Erie Co v. Shuart

• Decision Date: 09 June 1919
• Docket Number: No. 342,342
• Citation: 39 S.Ct. 519,63 L.Ed. 1088,250 U.S. 465
• Parties: ERIE R. CO. v. SHUART et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

250 U.S. 465

39 S.Ct. 519

63 L.Ed. 1088

ERIE R. CO.

v SHUART et al.

No. 342.

Submitted April 25, 1919.

Decided June 9, 1919.

Mr. Thomas Watts, of Middletown, N. Y., for petitioner.

Mr. Reeves T. Strickland, of Washington, D. C., for respondents.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents delivered to the Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad, at East St. Louis, Ill., a carload of horses for transportation, under a limited liability live stock contract or bill of lading via petitioner's road, to themselves at Suffern, N. Y., their home. Among other things the contract provided:

'That the said shipper is at his own sole risk and expense to load and take care of and to feed and water said stock whilst being transported, whether delayed in transit or otherwise, and to unload the same; and neither said carrier nor any connecting carrier is to be under any liability or duty with reference thereto, except in h e actual transportation of the same. * * * That no claim for damages which may accrue to the said shipper under this contract shall be allowed or paid by the said carrier, or sued for in any court by the said shipper, unless a claim for such loss or damage shall be made in writing, verified by the affidavit of the said shipper or his agent, and delivered to the general auditor of the said carrier at his office in the city of Chicago, Ill., within five days from the time said stock is removed from said car or cars, and that if any loss or damage occurs upon the line of a connecting carrier, then such carrier shall not be liable unless a claim shall be made in like manner, and delivered in like time, to some proper officer or agent of the carrier, on whose line the loss or injury occurs.'

Immediately after the car arrived at Suffern, petitioner placed it on a switch track opposite a cattle chute and left it in charge of respondents for unloading. By letting down a bridge they at once connected the chute and car and were about to lead out four horses, when an engine pushed other cars against it and injured the animals therein. No written claim was made for the loss or damage as provided by the bill of lading; and when sued the carrier defended upon that ground. Respondents maintain that transportation had ended when the accident occurred and consequently no written claim was necessary. The courts below accepted this view.

Under our former opinions, the clause requiring presentation of a written claim is clearly valid and controlling as to any liability arising from beginning to end of the transportation contracted for. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McLaughlin, 242 U. S. 142, 37 Sup. Ct. 40, 61 L. Ed. 207; St. Louis, Iron Mt. & So. Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592, 37 Sup. Ct. 462, 61 L. Ed. 917; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. J. G. Leach, 249 U. S. 217, 39 Sup. Ct. 254, 63 L. Ed. 570 (decided March 10, 1919); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach, 239 U. S. 588, 593, 594, 36 Sup. Ct. 177, 60 L. Ed. 453; Southern Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 36 Sup. Ct. 469, 60 L. Ed. 836.

In Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach we pointed out that the Hepburn Act (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584) enlarged the definition of 'transportation' so as to include 'cars and other vehicles and all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or carriage, irrespective of ownership or of any contract, express or implied, for the use thereof and all services in connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation and transfer in transit, ventilation, refrigeration, or icing, storage and hauling of property transported,' and we said from this and other provisions of the act 'it is evident that Congress recognized that the duty of carriers to the public included the performance of a variety of services that, according to the theory of the common law, were separable from the carrier's service as carrier, and, in order to prevent overcharges and discriminations from being made under the pretext of performing such additional services, it enacted that so far as inter state carriers by rail were concerned the entire body of such services should be included together under the single term 'transportation' and subjected to the provisions of the act respecting reasonable rates and the like.'

In the instant case, when injured, the animals were awaiting removal from the car through a cattle chute alleged to be owned, operated and controlled by the railroad. If its employes had then been doing the work of unloading there could be no doubt that transportation was still in progress; and we think that giving active charge of the removal to respondents, as agreed, was not enough to end the interstate movement. The animals were in the car; no adequate time for unloading had transpired. The carrier had not fully performed the services incident to final delivery imposed by law. These included the furnishing of fair opportunt y and proper facilities for safe unloading although the shippers had contracted to do the work of actual removal. See Hutchinson on Carriers, §§ 711, 714, 715.

Petitioner's request for an instructed verdict in its behalf should have been granted. The judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice CLARKE dissenting.

I greatly regret that I cannot concur in the opinion and judgment of the court in this case, but I cannot consent to share in what seems to me a very strained construction of a definition in the Hepburn Act (34 Stat. 584, c. 3591, § 1 [Comp. St. § 8563]) which will result in keeping alive a bill of lading, with the effect of excusing the carrier from liability for negligently damaging the live stock of a consignee, after it had been delivered, on the ground that a claim in writing for the damage, duly verified, had not been presented within five days.

My reasons for dissenting, stated as briefly as may be, are as follows:

It is shown by the opinion of the court that the consignee, a partnership of three members, was bound by the bill of lading to unload the horses at destination.

The consignee, being notified by the carrier as to the probable time of the arrival of the car, on the day before it arrived, paid what was supposed to be the full amount of the freight charges, and two members of the partnership were at the station at 3 o'clock in the morning to receive and unload it.

When the train came, the senior member of the consignee stood in the cattle chute with the conductor, while the latter was placing the car for unloading and approved as satisfactory the position in which it was placed. Thereupon a brakeman set the brake, the engine was cut off and the conductor went away and left the car in the sole custody of the consignee, after saying to its representative, 'You had better get them out as soon as you can as they have been on the road a good while and are tired and hungry.' Two members of the partnership, consignee, went to work at...