Ericksen v. School Dist. No. 2 of Natrona County

Citation67 Wyo. 216,217 P.2d 887
Decision Date02 May 1950
Docket NumberNo. 2472,2472
PartiesERICKSEN et al. v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 OF NATRONA COUNTY et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Edward E. Murane, Casper, for appellants.

E. L. McCrary, Casper, Myles P. Tallmadge, Denver, Colorado, for respondents.

BLUME, Justice.

The facts in this case and the constitutional and statutory provisions applicable have been stated by the Chief Justice, and it is not necessary to do so again except insofar as deemed necessary for a fair understanding of this opinion. Natrona County High School District embraces School District No. 2 of said county and some territory in addition thereto, the addition having about 11 per cent of the assessed valuation of the high school district, the remainder--the territory of School District No. 2--having about 89 per cent of the assessed valuation of the whole high school district. Section 5, Article 16 of our Constitution limits the debt of school districts to 2 per cent, with an additional 4 per cent for buildings, a total of 6 per cent. The question to be resolved herein is, as stated by the Chief Justice, whether District No. 2 in the County of Natrona and the Natrona County High School District each have their own separate 6 per cent limitation of bonded indebtedness, or whether the maximum of 6 per cent as a debt limit applies to both of them so that the debts of both districts when entered together may not exceed that figure. The contention of respondents, upheld by the trial court, is for the correctness of the first of these positions, that of the appellant is to the contrary.

For the purposes of this case we may at times for convenience refer to School District No. 2 of Natrona County and like districts as the ordinary school district in contra-distinction to a high school district. It is at least a doubtful question whether Section 5, Article 16 of our Constitution relating to the limitation of indebtedness in school districts permits each of the districts mentioned to have their own 6 per cent limitation, an affirmative answer apparently involving, as pointed out by counsel for appellant, the logical conclusion that if a high school district may be superimposed in whole or in part upon an ordinary school district with an independent debt limit of 6 per cent, so may a junior high school district, a kindergarten district, and in fact a district for every grade of school. See State ex rel. Zylstra v. Clausen, 66 Wash. 324, 119 P. 797, Ikard v. Union Graded School Dist. No. 64 of Caddo Co. et al., 101 Okl. 80, 223 P. 141, Mistler v. Eye, 107 Okl. 289, 231 P. 1045, 2 dissenting opinions in House v. School District No. 4 of Park County, 120 Mont. 319, 184 P.2d 285. But it is not necessary to decide that point at the present time, since this case may be disposed of by considering our statutory provisions, and when that can be done, courts will not decide constitutional questions. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 94, page 207, etc. What we have said on the latter subject has been said solely for the purpose of aiding us in determining the probable meaning of the statutes hereafter considered. There must be statutory authority for the right of each of the districts to have a separate 6 per cent limitation hereinabove mentioned. Not only do we find no such statutory authority, but on the contrary it is, we think, specifically forbidden under our statutes, as will presently be shown. In order that the statutory provisions applicable may be more clearly understood, we must bear in mind that a school district as ordinarily understood includes a high school. It is said in 56 C.J. 168: 'Properly speaking, the term 'public' or 'common' as applied to a school has no reference to the grade of the school or to what may or may not be taught therein, and includes graded and ungraded schools, elementary schools, grammar schools, and high schools. * * * The phrase 'common school education' has been said to be not easily defined nor to have any accepted definite meaning; but it has been held that education in subjects commonly taught in high schools is within the term as used in a constitutional provision for schools providing a common school education.' In Annotation 113 A.L.R. 702 it is stated: 'It is generally held, or conceded, that high schools are common or public schools within constitutional and statutory provisions.' Cases are cited from 16 different jurisdictions. We think that various sections of our Constitution, for example Sections 1, 6, and 9 of Article 7, support the general rule. In other words a high school is a component part of a school district.

The cases cited by the Chief Justice which deal with constitutional questions are not in point herein for the reason that the statutes applicable in those cases do not deal with the limitation of indebtedness contained in our own statutes. Thus in Montana, for instance, the statute provided that the high school districts could issue bonds 'irrespective of the debt of the common school districts.' Laws Mont. 1947, c. 275, § 3. Nor do we think that the cases are in point herein which hold that a municipality and a school district are separate entities enabling each to have indebtedness up to the limitation provided by the Constitution. There is no doubt on that point. The question here is whether the legislature intended that a school district can, for the purpose of creation of debt, be considered, practically speaking, as consisting of component parts, so as to give the school district and each part thereof authority to have indebtedness up to the constitutional limitation, namely, up to 6 per cent of the assessed valuation. Stated otherwise the question is whether a school district has more than one debt capability, which is similar to the question as to whether or not a municipality has more than one debt capability. In the latter case the question would be readily answered in the negative. We might incidentally mention the fact that only a 'school' district, not a 'high school' district is as such, permitted under Section 5, Article 16 of the Constitution to incur a debt of 4 per cent of the assessed valuation for the purposes of construction of buildings (authorized by a constitutional amendment in 1920), and if a high school district does not come within the orbit of indebtedness of the constitutional 'school district' but were considered an independent subdivision of the state for that purpose, it would, it seems, at most be enabled to incur an indebtedness not exceeding 2 per cent of its assessed valuation. However, as already stated, a school district as ordinarily understood includes a high school.

Section 67-916, Wyo.Comp.St. 1945, both as it originally stood and as it was amended by Chapter 90, Session Laws 1947, which relates to a high school district provides as follows: 'and provided further, that no bonds shall be issued by such district beyond the united bonding capability of the territory embraced within such district, taking into consideration existing obligations thereof at the time of the creation of such high school district.' What does bonding capability of the territory mean? There is no definition of that term in the statute and there can scarcely be any doubt that it refers to the 6 per cent limitation of indebtedness mentioned in Section 5, Article 16 of our Constitution. That constitutional provision insofar as pertinent here refers to school districts, not to any subdivision or component part thereof or adjunct thereto. And in the absence of a contrary showing--and there is none--it must be understood as heretofore shown, as including high schools. Hence, the legislature must be presumed to have had in mind, we think, that none of the territory embraced in a high school district could be bonded for more than a total of 6 per cent of the assessed valuation. That conclusion is strengthened by the provision that obligations should be considered which existed at the time of the creation of the high school district. That existing obligation could refer only to the obligation existing in what we have heretofore denominated as the ordinary school district, and the indebtedness of that district and the indebtedness of the high school district are here linked together. If the high school district had an independent bonding capability of 6 per cent as contended by respondents herein, it is rather strange and was wholly futile and meaningless for the statute to refer to, and link the indebtedness of the high school district to an indebtedness of, any other district. It is true as pointed out by the Chief Justice that Section 67-916, supra, is no longer a part of the statutes of this state, in view of the fact that the amendment of 1947 provided that it should cease to be in force after June 1, 1949. Nevertheless, we think it clear that the statutory provision here discussed may still be taken into consideration in determining the meaning of the following section of the statute which we shall proceed to consider. 50 Am.Jur. 'Statutes', Sec. 353.

Section 67-917, Wyo.Comp.St. 1945, is the main section which provides for issuing bonds of a high school district, after having been authorized by a vote of the people. That section contains this provision: 'and provided, any such issue of bonds shall not increase the school indebtedness of the territory of said district beyond the maximum limit fixed by the State Constitution.' That provision seems plain enough, but we may possibly make it still plainer. School indebtedness means nothing more than an indebtedness for schools. The maximum constitutional limitation as contained in Section 5, Article 16 of our Constitution is 6 per cent of the assessed valuation of the property in the district. Substituting these terms we have the statute reading substantially as follows: 'Provided any such issue of bonds shall not increase the indebtedness for schools in the territory of said district beyond 6 per...

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5 cases
  • Marathon Oil Co. v. Welch
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1963
    ...for a high school district to be superimposed over an ordinary school district. This was recognized in Ericksen v. School Dist. No. 2 of Natrona County, 67 Wyo. 216, 217 P.2d 887, 891. The court in that case said the governing authorities of the high school district and the governing author......
  • Forest Oil Corp. v. Davis, 3146
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • August 12, 1963
    ...this title, includes not only school districts as ordinarily understood but also high school districts. Ericksen v. School Dist. No. 2 of Natrona County, 67 Wyo. 216, 217 P.2d 887, 890. Therefore, since the purpose and effect of the 1961 amendment was to extend the power of district boundar......
  • Elementary School Dists. 2, 3, and 10, of Campbell County v. District Boundary Bd. of Campbell County
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • May 9, 1969
    ...districts' was not defined, but it was ordinarily understood to mean that a high school was included, Ericksen v. School Dist. No. 2 of Natrona County, 67 Wyo. 216, 217 P.2d 887, 889, and it also applied to school districts with fewer than grades 1 through 12. Chicago, B & Q. R. Co. v. Byro......
  • Appeal of Sanders
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • February 17, 1958
    ...funds distributed by the state to the various school districts. Counsel for appellees also cites us to Ericksen v. School District No. 2 of Natrona County, 67 Wyo. 216, 217 P.2d 887. That case refers to the limitation of bonded indebtedness of a high school district and has no bearing in th......
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