Ervin v. Collins
| Citation | 85 So.2d 852,59 A.L.R.2d 706 |
| Parties | Richard W. ERVIN, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. LeRoy COLLINS, individually, R. A. Gray, as Secretary of State of the State ofFlorida, and Peaslee Streets, Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 05 March 1956 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Howard S. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
R. A. Gray, Secretary of State, Tallahassee, in pro. per.
Chas. S. Ausley, D. Fred McMullen, Ben C. Willis, Tallahassee, and William A. McRae, Jr., Bartow, for appellee LeRoy Collins, individually.
Damon Yerkes, Jacksonville, for appellee Peaslee Streets.
This is a suit for declaratory decree instituted by Peaslee Streets against LeRoy Collins, individually, and as Governor, R. A. Gray, as Secretary of State, and Richard W. Ervin, as Attorney General. The complaint prays the court to take jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties and determine whether or not Honorable LeRoy Collins having been election Governor in 1954 for the unexpired term of Honorable Dan McCarty, deceased, is eligible to reelection for the four-your term beginning on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January, 1957. A rash of pleadings and orders followed the complaint but we refrain from detailing them as this would serve no useful purpose. At final hearing the chancellor found and decreed that the election of Honorable LeRoy Collins in 1954 to complete the unexpired term of Honorable Dan McCarty, deceased, did not render him ineligible to run for and be elected Governor of Florida for the four-year term commencing in January, 1957. The Attorney General has appealed from the declaratory decree which was entered January 11, 1956.
The primaries for which all state and county candidates are required to qualify will be held May 8 and 29. Candidates for Governor and other state officers must qualify during the period from noon, February 21, to noon, March 6, 1956. The authority of the Attorney General to prosecute this appeal is not challenged. It is admitted that the question of eligibility of Collins to run for Governor at this time is of vital concern to the electorate of Florida and is of such public interest that it should be settled without delay. Section 12 of the complaint so alleges and the same section of the answer admits this allegation to be true. It is also admitted, or not questioned, that the Attorney General, being the legal representative of the people, should bring this question to the attention of the court for final adjudication. Section 16.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929, and State ex rel. Landis v. S. H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823, recognize the Attorney General as the chief law officer of the state and absent express legislative restriction to the contrary, may exercise his power and authority in the premises as the public interest may require. When the public interest is involved a more liberal rule governs who may appropriately bring an action of this kind and prosecute it to this court, if need be. Chapter 87, Florida Statutes 1953, Declaratory Judgments, F.S.A., and other extraordinary remedies govern the procedure. We think the case is properly here. Watson v. Claughton, 160 Fla. 217, 34 So.2d 243; Holland v. Watson, 153 Fla. 178, 14 So.2d 200; Reiter v. Wallgren, 28 Wash.2d 872, 184 P.2d 571; Capital Stages, Inc., v. State, 157 Miss. 576, 128 So. 759.
This is the first time we have been confronted with the main question presented by the appeal. It is our view that the answer to it is found in the interpretation of Sections 2, 3 and 19, Article IV of the Constitution, F.S.A., the said provisions being as follow:
We are called on to construe the terms the people, and we are to effectuate from the people, and we are to effectuate their purpose from the words employed in the document. We are not permitted to color it by the addition of words or the engrafting of our views as to how it should have been written. The point of our concern at this time has to do solely with the eligibility, election and term of Governor. As pointed out by the chancellor, it must be presumed that those who drafted the Constitution had a clear conception of the principles they intended to express, that they knew the English language and that they knew how to use it, that they gave careful consideration to the practical application of the Constitution and arranged its provisions in the order that would most accurately express their intention.
Guided by the principles stated in the preceding paragraph, let us examine the quoted provisions of the Constitution. Section 2 has to do with the election and term of Governor, fixes the beginning and length of his term and inhibits his election to 'said office the next succeeding term.' Section 19 has to do with succession to the office of Governor in case of impeachment, death, resignation or inability of the Governor to discharge the duties of the office. It provides for filling the vacancy caused by death of the incumbent by election in event there should be an election for members of the legislature during the vacancy.
Sections 2 and 19 are complementary in that Section 2 provides a four-year term and Section 19 provides for filling the office in the event of a vacancy from one of the extraordinary means enumerated therein. It is pertinent to point out that the makers of the Constitution imposed ineligibility for reelection only on those elected under Section 2, Article IV, and did not impose such a restriction on those who succeeded to the office for the unexpired term as provided by Section 19, Article IV. The makers of the Constitution not having seen fit to impose ineligibility for reelection to the office of Governor on those succeeding to the office for the causes stated in Section 19, Article IV, there is no authority for this court to impose such a restriction.
Section 3, Article IV, has to do with the eligibility of one who aspires to be Governor. He must be a qualified elector, five years a citizen of the state and ten years a citizen of the United States. By proviso it removes these limitations from the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House if the powers and duties of Governor devolve upon them. It follows that the inhibition against succession to the office under Section 3, Article IV, the qualifications of Governor, do not apply to those succeeding under Section 19, Article IV, for the obvious reason that persons who may become President of the Senate and Speaker of the House and have the powers and duties of Governor devolve on them need only be qualified electors under Section 3, Article IV. The legislature has at no time, if indeed it has the power to do so, attempted to qualify said provisions of the fundamental law. Courts are lawinterpreting and not law-making bodies and have no power to do so. The chancellor below, as did the Chancellor in Bryant v. Gray, Fla., 70 So.2d 581, decided February 23, 1954, reached this conclusion.
It is urged that the language, 'shall not be eligible for re-election to said office the next succeeding term', was included in the Constitution to prevent the incumbent exercising the powers of the office of Governor to aid his election for another term. Much talk has been indulged about similar provisions which are found in other Constitutions but as to this case no such purpose is reflected by the Constitution or supported by those who suggest the charge. No such premise is established here and for this court to approve it unsupported would at least amount to charging the makers of the Constitution with being lax and careless.
The brief of appellant directs our attention to the fact that the provision of Section 2, Article IV, of the Constitution inhibiting the Governor from succeeding himself after a four-year term was included in the first Constitution of 1838, that it was not included in the Constitutions of 1861, 1865 and 1868, but that it then reappeared in the Constitution of 1885. This fact is of historical interest but for reasons not necessary to discuss it is not pertinent or material here. Appellant...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.
...after case from Gleason to the 1972 decision in State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So.2d 891 (Fla.1972). 15 See State ex rel. Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852 (Fla.1956); State ex rel. Landis v. Kress, 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823 (1934); State ex rel. Davis v. Love, 126 So. 374 (Fla.1930);......
-
Kneip v. Herseth
...rights or status which are based upon future events when a good-faith controversy is brought before the courts. This appears In Ervin v. Collins, supra, the Florida Supreme Court allowed a declaratory judgment in a case similar to the one now brought by plaintiff Governor Kneip. Prior to th......
-
State v. Aiuppa
...Fla.Const., art. II, § 3, F.S.A.7 State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla.1972); State v. Tindell, 88 So.2d 123 (Fla.1956); Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852 (Fla.1956).8 82 Wash.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973).9 RCW ...
-
Ex parte Coker
...146 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892). "This general rule was restated by the Supreme Court of Florida in Ervin v. Collins (Fla.), 85 So.2d 852, 855 (1956), as " 'We are called on to construe the terms of the Constitution, an instrument from the people, and we are to effectuate their ......
-
The administrative process and constitutional principles.
...See Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Dade County, Lodge No. 6 v. Dept. of State, 392 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1980); Ervin v. Collins, 85 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1956), 59 A.L.R.2d 706; Shupe v. State, 516 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1987) (sentence depriving prisoner of gain time was not option gi......