Ericson v. Conagra Foods, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-07065 |
| Parties | Pochanart ERICSON, Plaintiff, v. CONAGRA FOODS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Frank Cesarone, Pro Hac Vice, Frank Vincent Cesarone, Meyers & Flowers, LLC, St. Charles, IL, J. Craig Smith, Pro Hac Vice, Koskoff Koskoff & Bieder, Bridgeport, CT, Peter J. Flowers, Meyers & Flowers, LLC, Chicago, IL, Elizabeth N. Mulvey, Crowe & Mulvey, LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Brian P. Voke, Campbell, Campbell, Edwards & Conroy, PC, Boston, MA, Emily Ambrose, Pro Hac Vice, Blackwell Burke P.A., Minneapolis, MN, Amie Marie Bauer, Daniel L. Stanner, Tabet DiVito & Rothstein, Chicago, IL, for Defendants Conagra Brands Inc., Conagra Foods Inc.
Rachel S. Nevarez, Pro Hac Vice, Richard J. Leamy, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Richard John Leamy, Jr., Lindsay C. Omolecki, Wiedner & Mcauliffe, Ltd., Chicago, IL, L. Jeffrey Meehan, Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, P.C., Springfield, MA, for Defendant Full-Fill Industries, LLC.
Franklin U. Valderrama, United States District Judge Plaintiff Pochanart Ericson (Plaintiff) asserts claims of negligence, breach of warranty, and unfair and deceptive practices against Defendants Conagra Foods, Inc., Conagra Brands, Inc. (together, Conagra), and Full-Fill Industries, LLC (Full-Fill) (collectively, Defendants), stemming from the severe burns and injuries she sustained while using Conagra's Chef's Quality Cooking Spray (the Cooking Spray). R. 1, Compl.1 Defendants, the manufacturers and distributors of the Cooking Spray, have moved to dismiss all 12 counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing first that Plaintiff's claims are all barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and alternatively that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim with respect to all but Counts II and VIII (the breach of warranty claims predicated on manufacturing defect). R. 44, Mot. Dismiss Memo. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. The Court grants Defendants’ motion as to Counts IV–VI and X–XII ( the negligence claims on a statute of limitations defense, the non-specific defect claims on failure to state a claim, and the Massachusetts General Law (MGL) claims on failure to state a claim). The Court denies Defendants’ motion as to the remaining claims, namely Counts I–III and VII–IX.
At some point before June 3, 2017, Plaintiff, a resident of Weymouth, Massachusetts and food truck employee, purchased a can of the Cooking Spray. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 3, 23.2 Conagra designed, filled, tested, labeled, marketed, promoted, supplied, distributed, and sold the Cooking Spray to retailers nationwide, and Full-Fill manufactured the vented DOT-2Q cans that Conagra uses for the Cooking Spray containers. Id. ¶¶ 13, 16, 26. The Cooking Spray is used in commercial as well as consumer kitchens and outdoor grilling environments. Id. ¶ 18.
On or about June 3, 2017, Plaintiff was working in a food truck operating in Worcester, Massachusetts. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23. Suddenly, and without warning, a canister of the Cooking Spray began spraying its flammable contents through the u-shaped vents at the bottom of the can, causing a "flash fire, flames and/or explosion." Id. The explosion and flames caused Plaintiff to suffer and sustain injuries of a permanent nature, including but not limited to, burns, scarring, and disfigurement, in addition to pain and anguish. Id. ¶¶ 22, 37. Plaintiff alleges that the Cooking Spray was stored and used in a reasonably foreseeable manner at the time of and prior to the incident. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff also alleges that the Cooking Spray was some distance away from any heat source in the food truck and kept at a regular temperature at the time of the incident. Id. ¶¶ 20, 74.
Following these events, on May 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Defendants, asserting causes of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, arising from design defect, manufacturing defect, and a failure to warn (Counts I–IV, VII–X); negligence (Counts V, XI); and unfair and deceptive business practices in violation of Chapter 93A, Section 2(a) of the MGL (Counts VI, XII). See Compl. On November 24, 2020, the case was transferred to this Court from the District of Massachusetts for lack of personal jurisdiction. R. 32, Mass. Dismissal Order; R. 33, Transfer Order. Soon after the inter-District transfer, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and alternatively, that most claims otherwise fail to state a claim. See Mot. Dismiss Memo. The Court takes these arguments in turn below.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7 , 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
As previously noted, Defendants move to dismiss on two fronts. First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims are all barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Mot. Dismiss Memo. at 5–10. Second and alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in all but two counts. Id. at 10–15. The Court addresses Defendants’ arguments concerning statutes of limitations first, followed by Defendants’ arguments concerning the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations.
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety because all claims are time-barred. Mot. Dismiss Memo. at 6. Although "expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be pled in an answer pursuant to Rule 8(c), it can be used as a basis for granting a 12(b)(6) motion where the case is ‘obviously time-barred.’ " Chapman v. Vill. of Hinsdale , 2008 WL 2557465, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2008) (quoting Small v. Chao , 398 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005) ). "When its jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, a federal court is obliged to apply the statute of limitation of the state in which it sits." Reinke v. Boden , 45 F.3d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Defendants contend (and the Court agrees, with one caveat, see infra Section I.C) that the Court must apply the applicable Illinois statutes of limitations to Plaintiff's claims. Mot. Dismiss Memo. at 5–6.
Defendants insist that Illinois's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries applies to all claims. See 735 ILCS 5/13–202 (). Defendants maintain that because Plaintiff filed her Complaint on March 28, 2020, more than two years after the Cooking Spray exploded and caused injuries, her suit is time-barred. Mot. Dismiss Memo. at 6. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that (i) the two-year statute of limitations that governs the negligence claims was tolled per the discovery rule; (ii) a five-year statute of limitations governs the breach of warranty claims; and (iii) a four-year statute of limitations governs the unfair and deceptive practices claims. R. 48, Resp. at 11–15. All in all, Plaintiff contends that she filed her Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations periods. Id. The Court begins its statute of limitations analysis with the negligence claims.
In Counts V and XI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligent in the design, manufacture, marketing, promotion, and sale of the Cooking Spray. Compl. ¶¶ 82, 156. Defendants argue that the Illinois two-year statute of limitations for claims alleging personal injury bars these counts. Mot. Dismiss Memo. at 6.
In Illinois, the statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. 735 ILCS 5/13–202 (). In general, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the injury occurs. Golla v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 167 Ill.2d 353, 212 Ill.Dec. 549, 657 N.E.2d 894, 898 (1995). That is, "when facts exist that would authorize the bringing of the cause of action." Stark v. Johnson & Johnson , 10 F.4th 823, 828 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing MC Baldwin Fin. Co. v. DiMaggio, Rosario & Veraja, LLC , 364 Ill.App.3d 6, 300 Ill.Dec. 601, 845 N.E.2d 22, 30 (2006) ). The discovery rule, which Plaintiff is attempting to invoke here, "is an equitable exception to the statute of limitations." Feltmeier v. Feltmeier , 207 Ill.2d 263, 278 Ill.Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d 75, 89 (2003). Under this rule, "a cause of action accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, when the party seeking relief knows or reasonably should know of an injury and that it was wrongfully caused." Id. "The rule mitigates the...
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