Erdman v. State, 1535
Citation | 75 Md.App. 560,542 A.2d 399 |
Decision Date | 01 September 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 1535,1535 |
Parties | David Allen ERDMAN v. STATE of Maryland. , |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Mark Colvin, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Ann N. Bosse, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Atty. for Baltimore County and Mickey Norman, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore County on the brief, Towson), for appellee.
Argued before WILNER, GARRITY and ROSALYN B. BELL, JJ.
David Allen Erdman was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of robbery with a deadly weapon, breaking and entering, battery, and false imprisonment, for which he received a substantial prison sentence.
Although there was some quibbling over a few of the details, Mr. Erdman essentially conceded that he, in fact, did most of the things that led to the charges against him: that, on November 10, 1985, he accosted Ms. H in front of her apartment, tied her hands, and, brandishing a gun of some sort--whether toy or real was in dispute--stole her purse; that, on November 17, 1985, he broke into the apartment of Ms. C, but, upon discovery by a friend of Ms. C, left without taking anything; and that, on December 1, 1985, he lured Ms. D to a supposed job interview, tried to persuade her to undress for a physical examination, briefly touched her shoulder, pushed her into a chair, and momentarily prevented her from leaving.
While Mr. Erdman pled not guilty to the charges and did dispute some of them, his principal defense was non-responsibility, i.e., because of a mental disorder, he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. See Md.Code Ann.Health-Gen. art., § 12-108(a) (Supp.1987). The State did not really dispute that Erdman had a mental disorder. All of the doctors agreed that he suffered from paraphilia, with fetishistic and/or transvestite features. He liked to dress as a woman and had recurrent urges to place women in bondage or in positions of subjugation. 1 The issue, then, centered on whether, by reason of this disorder, he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
In furtherance of this defense, Erdman (1) asked for an instruction that:
(2) renewed that request following the opening portion of the prosecutor's closing argument, and (3) asked for the opportunity to make the final closing argument on the issue of criminal responsibility.
The court denied all three requests; hence, this appeal.
In the circumstances of this case, the proposed instruction appears to be a correct summary of what would have happened to Erdman if he had been found not criminally responsible. The State makes no contrary contention. The issue, then, is not the correctness of the instruction but its relevance.
With limited exceptions, such as in the meting out of capital punishment, it has not been the function of juries to decide upon or concern themselves with the penalty that may be imposed or actually inflicted upon a defendant following conviction. 2 The jury's traditional role is simply to decide guilt or innocence or, where "insanity" or non-responsibility has been asserted, whether the defendant meets the statutory test for that status. Normally, then, juries are not informed and are not required to be informed as to the possible sentences that may be imposed, much less whether they will be concurrent or consecutive to other sentences to which the defendant may be subject, or what the prospects may be either for suspension of all or part of the sentence in favor of probation or for early release on parole.
In keeping with that principle, courts traditionally have declined to instruct juries on the consequences that would follow from a verdict of "insanity" or non-responsibility. See, for example, State v. Wade, 96 Conn. 238, 113 A. 458, 460 (1921):
See also State v. Daley, 54 Or. 514, 103 P. 502 (1909), and cf. State v. Barnes, 54 Wash. 493, 103 P. 792 (1909).
It does not appear, even in the early days, that this was a rule absolutely forbidding such an instruction but rather one making clear that the instruction was not required. Some courts, under some circumstances, did tell the jury that a finding of insanity would not necessarily result in the defendant's release from restraint, and the giving of such an instruction was not held to be error. The Connecticut Court in Wade, supra, for example, noted the giving of such an instruction where both the guilt and the insanity of the defendant seemed clear and observed, 113 A. at 460:
In 1955, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit began somewhat of a countermarch on this issue. In Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C.Cir.1955), an appellant, whose sole defense was insanity, claimed that the judge improperly told the jury that, if acquitted, he would go free. Although finding no merit to that claim, the Court, without benefit of either precedent or extended reasoning, held, at 404:
(Emphasis added.)
Two years later, in Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C.Cir.1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 961, 78 S.Ct. 997, 2 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1958), the same court, in a 6-3 en banc decision, confirmed the Taylor holding and provided a more detailed basis for it. The trial court in Lyles had given the disputed instruction, telling the jury that, if found insane, the defendant would be committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital where he would remain until cured "and it is deemed safe to release him." Id., 728. As Lyles was, in fact, convicted of the charges against him and made no challenge to the correctness of the instruction, it is not altogether clear why the Court chose to consider the instruction, but it did clearly announce its views on the matter.
The Court began by acknowledging the doctrine "well established and sound, that the jury has no concern with the consequences of a verdict..." but concluded that that doctrine did not apply in the context of an insanity plea:
(Footnote omitted.) Id.
Though eschewing any prescribed form of instruction, the Court discouraged any "recitation of the statutory procedure in great detail" and opted instead for simply explaining that, in the event of a finding of insanity, the defendant would be confined in a hospital until the court was satisfied that he had recovered his sanity and was no longer dangerous, whereupon he would be released, either conditionally or unconditionally. The Court's final conclusion, expressed at 728-29, was:
(...
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...A substantial term of imprisonment was imposed. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments. Erdman v. State, 75 Md.App. 560, 542 A.2d 399 (1988). Erdman questioned two rulings of the trial court relating to the plea of not criminally responsible. The first was the court'......