Eric Greene Also Known As Jarme. Q. Trice v. Palakovich

Decision Date28 May 2010
Docket NumberNo. 07-2163.,07-2163.
Citation606 F.3d 85
PartiesEric GREENE also known as Jarmaine Q. Tricev.John A. PALAKOVICH; The District Attorney of The Philadelphia County; The Attorney General of the State of PennsylvaniaEric Greene, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

606 F.3d 85

Eric GREENE also known as Jarmaine Q. Trice
v.
John A. PALAKOVICH; The District Attorney of The Philadelphia County; The Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania
Eric Greene, Appellant.

No. 07-2163.

United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.

Argued March 8, 2010.
Filed: May 28, 2010.
As Amended July 22, 2010.


606 F.3d 86

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

606 F.3d 87
Isabel K. McGinty (Argued), Highstown, NJ, Counsel for Appellant.

Susan E. Affronti (Argued), Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellees.

Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and MICHEL,* Circuit Judges.
OPINION
SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Eric Greene petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his state court convictions for second degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. This appeal requires us to resolve the thorny question of what the temporal cutoff is for determining “clearly established Federal law” for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) standard of review, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Based on the statute's text and Supreme Court precedent, we now hold that “clearly established Federal law” should be determined as of the date of the relevant state-court decision. Because the Supreme Court decision that Greene wishes to rely upon in his habeas petition, Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), had not yet been decided at the time of the relevant state-court decision, he cannot show that his state court proceedings resulted in an unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court denying Greene's habeas petition.

I.
The Crime

In early December of 1993, three or four men robbed a small family owned grocery store in North Philadelphia, and its owner,

606 F.3d 88
Francisco Azcona, died after being shot at point-blank range. When the robbers were unable to open the cash register, they picked it up and carried it out of the store, escaping in a station wagon parked nearby. A week after Mr. Azcona's murder, Greene, Julius Jenkins, Atil Finney, and Gregory Womack robbed a check cashing facility. They were apprehended shortly thereafter and the police seized a firearm. Through ballistics testing, the police determined that the seized firearm was used in Mr. Azcona's murder. With this evidence, the police were able to make progress in the murder investigation.
The Investigation

In late February of 1995, Detective Robert Snell of the Philadelphia Police Department questioned Demond Jackson about his involvement in Mr. Azcona's murder. Jackson admitted that he was in the station wagon parked outside of the grocery store the night of the murder, but he claimed that he was simply getting a ride to West Philadelphia when the others stopped at the store. He described how several of them went inside and committed the murder. He also identified Jenkins as the shooter, and indicated that Naree Abdullah carried the cash register out of the store. According to Jackson, Finney entered the store with Jenkins and Abdullah, while Greene remained with the driver and Jackson in the automobile. Jackson added that the proceeds of the robbery were split among only five of the men, and that he did not take a share of the proceeds.

Armed with the information from Jackson, Detective Michael Gross of the Philadelphia Police Department questioned Finney in early March of 1995. Finney gave a statement to the police in which he admitted that he was one of the participants in the grocery store robbery and that he was inside the store at the time of the robbery. He identified Jenkins as the shooter, implicated Greene as the robber who carried the cash register out of the store, indicated that Womack had driven the station wagon, and stated that another individual was involved in the robbery. Although Finney initially stated that five people were involved in the robbery, he later noted that there were six people in the car. A few days later, Detective Joseph Walsh of the Philadelphia Police Department questioned Womack. Womack gave a statement to the police in which he admitted he was the driver of the station wagon the night that Jenkins killed Mr. Azcona. In addition, he implicated Finney, Abdullah, and Greene in the robbery.

Shortly after these statements were obtained, first degree murder charges were filed against Jenkins. Greene, Finney, Womack, and Abdullah were charged with, inter alia, second degree murder, three counts of robbery, and conspiracy.

The Trial

Greene filed a pretrial motion seeking severance on several grounds. In that motion, he argued, inter alia, that a joint trial with his codefendants would be prejudicial because of the incriminating statements they had made to authorities. As support for his motion, Greene cited Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). During a pretrial hearing, Greene urged the trial court, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, to sever the trials because the statements of some of his non-testifying codefendants implicated him and identified him as the person who carried the cash register out of the grocery store. The trial court, recognizing that the statements might be inadmissible at a joint trial, but also noting that redaction might resolve any problem

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of prejudice, posed a hypothetical to the parties:
Judge: It's unusual to do this, but suppose the statement is redacted to say, “I didn't take the cash register.” In other words, each defendant's statement would state-
[Greene's Counsel]: I didn't take it.
Judge: I didn't. Someone else took the cash register.
[Greene's Counsel]: There's another nuance that I want Your Honor to know because your suggestion is brilliant. I just want to factor in one more thing. Of the three co-defendants who gave statements, indeed, Atil Finney says that my client took the cash register and Mr. Gregory Womack made the statement that my client was involved in that, but believe it or not, Julius Jenkins says that someone entirely different-he says that either Naree or another person ... took the cash register, either Womack or Naree, so you have Mr. Jenkins saying specifically that one of two other people took it-people involved, I might add, but not [Greene].

In response, the Court declared that the statements were not interlocking and inquired how the conflicting statements “pin point[ed]” Greene since the jury would have “information that three different people have been named as having taken the cash register.” Greene's counsel replied that the Court's analysis was “excellent,” but wondered how the Commonwealth would redact the statements. The Court replied that “it seems to me that the fair way to redact these [statements] is to refer to three different people.” Greene's counsel responded: “As long as I would be allowed to argue in my closing speech that you heard what you heard and you heard that there were different people, then I would have no problem with [it].” The prosecutor offered to redact the statements so that “not one specific person carries out the cash register.” Greene's counsel agreed that, under Bruton, such a redaction would remove any prejudice from the statements. Greene's counsel also pressed, without success, an additional basis for severance: that Jenkins, who would be tried alongside Greene, was facing a capital murder charge.

Greene's trial was held in February of 1996. At trial, Mr. Azcona's wife and sister-in-law identified Jenkins as the shooter, but they were unable to identify any of the other robbers in the store or to state with certainty whether there were three or four men involved in the robbery.

Jackson, who had not been charged with any crimes associated with the robbery, was the prosecution's star witness. His testimony differed significantly from his statement to Detective Snell. Jackson testified that all of the occupants of the station wagon went into the store except for him and Womack. Contrary to his earlier statement that Abdullah picked up the cash register, Jackson testified that Greene took the cash register from the store. Jackson was cross-examined extensively on the differences between his earlier statement and his trial testimony. In addition, Greene attacked Jackson's credibility by highlighting that Jackson was present in Womack's station wagon but had not been charged with any crimes related to the robbery and that Jackson had outstanding drug charges.

The Commonwealth also called Detectives Gross and Walsh to testify about the statements they obtained from Finney and Womack. Neither Greene nor his codefendants objected to the reading of those statements in redacted form. Detective Gross read Finney's redacted statement, which substituted the nicknames or proper names of Finney's codefendants with the

606 F.3d 90
phrases “this guy,” “other guys,” and “two guys.” The redacted statement also used the neutral pronouns “we” or “someone” in certain instances. For example, Finney's initial description of the robbery in its redacted form read:
We were riding around in this, this guy's car, me and three other guys were in the North Philadelphia. We-when one said let's get paid. Everyone said okay and we saw this store. So me and two guys went in the store. When we got inside two guys stayed up front and I stayed to the back. One guy had his gun on the guy and was at the cash register getting the money, but it wouldn't open. I heard a shot and looked over. Blood was coming out of the guy's mouth. After that someone grabbed the register and we all ran out.

In at least one instance, when Detective Gross reached a portion of the statement where Finney was asked to identify “these guys” by their full names, the redaction simply deleted the names. The redacted answer stated: “One is and the other is.”...

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