Erickson v. Director, North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 930116
Decision Date | 26 October 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 930116,930116 |
Citation | 507 N.W.2d 537 |
Parties | Dwight Eugene ERICKSON, Petitioner and Appellee, v. DIRECTOR, NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent and Appellant. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Jean R. Mullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atty. General's Office, Bismarck, for respondent and appellant.
Thomas M. Tuntland, Mandan, for petitioner and appellee.
We are asked to decide, for purposes of driving under the influence and actual physical control cases, if the State Toxicologist must certify the blood testing equipment in his laboratory is "in good working order." We conclude such specific certification is not required to establish foundation for admission of blood test results.
The Director of the Department of Transportation suspended Dwight Erickson's driving privileges for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The district court reversed holding the Director's decision was based on improperly introduced evidence. The district court found a lack of proper foundation because the State Toxicologist did not certify his gas chromatograph, used to test Erickson's blood, was "in good working order."
The Director appeals. We reverse.
Erickson was arrested for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 1 At the time of Erickson's arrest, the arresting officer directed a sample of his blood be drawn, and sent to the State Toxicologist for testing. Erickson was given a temporary operator's permit, which notified him that the Department of Transportation intended to revoke his driving privileges. Erickson submitted a timely request for an administrative hearing to challenge the revocation.
At the hearing, the administrative hearing officer offered various exhibits for the record. Erickson objected to the introduction of Exhibit 7, a listing of the approved chemical testing devices compiled by the State Toxicologist. Exhibit 7 was offered as foundation evidence to prove the accuracy of the gas chromatograph used to measure Erickson's blood-alcohol content. Erickson argued Exhibit 7 should be disallowed because it did not show the date and the results of the last inspection of the gas chromatograph, and it did not state the gas chromatograph was ever inspected and found to be in good working order.
The relevant portion of Exhibit 7 states:
The hearing officer admitted the exhibit into evidence, noting Erickson's objection for the record. Erickson offered no evidence or testimony regarding the reliability or accuracy of the gas chromatograph. The hearing officer found there were articulable grounds to stop Erickson and to believe he had violated N.D.C.C. Sec. 39-08-01. The hearing officer found Erickson's blood test had been fairly administered and Erickson had a blood-alcohol content of over .10 percent. The hearing officer suspended Erickson's driving privileges for 364 days.
Erickson appealed to the district court, claiming Exhibit 7 lacked probative value because it did not show the date or the results of the last inspection of the gas chromatograph. The district court agreed with Erickson, and in a memorandum opinion held:
An appeal from an administrative hearing officer's decision involving a license suspension under N.D.C.C. Sec. 39-20-04.1 is governed by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32. Hammeren v. North Dakota State Highway Com'r, 315 N.W.2d 679, 683 (N.D.1982). This Court examines the record of the administrative agency rather than the findings of the district court. Holler v. Dept. of Transp. Director, 470 N.W.2d 616, 617 (N.D.1991). Since this appeal involves the interpretation of a statute, a legal question, this Court will affirm the agency's order unless it finds the agency's order is not in accordance with the law. See N.D.C.C. Secs. 28-32-21 and 28-32-19.
This case is governed by our decisions in State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854 (N.D.1976), and State v. VandeHoven, 388 N.W.2d 857 (N.D.1986). In Erickson, we explained that the "fairly administered" foundation requirements of State v. Salhus, 220 N.W.2d 852, 857 (N.D.1974), apply only to laypersons operating alcohol detection devices, and not to "experts." Erickson at 865. Our Erickson decision was based on N.D.C.C. Sec. 31-11-03(15), which gives the official acts of the State Toxicologist a disputable presumption of regularity, until contradicted by other evidence. Erickson at 865.
In VandeHoven, we held the inspection and certification requirements of N.D.C.C. Sec. 39-20-07(6) apply to "field inspectors of breath -testing equipment and its operation, not to expert, laboratory blood testing." VandeHoven at 859 (emphasis in original). In this case, the district court erred by excluding Exhibit 7 based on Salhus and the certification requirements of Sec. 39-20-07(6).
The proper requirements for admission of Exhibit 7 are found in N.D.C.C. Sec. 39-20-07(5) 2 which provides:
Erickson does not challenge the procedure used to obtain his blood sample, the method used to test his blood sample, or the qualifications of the person who performed the analysis on his blood sample. He provides no evidence to overcome the "disputable presumption of regularity." Erickson only challenges the gas chromatograph used to analyze his blood. Section 39-20-07(5) requires devices used to analyze blood be approved by the State Toxicologist. This requirement has been met. Exhibit 7 certifies that "the gas chromatographs located in the State Toxicology Laboratory are approved by the State Toxicologist as devices to conduct blood alcohol analysis." Although the State Toxicologist is not required to certify, under Sec. 39-20-07(5), that the gas chromatographs used in his office are "in good working order," confusion could be avoided if the State Toxicologist included such language in his certification.
In his appeal to the district court, Erickson also argued the Director lacked jurisdiction to revoke his license because there was no evidence that the analytical report from the office of the State Toxicologist was forwarded to the Director of Transportation within five days. The district court did not reach this issue. We may review issues involving subject matter jurisdiction on our own initiative. See Larson v. Dunn, 474 N.W.2d 34, 39 (N.D.1991). We hold that N.D.C.C. Sec. 39-20-03.1(3) does not require the analytical report be forwarded within five days.
At the time of Erickson's arrest, Sec. 39-20-03.1(3) (Supp.1991) provided:
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