Ernst v. Hollis

• Decision Date: 07 May 1889
• Citation: 86 Ala. 511,6 So. 85
• Parties: ERNST ET AL. v. HOLLIS, ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

6 So. 85

86 Ala. 511

ERNST ET AL. v. HOLLIS, ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 7, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Marengo county; W. E. CLARKE, Judge.

This action was by Ernst Bros., partners, against John L. Hollis and his wife. Mrs. Elizabeth G. Hollis, and was commenced on the 20th of August, 1887. The complaint claimed $365.91 as due by account on the 8th January, 1886, for goods sold by plaintiffs to defendants,-averring that they were, at the time, husband and wife; that the goods were articles of family supplies for their comfort and support, were suitable to their estate and condition in life, and such as the husband would be liable for at common law,-and sought to charge lands belonging to the statutory separate estate of Mrs. Hollis, which were particularly described. The defendants jointly pleaded (1) the general issue, (2) payment, and (3) accord and satisfaction; and Mrs. Hollis filed a separate plea of set-off, alleging that the plaintiffs were indebted to her in the sum of $1,035, the proceeds of 23 bales of cotton belonging to her, which they had received and sold. Issue was joined on these several pleas. Under the rulings of the court, in the charges to the jury sustaining the validity of the agreement or compromise set up by Mrs. Hollis, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs as against John L. Hollis, but further found that the separate estate of Mrs. Hollis was not liable for the debt. These charges of the court, to which the plaintiffs excepted, are now assigned as error.

Talor & Johnston, for appellants.

G W. Taylor, for appellees.

STONE C.J.

The present case must be determined under our woman's law as it existed before February 28, 1887. Code 1876, §§2706, 2711. The purpose of the suit is to subject the corpus of the wife's statutory separate estate to the payment of an account alleged to have been contracted in the purchase of articles of comfort and support of the household. The defense relied on in the court below was that, after the debt was incurred, there was an agreement, accord, and satisfaction or compromise, by which Ernst Bros. absolved and discharged the separate property of Mrs. Hollis from all liability for the debt. Joseph L. Hollis, the husband, had the management and control of his wife's statutory separate estate, and cultivated a crop on her lands in 1885. He cultivated with hired labor. January 3, 1885, he executed a mortgage to Ernst Bros., conveying to them the entire crop he might produce that year, to secure a note described as being given to secure advances made by them to enable him to make a crop during that year. The testimony most favorable to Mrs. Hollis tended to show that 20 or more bales of cotton was produced on her lands that season, which, at its close, were in the hands at Ernst Bros. She testified that her husband had promised that the cotton crop of that year should be marked in her name, and should be subject to her control. This promise was made after the execution of the mortgage to Ernst Bros. She testified, further, and another witness corroborated her statement, that she set up claim to the crop in the hands of Ernst Bros., and that an agreement was then entered into between them and her (not shown to have been in writing) to the effect that if she would surrender all claim to the cotton, and allow it to be credited on her husband's debt, they (Ernst. Bros.) would release her property from any and all claim they might have against it. Ernst in his testimony denied this. She testified, further that pursuant to this agreement she did relinquish her claim to the cotton, and permitted Ernst Bros. to retain it on her husband's debt. The question is thus presented, was this a compromise, or accord and satisfaction, which is binding in law?

The authorities bearing on this legal question express the principle in somewhat varying phraseology. The question in this class of cases is whether there is a consideration to uphold the release or...