Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 25 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-cv-1080 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
| Parties | ERIE INSURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff, v. TANIA CRAWFORD, Defendant. |
OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendant's two motions to dismiss for jurisdictional reasons and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's first motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is DENIED, Defendant's second motion to dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 21) is DENIED as moot.
On November 26, 2012, Plaintiff, Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company, Inc. filed a complaint with this Court seeking a declaration that it is not liable to defend or indemnify Defendant, Tania Crawford, in respect to a state court lawsuit brought by two people whom she shot in August of 2010. (Doc. 2, Compl.). Erie alleged diverse citizenship but did not specifically allege an amount in controversy. Id. Crawford moved to dismiss. (Doc. 6, D. Mot. to Dis.). However, before the Court ruled on that motion, the Court granted Erie leave to amend so that Erie could add a new policy that had previously been overlooked. (Doc. 12, Pretrial Order). Erie amended, adding a new policy, and this time, specifically alleged that the amount incontroversy exceeded $75,000. (Doc. 13, Amend. Compl. at ¶ 4). Defendant answered and counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith in an amount "in excess of $25,000.00." (Doc. 15, Answer & Counterclaim at prayer for relief). Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on the merits. (Docs. 21-22, P. Mot. for SMJ). Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss in which it argued that the Court should, even if it has subject matter jurisdiction in this case, abstain from exercising jurisdiction. (Doc. 24, D. 2d Mot. to Dis.). All motions are fully briefed. (See Docs. 6, 8-9, 21-22, 24-27, 30-31).
The core facts are undisputed in this case. Crawford, shortly after midnight on August 13, 2010, fired several shots into a car near her house and hit two of the four occupants. In connection to that event, she pled guilty to several felony assault counts and counts related to the improper discharge of a firearm. (Doc. 22, Ex. D, Sent. Ent. at 1). She was sentenced to 4 years and 11 months in prison. The State of Ohio agreed not to oppose early release after 2 years had been served. Id. at 3.
The two persons who were shot on August 13, 2010, sued Crawford on April 8, 2011, in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas for Meigs County. . They alleged that Crawford "negligently and without the right or privilege to do so, fired a firearm at the[m] . . . while they were in a motor vehicle on a public roadway." Id. at ¶ 1. They allege that they were hit by bullets fired by Crawford and that they have "incurred medical expenses, endured pain and suffering, mental anguish and have permanent scaring and injuries" as a consequence. Id. at ¶¶ 2-3. The Complaint filed in the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas seeks damages in excess of $25,000.00. Id. at prayer for relief.
Crawford was insured, at the time of the shooting, under two policies issued by Erie. (Doc. 22, Ex. E, Home Protector Policy; Doc. 22, Ex. F, Personal Catastrophe Policy). Bothprovided coverage for some amount that Crawford might become legally obligated to pay as a result of bodily injury to another person. (Doc. 22, Ex. E, Home Protector Policy at 14; Doc. 22, Ex. F, Personal Catastrophe Policy at 4; see also id. at 3 ()). Both promised a defense of any such claims at Erie's expense "even if the allegations are not true." (Doc. 22, Ex. E, Home Protector Policy at 14; Doc. 22, Ex. F, Personal Catastrophe Policy at 4). Both excluded from coverage, however, liability based on bodily injury that was "expected or intended by anyone we protect." (Doc. 22, Ex. E, Home Protector Policy at 15; Doc. 22, Ex. F, Personal Catastrophe Policy at 4). Yet, both carved out an exception to that exclusion by stating, "We do cover reasonable acts committed to protect persons [and/or] property."1 (Doc. 22, Ex. E, Home Protector Policy at 15; Doc. 22, Ex. F, Personal Catastrophe Policy at 4).
This much, at least, is undisputed. However, the parties dispute the details of what occurred on the dark morning of Friday the 13th of August, 2010, and whether the actions Crawford took were reasonably taken in defense of property and/or self.
Erie presents, via Crawford's guilty plea and a number of police reports, a story of a random shooting; Crawford, for no evident reason, opened fire upon a car passing her house. .
Crawford presents, via her own affidavit, a tale of intended defense and semi-accidental shooting. (Doc. 27, Ex. 1, Crawford Aff.). Crawford claims that she and her husband (a retired police officer) had, for some time, been the subject of a course of threats and harassment perpetrated by three neighboring men. Id. at ¶¶ 8-22. The harassment began following allegations of poaching, leveled against the men by Crawford's husband. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. Inaddition to the poaching that touched-off the conflict, these neighbors allegedly vandalized a hayfield, committed various trespasses, attempted to make Crawford's horses sick by putting trash and other articles where they might ingest them, shot Crawford's house and boat with paintball guns, and made threatening use of vehicles - driving by and squealing tires at all hours while yelling threats and profanity. Id. at ¶¶ 9-20. Thus, according to Crawford, it was after a long course of threatening conduct when, on August 13, 2010, a mysterious car appeared near her house after midnight and shone a bright light in her window. Id. at ¶¶ 3-22, 26-27. Crawford, awakened by the light, was home alone and claims to have heard male voices loudly yelling swear words and threatening harm to her. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 27, 29. After several passes and other maneuvers, the car pulled on to Crawford's property at her mailbox. Id. at ¶¶ 33-51. From the curtilage of her home, Crawford claims to have fired what she intended to be a warning shot. Id. at ¶¶ 53. She swears that in her panic, and unaware of how light the trigger pull was on her husband's pistol, she accidentally fired the gun multiple times. Id. at ¶¶ 54-63. She claims that she never meant to hurt anyone and that she pled guilty, rather than go to trial, because her husband has lung cancer and she wanted to be home as soon as possible. Id. at ¶¶ 63-68.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 grants district courts original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the action is between "citizens of different States . . . ."
In this case, Erie has alleged an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. (Doc. 13, Amend. Compl. at ¶ 4). Although the Amended Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment rather than traditional damages, the Sixth Circuit "has said that, '[w]here a party seeks a declaratory judgment, the amount in controversy is not necessarily the money judgment sought or recovered,but rather the value of the consequences which may result from the litigation.'" Freeland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 250, 253 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting LoDal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., Case No.: 95-2187, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12841, *6 (6th Cir. June 12, 1998)). The declaration Erie seeks would entitle it to avoid defending or indemnifying Crawford in the civil suit pending against her in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Meigs County, Ohio. . Though the complaint against Crawford in the Meigs County Court only pleads an amount in controversy "exceed[ing] $25,000.00," it is easy to see that defense expenses and potential awards to two gunshot victims who, at least allegedly, have "permanent scaring and injuries" could easily exceed $75,000. . Hence, the grant or denial of the declaratory judgment sought, is likely to have an impact upon the parties in excess of $75,000.
In addition, this litigation is between citizens of different states. Defendant, Crawford, is a natural person and domiciliary of the State of Ohio. . Plaintiff, Erie, is a corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania and has its principal place of business there as well. (Doc. 13, Amend. Compl. at ¶ 2). Accordingly, Crawford is a citizen of Ohio and Erie is a citizen of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
Crawford, however, argues that a carve-out, set forth in § 1332(c)(1), imputes her citizenship (Ohio) to Erie and thus there is no diversity of citizenship betwixt the parties. (Doc. 6, D. Mot. to Dis. at 2). However, the statute's language, on which Defendant relies, does not support this result.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). That is, Crawford wants this Court to treat Erie as an Ohio citizen. However, the carve-out, which would allow the Court to do that, is contingent upon the case being a "direct action against the insurer" in which the "insured is not . . . a party-defendant . . . ." Id. In this...
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