Erie County Bd. of Social Welfare v. Schneider

• Decision Date: 12 June 1957
• Citation: 163 N.Y.S.2d 184,6 Misc.2d 374
• Parties: Application of ERIE COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL WELFARE 210 Pearl Street Building, Buffalo, N. Y., Applicant, v. Linus SCHNEIDER, 174 Roebling Avenue, Buffalo 15, N. Y., Respondent, For the Support of his step-daughter, Mary Louise Schmitt. Children's Court, Erie County
• Court: New York Children's Court

Page 184

163 N.Y.S.2d 184

6 Misc.2d 374

Application of ERIE COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL WELFARE 210 Pearl Street Building, Buffalo, N. Y., Applicant, v. Linus SCHNEIDER, 174 Roebling Avenue, Buffalo 15, N. Y. Respondent, For the Support of his step-daughter Mary Louise Schmitt.

Children's Court, Erie County.

June 12, 1957.

Elmer R. Weil, County Atty., Buffalo, for applicant (Peter J. Mancuso, Buffalo, of counsel).

Raymond W. Young, Buffalo, for respondent (Leonard N. Lakser, Buffalo, of counsel).

WYLEGALA, Judge.

This is a proceeding brought by the Department of Social Welfare to enforce support by the respondent of his minor step-daughter, Mary Louise, who is receiving an Aid to Dependent Children grant from that department. The natural mother of the child in question died June 28, 1954. The step-father continued to support Mary Louise as well as other minor step-children until an older brother took her from the home of the step-father, refused to permit any contact between Mary Louise and her step-father. The step-father insists that he is willing to resume support on condition Mary Louise returns to his household, which she is not willing to do.

The objections to the insufficiency of the pleadings need not be passed upon, because it will be assumed that correction could be readily made by amendment or proceeding de novo.

The children's court has jurisdiction in matters relating to support of step-children only under Article III-A, Sections 30, 30-a, subd. 5 and 31, subd. 5 of the Children's Court Act. People ex rel. Deming v. Williams, 161 Misc. 573, 292 N.Y.S. 458.

There are various provisions in other statutes relating to support of step-children, which need not be discussed here, except to recall that statutory provisions in derogation of common law obligations must be strictly construed. There would be no question as to respondent's obligation to support as long as his wife, the mother of the step-child, lived.

The respondent seriously contends that death of the mother terminated his relationship and obligations to step-children. Unfortunately there is nothing in the statutes, and very little by way of decisions in the courts, to guide us in determining the duration of the step-parent obligation. It is significant that the statutes impose upon children the duty of supporting their parents and grand-parents, but not do so in cases of step-children. Neither step-children nor step-parents inherit property from each other.

After...