Erie-Western Pennsylvania Port Authority v. Rugare

• Citation: 29 Pa.Cmwlth. 83,370 A.2d 768
• Decision Date: 03 March 1977
• Docket Number: ERIE-WESTERN
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA PORT AUTHORITY v. Joseph RUGARE, d/b/a Julie Marie Lake Rides, Appellant.
• Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Page 768

370 A.2d 768

29 Pa.Cmwlth. 83

ERIE-WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA PORT AUTHORITY v. Joseph RUGARE, d/b/a Julie Marie Lake Rides, Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 3, 1976.

Decided March 3, 1977.

Daniel J. Beggy, Jr., Mansmann, Beggy & Campbell, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Stephen E. Jones, Knox, Graham, Pearson, McLaughlin & Sennett, Erie, for appellee.

Before BOWMAN, President Judge, and CRUMLISH, Jr., WILKINSON, MENCER, ROGERS and BLATT, JJ.

OPINION

ROGERS, Judge.

The narrow issue of this case is that of whether the exercise of regulatory authority by the Erie-Western Pennsylvania Port Authority (Port Authority) over ferryboat operations at the Port of Erie, Pennsylvania, pursuant to the Third Class City Port Authority Act (Act) ¹ preempts the regulatory authority of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (P.U.C.).

The Port Authority was created by ordinance of the City of Erie adopted pursuant to the Third Class City Port Authority Act. The Port Authority acquired land commonly known as the Erie public docks and the docking berths appurtenant which were formerly owned by the City. The Port Authority prepared leasing agreements for its public docks and berths, which described, Inter alia, the services to be rendered and the rates to be charged for such services by the successful bidder. ² In the spring of 1975 the Port Authority publicly advertised for bids for the leasing of the public dock facilities.

The appellant, Joseph Rugare, an individual doing business as Julie Marie Lake Rides and Ferry Service, has been transporting passengers on Lake Erie as a common carrier under rights granted by a P.U.C. Certificate of Public Convenience. The certificate permits the transportation by watercraft of persons between the public docks in the City of Erie and the pier on the north side of the entrance channel to Erie Harbor.

Upon receipt of a copy of the Port Authority's proposed lease and specifications, Rugare filed a complaint in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County seeking injunctive relief, alleging that the leasing specifications were a usurpation by the Port Authority of the P.U.C.'s power to set schedules and rates for common carriers, exercised by the grant of a certificate of public convenience to the plaintiff.

The Port Authority then filed its complaint against Rugare seeking an order restraining the defendant from trespassing on the public docks and berths. Judge Fred P. Anthony, noting that the parties had stipulated that the only issue was whether or not the Port Authority had regulatory authority to the exclusion of the P.U.C. and concluding on the authority of the Act that it did, enjoined Rugare from using the public dock facilities in his business and from the unauthorized use of water routes within the jurisdiction of the Port Authority. Exceptions filed by Rugare were dismissed by the court en banc and Rugare appealed to this Court. ³ We affirm.

As the trial judge noted, the Third Class City Port Authority Act is new and there are no cases construing it. The problem is one purely of statutory construction. The cardinal principle that the plain words of a statute cannot be disregarded where the language is free and clear from all ambiguity ⁴ is controlling here.

The Legislature stated the purposes of the port authorities authorized by the Act in Section 3(a), 55 P.S. § 573(a), as those of 'planning, acquiring, holding, constructing, improving, maintaining and operating, owning, leasing, either as lessor or lessee, port facilities and equipment.' A port facility is defined by Section 2 of the Act, 55 P.S. § 572, as

'(including) all real and personal property used in the operation of a port terminal, ⁵ including, but without being limited to, wharves, piers, slips, Ferries, docks, graving docks . . . Or harbor craft of any kind, markets and every kind of terminal storage or supply depot, now in use or hereafter designed for use, To facilitate transportation and for the handling, storage, loading or unloading of freight at terminals, and equipment, material and supplies therefor.' (Emphasis supplied.) (Footnote added.)

Section 3(b) of the Act, 55 P.S. § 573(b), grants port authorities and powers necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the purposes described above. In addition, a number of specific rights and powers are conferred by that section. One conferred by Section 3(b)(5), 55 P.S. § 573(b)(5), is that of leasing franchises, property or interests therein as necessary or desirable for carrying out the authorities' purposes. By Sections 3(b)(9) and 3(b)(20), 55 P.S. §§ 573(b)(9) and (20), respectively, authorities are empowered:

'To Fix, alter, charge and collect fares, rates, rentals and other charges for its facilities by zones or otherwise, at reasonable rates to be determined Exclusively by it, subject to appeal, as hereinafter provided, for the purpose of providing for the payment of the expenses of the authority, the acquisition, construction, improvement, repair, maintenance and operation of its facilities and properties, the payment of the principal and interest on its obligations, and to comply fully with the terms and provisions of any agreements made with the purchasers or holders of any such obligations. The authority shall determine by itself exclusively, the facilities to be operated by it and the services to be available to the public. Any person questioning the reasonableness of any rate or services fixed by an authority may bring suit against the authority in the court of common pleas of the county wherein the authority is incorporated. The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of fares, rates and other charges or services fixed, altered, charged or collected by an authority. The court shall make such order as to fares, rates and other charges or services as to it shall be just and proper. . . .' (Emphasis supplied.)

and

'To establish carrier routes and services, including water routes and water services as it deems necessary for the efficient operation of the port; provided, that the authority shall not engage in the transportation of property by motor vehicle outside the port terminal without the approval of, and subject to regulations by, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.'

Our reading of these provisions convinces us, as it did the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, that the Erie Port Authority has the power to regulate passenger ferryboat operations at the Port of Erie, exclusive of the P.U.C. The definition of public facilities, over which the Port Authority is given broad powers, clearly includes the public docks and facilities which the Authority leased. As noted by Judge Anthony for Erie County Court, the use of the word 'exclusively' in Section 573(b)(9) clearly demonstrates the Legislature's intention to give the Port Authority sole power to determine the existence and extent of public necessity for all water services and matters incident thereto. The statutory directive that the Court of Common Pleas have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of 'fares, rates, and other charges and services' precludes the exercise of the same power by the P.U.C.

Section 3(b)(20), 55 P.S. § 573(b)(20), grants the Port Authority power to establish water carrier routes and services. The same...