Erwin v. Zmuda
| Docket Number | 21-3213-SAC |
| Decision Date | 11 January 2022 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER ADAM ERWIN, Plaintiff, v. JEFF ZMUDA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
The plaintiff Christopher Adam Erwin (“Erwin”) pro se is hereby required either to show good cause in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Court Judge, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in the plaintiff's complaint as discussed herein or to file an amended complaint correcting those deficiencies which may be curable as a matter of law and fact.
Erwin is presently an inmate at El Dorado Correctional Facility (“EDCF”). He brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Jeff Zmuda, EDCF's Warden and over 40 other defendants, most of whom work in some capacity at EDCF some of whom are employed by Aramark Food Services, and some of whom are employed by Centurion. Because of his insulin-dependent diabetes, Erwin asserts his constitutional rights under the 8th and 14th Amendments have been violated by the defendants' denial of proper accommodations and care for his medical condition since February of 2021. His 60-page complaint sets out 66 counts for relief alleging they are actionable as violations of not only the United States Constitution but of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II. Erwin seeks injunctive relief requiring timely distribution of insulin and meals, adequate nurses and staff to ensure correct insulin administration, sufficient food supplies to meet all diabetic needs, correction of all food mistakes within 30 minutes, dietician-approved menus with carbohydrate information, all meals prepared according to the menus, specific requirements for all meals and snacks, reimbursement of fines and lost wages due to discipline, and compensatory damages for violations of his civil rights, including punitive damages. The court has granted Erwin leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed an initial partial filing fee which Erwin has paid. ECF# 6.
A court must screen prisoners' complaints which seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The screening court must dismiss the entire complaint or any part of it that, “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
The same standard used for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motions is used for § 1915 dismissals, and this includes the newer language and meaning taken from Twombly and its “plausibility” determination. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148 (2010). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has made clear, “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims for Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Violations
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). In addressing a claim brought under § 1983, the analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). The validity of the claim then must be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right. Id.
A viable § 1983 claim must show each named defendant caused a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Walker v. Mohiuddin, 947 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2020). “[A] complaint must make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.” Robbins v. State of Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations of involvement are insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Id. (). Thus, the plaintiff must name each defendant in the caption and in the body of the complaint, and there describe the personal unconstitutional actions allegedly done by each defendant with “dates, locations, and circumstances.” Lynn v. Willnauer, 2021 WL 1390384, at *10 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 2021). The Tenth Circuit “recognizes that non-supervisory defendants may be liable if they knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct would lead to the deprivation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights by others, and an unforeseeable intervening act has not terminated their liability. Fudge v. Martinez, 504 F.Supp.3d 1215, 1221 (D.N.M. 2020) (citing See Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012); Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 2006)).
Mere supervisory status is insufficient to create personal liability. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008). To allege a claim for supervisory liability against a governmental official, the plaintiff must show “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 960 (2011). A culpable “state of mind” means here that the supervisor acted knowingly or with deliberate indifference that a constitutional violation would occur. Id. at 1196. The Tenth Circuit recognizes that prison officials' responses to grievances may show nothing more than a reasonable reliance on medical staff's judgment. Phillips v. Tiona, 508 Fed.Appx. 737, 744 (10th Cir. 2013) (); see Pemberton v. Dedeke, 2021 WL 4709933, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 9, 2021).
In bringing a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to his prison conditions and medical needs, the plaintiff as a convicted person has his rights protected under the Eighth Amendment while pretrial detainees can assert their similar rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989 (10th Cir. 2020). The standards for a general Eighth Amendment prison conditions claim were recently summarized by the Tenth Circuit in Brooks v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 12 F.4th 1160, 1173 (10th Cir. 2021):
Prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). An inmate raising an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim must prove both an objective and subjective component associated with the deficiency. Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The objective component requires conditions sufficiently serious so as to (1) deprive an inmate “of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” or (2) subject an inmate to “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Shannon v. Graves, 257 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). “The subjective component requires that a defendant prison official have a culpable state of mind, that he or she acts or fails to act with deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety.” Id. To prove deliberate indifference, a prisoner must adduce sufficient facts to show the defendant knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Under this standard, “the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. This high standard for imposing personal liability on prison officials (i.e., the same...
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