Errico v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 19282.

Decision Date14 August 1965
Docket NumberNo. 19282.,19282.
PartiesGiuseppe ERRICO, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Frank M. Ierulli, Gerald H. Robinson, Portland, Or., for petitioner.

Cecil F. Poole, U. S. Atty., Charles Elmer Collett, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for respondent.

Before MERRILL, DUNIWAY, and ELY, Circuit Judges.

ELY, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner, now thirty-one years of age, emigrated from his native Italy and, with his wife, gained admission to the United States on October 17, 1959. His parents and all of his brothers and sisters reside in this country, and his son, an American citizen, was born here on August 3, 1960. He was admitted as a selected immigrant under the first preference of the Italian immigration quota. The status was approved under the authority of Section 203(a) (1) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S.C. § 1153(a) (1) (A)). The visa petition had been submitted by a motor company of Portland, Oregon, and was supported by representations, in the form of affidavits originating in Italy, that the petitioner was a specialized mechanic and motor tune-up man on motors of Italian manufacture. Eight days after his arrival in New York City, the petitioner commenced his employment with the Portland motor company. The record reveals that he was given the assignment of performing work on German motors with tools which were strange to him. He remained in this employment for only three months, having failed, according to a finding of the Special Inquiry Officer, "to measure up to the requirements of a specialized mechanic." On August 29, 1960, he entered the employ of Victory Plating Works, Inc., of Portland, and he has remained continuously in such employment.

On September 11, 1963, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing In Deportation Proceedings in which it was alleged that petitioner was "not a specialized mechanic and tune-up man as alleged. And on the basis of the foregoing * * *, it is charged that you are subject to deportation pursuant to the following provision(s) of law:

Section 241(a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, in that, at time of entry you were within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry, to wit, aliens who are not of the proper status under the quota specified in the immigrant visa, under Section 211(a) (4) of the Act."

A hearing followed, and while it was shown that before he left Italy, and in anticipation of his prospective employment in the United States, the petitioner worked for a few months as an unpaid apprentice in an Italian garage, there was ample evidence to support a finding by the Special Inquiry Officer that the petitioner, at the time of his entry into the United States, was not a qualified automobile mechanic or a specialist in motors of Italian manufacture.

The petitioner sought relief from deportation under the provisions of Section 211(c) and (d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. § 1181(c) (d)), which provide, in effect, that the Attorney General may, in his discretion, grant relief to an inadmissible alien "if satisfied that such inadmissibility was not known and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence by such immigrant" prior to his entry to the United States. The petitioner's application for this relief was denied upon the ground that the petitioner knew of his lack of qualifications prior to his departure from Italy and consequently could not qualify for favorable discretionary action under the provisions of Section 211(c). It is our opinion that the Special Inquiry Officer properly applied Section 211(c) and that the denial of relief under this Section, affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, was correct.

In all stages of the proceedings, the petitioner has insisted that he is saved from deportation by Section 241(f), Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1251(f)), which provides:

"The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." (Emphasis added)

It is important to note that the italicized language has been adopted from Section 212(a) (19) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (19)), one of many sections designating classes of aliens who "shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:". We have seen that the petitioner is a parent of a United States citizen and the child of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. It is also established that the petitioner procured "visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation." Against the petitioner, it has been contended that in the Order to Show Cause, he was not charged with being inadmissible because of the provisions of Section 212(a) (19) relating to aliens who have gained entry by fraud or misrepresentation, but with inadmissibility under the provisions of Section 211(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (4)) which reads:

"(a) No immigrant shall be admitted into the United States unless at the time of application for admission he * * * (4) is of the proper status under the quota specified in the immigrant visa, * * *".

This contention, carefully considered by the Special Inquiry Officer, was correctly treated in his decision as follows:

"The respondent has established the necessary relationship to come within the provisions of Section 241(f). Several questions, however, remain. The first, whether the provisions of Section 241(f) would apply to his case because he is charged with inadmissibility under the provisions of Section 211(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act relating to aliens who at entry were not of the proper status specified in the immigrant visa, rather than under Section 212(a) (19), aliens who procured a visa by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact. The Board of Immigration Appeals, in the Matter of K----, I & N Dec. 585, 589, March 9, 1962, reaffirmed the previous order in Matter of S----, 7 I & N Dec. 715, holding that the section of law under which the deportation charge is laid is immaterial. The Board, in Matter of K----, stated: `There are, however, other provisions of Section 241(a) which render an alien deportable after entry on charges which flow directly from the entry by fraud or misrepresentation. The two charges set forth in Section 241(a) (2) come within this category. Since Section 241(f) described in general terms aliens whose documentation or entry was procured by fraud or misrepresentation, we are of the opinion that it was the intent of Congress to save from deportation those aliens who were admissible except for the fact that they had made fraudulent statements regardless of the provision of the statute under which their deportation is sought.\'
It is concluded that the fact that the charge, excludable at entry for fraud or misrepresentation, is not urged, would not disqualify the respondent from the benefits of Section 241(f)."

It would therefore appear that petitioner, as an alien who "procured a visa or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation" and "who is the * * * parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence", is saved from deportation by the provisions of Section 241(f) (8 U.S.C. § 1251(f)) if he was "otherwise admissible" at the time of his entry. The Special Inquiry Officer concluded that since this issue of statutory construction "presents a novel question not decided by the Board", it would be "certified to the Board of Immigration Appeals for review and final decision". The Board held that since the petitioner's application for discretionary relief by waiver under Section 211(c) was not granted, he could not be "otherwise admissible at the time of entry" and that "Section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act has no applicability to this case and need not have been discussed".

We disagree with the Board. Fair interpretation of the legislative history of the Section, its terms, and its relation to other statutes in pari materia lead to the conclusion that it is operative to spare the petitioner from deportation. Under its plain terms, the Section purports to grant absolute relief to aliens who have close familial ties in the United States and who have gained entry into the United States through "fraud or misrepresentation". Its benefits are not made dependent upon the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General in the granting of a waiver or in any other manner. It was enacted on September 26, 1961 and modified the terms of a portion of a statute, simultaneously repealed, which contained similar provisions. This previously existing statute, Pub.L. 85-316, 71 Stat. 640, 8 U.S.C. 1251a (not 1251(a)) was enacted in 1957. Upon its repeal, a portion of it was incorporated into Section 1182 of Title 8 as Section (h). This portion conferred upon the Attorney General the discretionary power to consent to the admission to the United States of certain aliens upon certain conditions, in general, as follows: (1) Aliens with certain close relatives already in the United States (2) whose exclusion would result in extreme hardship to the relatives residing in the United States (3) whose admission to the United States would not be contrary to the national welfare,...

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