Erickson v. Kongsli, 31844

• Decision Date: 21 February 1952
• Docket Number: No. 31844,31844
• Citation: 240 P.2d 1209,40 Wn.2d 79
• Parties: ERICKSON et ux. v. KONGSLI et ux.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 79

40 Wn.2d 79

240 P.2d 1209

ERICKSON et ux. v.KONGSLI et ux.

No. 31844.

Supreme Court of Washington, en Banc.

Feb. 21, 1952.

Paul Clair Edmondson, Yakima, for appellants.

Olson & Palmer and John Wm. McArdle, all of Yakima, for respondents.

DONWORTH, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment for defendants in an action for damages occasioned by defendants' automobile striking a building owned by plaintiffs.

The action was tried to the court sitting without a jury.At the close of all the evidence presented by both partiesthe court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action.

Appellants' only assignment of error is that the trial court erred in dismissing the action and entering judgment for respondents.No error is assigned upon any of the trial court's findings of fact.Therefore, we are bound to accept them as the facts of the case.State v. Moore, 34 Wash.2d 351, 208 P.2d 1207;La Lone v. Smith, Wash., 234 P.2d 893.Thus the only question presented by this appeal is whether the findings of fact support the judgment.

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: Appellants are the owners of the Cabana Lodge, a hotel facility, which abuts on highway 97 just north of the city of Yakima.On or about November 20, 1949, respondentWilliam Kongsli was driving in a northerly direction on highway 97.He desired to make a left turn off the highway into the entrance of Cabana Lodge and signalled for a left turn.He observed an automobile proceeding in a southerly direction on highway 97 but, thinking he had time to turn safely in front of it, proceeded across the highway.The two automobiles collided and following the impact the automobile driven by respondent struck one of the Cabana Lodge buildings.

Appellants assert that, in making the left turn in front of an on-coming car, respondent failed to yield the right of way as required by statute, Rem.Rev.Stat. Vol. 7A, § 6360-75, and particularly subdivisions 84 and 89 thereof, and that this was negligence per se.This argument overlooks the rule that violation of a statute is not negligence per se except as to persons within the class intended to be protected by the statute.Stoddard v. Smathers, 120 Wash. 53, 206 P. 933;Barnett v. Bull, 141 Wash. 139, 250 P. 955;Restatement, Torts, 752, § 286;Prosser on Torts (Hornbook Series) 265, § 39.

In 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice 215, § 2721, the rule is stated as follows: 'Generally speaking, the harm for which an action under a statute is brought must be of a kind which the statute was intended to prevent, and a person injured, to recover, must be within the class which it was intended to protect.Under this principle, a person asserting a cause of action or defense, because of the violation of a traffic regulation concerning the movements of vehicles on a highway, cannot invoke the rule that such violation is negligence per se, unless he is one of the class for whose benefit the regulation was made.'

The rules of the road relative to right of way are patently designed only for the protection of users of the roadway and a violation of them as to persons within that class may be negligence per se.Appellants, as owners of a building on land abutting the highway, are not within that class.Therefore, as to them, respond...