Eric J., In re
Decision Date | 22 October 1979 |
Citation | 25 Cal.3d 522,159 Cal.Rptr. 317,601 P.2d 549 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 601 P.2d 549 In re ERIC J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC J., Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 31076. |
Appellate Defenders, Inc., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Handy Horiye, San Diego, for defendant and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger and George Deukmejian, Attys. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jay M. Bloom and Lillian Lim Quon, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Eric J., a minor, appeals from an order continuing his juvenile court wardship and committing him to the Youth Authority (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 602, 731) after findings he committed burglary (Pen.Code, § 459) and was in contempt of court for violating conditions of an earlier order granting probation (Pen.Code, § 166, subd. 4). The maximum term for which he might be confined was determined to be three and one-half years three years for the burglary and six months for the misdemeanor contempt. The commitment order must be modified to recite that appellant's maximum term is three years, two months, and that he is to receive forty-six days credit for time in custody prior to commitment. As modified, the judgment will be affirmed.
A month after 10 pairs of roller skates were taken in a burglary of the Sweetwater Roller Rink, Midge Rhoda, a professional skating instructor, informed the owner that appellant was at the Palisades Gardens Skating Rink attempting to sell roller skates which might be the ones stolen. In response to a call from the owner, Officer Merrell Davis went to the Sweetwater rink and was advised by the manager, Buddy Morris, of appellant's identity and his employment at the rink. Officer Davis had a copy of the burglary report.
The uniformed officer drove Morris to the Palisades Gardens where they met Rhoda. She suggested they talk to appellant in her office and summoned him. During questioning by Morris for 45 minutes to an hour, appellant confessed to the burglary, implicated his brother as his accomplice, and stated that he had sold some of the skates to individuals still at the Palisades Gardens, and that the remaining skates were at his house. On two occasions during the conversation appellant left the office and returned with individuals to whom he had sold skates. Officer Davis then drove Morris and appellant to the latter's house where he remained outside while Morris and appellant went in and retrieved the other skates.
Both Morris and Officer Davis testified that Morris questioned appellant on his own initiative, that the officer did not suggest or arrange he do so, and that the officer, while present during the conversation between Morris and appellant, did not participate in it. Appellant testified to the contrary, claiming that Officer Davis joined Morris in questioning him.
Appellant contends his confession and resulting evidence should have been suppressed because he was not advised prior to being questioned of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
The procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda "come into play only where 'custodial interrogation' is involved, and by 'custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' " (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 718, 68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 819, 441 P.2d 625, 627.) (People v. Mangiefico (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1049, 102 Cal.Rptr. 449, 454, citations omitted; see People v. Price (1965) 63 Cal.2d 370, 379, 46 Cal.Rptr. 775, 406 P.2d 55.) The question thus presented is whether Officer Davis participated in the questioning of appellant either directly or through the agency of Mr. Morris.
(People v. Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 665, 670, 145 Cal.Rptr. 795, 797-798.)
The trial court expressly found Officer Davis did not directly participate in questioning appellant, and, in ruling a Miranda warning was unnecessary, impliedly found lack of complicity between Davis and Morris. As the findings were supported by substantial evidence, we must uphold them.
Appellant's reliance on Stapleton v. Superior Court (1968) 70 Cal.2d 97, 73 Cal.Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967 is misplaced. There we held that in appropriate circumstances a private citizen may be deemed to act as an agent of the police when the latter merely "stand idly by," i. e., when they knowingly permit the citizen to conduct an illegal search for their benefit and make no effort to protect the rights of the person being searched. (Id. at pp. 102-103, 73 Cal.Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967.) However, a "prerequisite to invoking the Stapleton-Moody (Moody v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 163 A.2d 337) rule is, manifestly, that the search permitted by the police be illegal." (People v. McKinnon (1972) 7 Cal.3d 899, 913, 103 Cal.Rptr. 897, 906, 500 P.2d 1097, 1106.) In Stapleton, the private citizen searched the locked trunk of the defendant's car, committing both a misdemeanor and a civil trespass. (70 Cal.2d at p. 103, 73 Cal.Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967.) Stapleton was held inapposite in McKinnon where the private party, a common carrier, had legitimate grounds for carrying out the challenged search. (7 Cal.3d at p. 913, 103 Cal.Rptr. 897, 500 P.2d 1097.) For the same reason it is inapposite here. It was perfectly appropriate of Mr. Morris to question appellant in order to secure the return of the stolen skates.
Relying on People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375, appellant contends Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 denies him equal protection of the laws by providing that the maximum term of confinement for a juvenile is the longest term imposable upon an adult for the same offense, without the necessity of finding circumstances in aggravation of the crime justifying imposition of the upper term as is required in adult criminal procedure by Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b).
Section 726, subdivision (c), of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides in relevant part:
Section 1170, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code provides:
Appellant was found to have committed burglary. (Pen.Code, § 459.) Because the court failed to find the degree of the offense, it is deemed to be of the second degree. (Pen.Code, § 1157.) Second degree burglary is punishable "by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison." (Pen.Code, § 461, subd. 2.) Where it is not otherwise specified, the term for an offense punishable by imprisonment in a state prison is "16 months, or two or three years." (Pen.Code, § 18.) Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c), the maximum term for which appellant might be confined for the burglary was determined to be three years. He contends that, in the absence of any finding of aggravation, it is a...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. I.F. (In re I.F.)
... ... In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 ( Eric J. ), on 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 495 which the People rely, illustrates the distinction. In Eric J. , the minor was suspected of stealing roller skates from one roller skating rink, where he was employed, and selling them to another. ( ... ...
-
People v. Almodovar
... ... (In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 919-920, 112 Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073.) Lynch and some of its early progeny involved the indeterminate ... Page 621 ... sentencing law, which had as one of its main purposes rehabilitation of the offender. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 531, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549; Way v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 165, 169, 141 Cal.Rptr. 383.) Thus, the court looked long and hard at the nature of the offender and whether the prescribed penalty would aid or hinder his or her rehabilitation; a ... ...
-
People v. Alejandro R. (In re Alejandro R.)
... ... 210, 940 P.2d 797.) When a child is declared a ward, these rights are permissibly limited even further because the child has engaged in criminal behavior, and the juvenile court acts in parens patriae, thus "assum[ing] the parents' authority to limit the minor's freedom of action." ( In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 ; see Leroy T. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 434, 439, 115 Cal.Rptr. 761, 525 P.2d 665 [juvenile system is "fundamentally different from the adult penal system" because it is "designed to place the state in the ... ...
-
Duffy v. State Personnel Bd.
... ... Law (9th ed. 1988) Const. Law, §§ 599, 603, pp. 51, 57.) Pre-requisite to a meritorious claim under an equal protection analysis is a showing that the state has imposed a classification which affects two or more similarly situated groups. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 [holding that adults convicted in the criminal courts and sentenced to prison and youths adjudged wards of the juvenile courts and committed to the Youth Authority are not similarly situated]; Respers v. University of Cal. Retirement ... ...
-
Chapter 5 - §2. Elements for exclusion
...officers did not ask or order friend to act on their behalf and did not tell her how to proceed when talking to D); In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 527-28 (shop owner was not acting as agent when questioning D in presence of officer; officer did not suggest or arrange for questioning, d......
-
Table of Cases null
...Ch. 5-C, §2.1.2(1)(a) E.P., In re, 35 Cal. App. 5th 792, 247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587 (4th Dist. 2019)—Ch. 8, §1.1.1(1)(a) Eric J., In re, 25 Cal. 3d 522, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549 (1979)—Ch. 5-C, §2.1.3(2)(g) Espinoza v. Shiomoto, 10 Cal. App. 5th 85, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807 (4th Dist. 2017)......