amount of work and the substantial cost which would be necessary to produce the required information. ³

Ultimately the court passed an order directing Equitable to produce all of the requested items other than those pertaining to mortgage loans. (The reason for this latter exception was that a subpoena was already outstanding and ordered enforced in another proceeding pertaining to those documents.) An appeal followed to the Court of Special Appeals. It affirmed. We granted the writ of certiorari in order that we might address the following issues as framed by Equitable:

1. May the Commission validly issue and compel compliance with a subpoena Duces tecum which seeks documents pertaining to types of financing not regulated by Article 49B . . .?

2. May the Commission validly issue and compel compliance with a subpoena Duces tecum when its complaint was not made under oath as required by section 9 of Article 49B . . . and §§ 14.03.03(D)(1), .09(A)(1) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure?

3. May the Commission validly issue and compel compliance with a subpoena Duces tecum which seeks documents which are so voluminous that they would be unduly burdensome for Equitable to provide?

I

The Commission says that its authority to seek these documents stems from the provisions of Code (1957, 1979

Repl. Vol.) Art. 49B, § 8. ⁴ That section makes it unlawful for one

licensed or regulated by the Department of Licensing and Regulation as set out under Article 41, . . . § 221A(a) [411 A.2d 90] "The Department of Licensing and Regulation," to refuse, withhold from, deny or discriminate against any person in the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, sales or services because of the race, sex, creed, color, national origin, marital status, or physical or mental handicap of any person.

Equitable's argument is that the statute originally enacting this section placed it under the "Public Accommodations" subtitle. Since the activities here do not amount to public accommodations, it says the statute is not applicable.

The standards for construing statutes have been set forth by this Court many times. We have indicated that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent, that in determining that intent the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification, and that a corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. See, e. g., In re James S., --- Md. ---, 410 A.2d 586 (1980), and Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418, 379 A.2d 1007 (1977). There is no ambiguity here; thus there is no reason to look elsewhere for interpretation. Section 8 prohibits, among other things, refusal or withholding of certain advantages from any person. If one denies an individual an automobile loan or a credit card because of his race or sex, as the complaint alleges has been done, then it certainly follows that he has been denied an advantage. It is conceded that Equitable is subject to regulation by the Bank Commissioner, who is assigned by Code (1957, 1978 Repl. Vol.) Art. 41, § 221A(a) to the

Department of Licensing and Regulation. Hence, this argument is without merit

II

The Commission conceded at oral argument that it did not seeks its subpoena here as a part of a preliminary investigation under § 9(b) as was the case in Banach, 277 Md. 502, 356 A.2d 242, but it seeks the subpoena pursuant to its investigation of a complaint filed by the Commission on its own motion. Equitable counters by saying, correctly, that the complaint is not under oath. The Commission contends its complaint is not required to be under oath.

Art. 49B, § 9 states in pertinent part:

(a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged discrimination prohibited by any section of this article may make, sign and file with the Human Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") a complaint in writing under oath. The complaint shall state the name and address of the person, . . . (or) corporation, . . . alleged to have committed the act of discrimination together with the particulars thereof . . . . A complaint must be filed within six months from the date of the occurrence alleged to be a violation of this article. A complaint filed with the federal or with a local human relations commission within six months from the date of occurrence shall be deemed to have complied with the provisions of this section.

(b) Whenever the Commission has received reliable information from any individual . . . that any person has been engaged . . . in any discriminatory practice within the scope of this article, and after a preliminary investigation by the Commission's staff authorized by the chairman . . . it is satisfied that said information warrants the filing of a complaint, the Commission, on its own motion, and by action of not less than three commissioners, may issue a complaint in its name in the same manner as if the complaint had been filed by an individual.

To the principles relative to statutory construction which we set forth in part I of this opinion we add that a court may not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form; the General Assembly is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to [411 A.2d 91] prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the prior law; and, absent a clear indication to the contrary, a statute, if reasonably possible, is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. In re James S. supra, --- Md. at ---, 410 A.2d 586 and Dowling, 281 Md. at 419, 379 A.2d 1007.

The Commission would have us read the words "in the same manner as if the complaint had been filed by an individual" as requiring it to state the name and address of the one "alleged to have committed the act of discrimination together with the particulars thereof" and no more. It says that the oath requirement is in no way applicable. Apparently, the Commission desires to pick and choose which of the requirements in § 9(a) are applicable to its own complaint under § 9(b). If the Commission is correct in its construction of what portion of § 9(a) is applicable to a complaint filed by it on its own motion, then following its argument to its logical conclusion the Commission could file a...