Escamilla v. Superintendent
| Decision Date | 29 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 141121. |
| Citation | 777 S.E.2d 864,290 Va. 374 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Felipe Melendez ESCAMILLA v. SUPERINTENDENT, Rappahannock Regional Jail. |
Jonathan P. Sheldon (Sheldon, Flood & Haywood, on briefs), Alexandria, for appellant.
John C. Johnson (Frith Anderson & Peake, on brief), Roanoke, for appellee.
PRESENT: All the Justices.
In this appeal, we consider whether a Virginia circuit court has jurisdiction to provide habeas corpus relief to a petitioner being detained by federal authorities because of immigration issues arising as a consequence of a state conviction after the sentence for the state conviction has expired.
Felipe Melendez Escamilla was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1999. He was arrested in 2003, after being caught removing radios from automobiles, and charged with one count of grand larceny and three counts of tampering with a vehicle. Escamilla pled guilty in the General District Court of Stafford County to petit larceny and to the three misdemeanor tampering charges. Before pleading guilty, Escamilla asked his attorney if his guilty plea would have adverse consequences on his immigration status as a lawful permanent resident. His attorney erroneously advised him that there would be no negative consequences because he would serve less than one year's imprisonment. The general district court sentenced him to twelve months' incarceration with all but one month suspended for the petit larceny charge, and 180 days' incarceration, all of which was suspended, for each of the tampering charges. All of the suspended sentences were suspended for three years, and all of Escamilla's sentences expired in 2006.
On November 18, 2013, Escamilla was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities and taken to Rappahannock Regional Jail in preparation for removal proceedings. In a document styled “Notice to Appear” (designated ICE Form I–862), ICE charged that Escamilla was subject to removal because his 2003 petit larceny conviction triggered the applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which provides that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”1 The Notice to Appear further charged that Escamilla was subject to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), because he had been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude that did not arise from a single scheme of criminal conduct.2
On April 7, 2014, while in federal custody, Escamilla filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Stafford County alleging he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the attorney representing him in the 2003 Stafford County petit larceny case incorrectly informed him that his guilty plea would not have any negative immigration consequences. Escamilla alleged that had he known pleading guilty to the petit larceny charge could have resulted in his removal, he would have asked counsel to secure a sentence that would not qualify as a predicate under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) or otherwise gone to trial on the grand larceny charge.
The Superintendent of the Rappahannock Regional Jail moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider Escamilla's petition because he was not in custody pursuant to the challenged conviction and because his petition was time-barred. The Superintendent also argued that he had failed to establish prejudice as required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), because he had not proven it would have been reasonable to proceed to trial instead of pleading guilty.
The circuit court issued a letter opinion, granting the motion to dismiss. It held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition because Escamilla was not in custody for the purposes of Code § 8.01–654 at the time he filed the petition. The circuit court further found that the petition was untimely, having been brought more than ten years after the challenged conviction became final. Escamilla objected to the court's ruling, arguing that immigration detention was sufficient to satisfy the custody requirement and that the petition was timely because it was brought within one year of Escamilla's discovery of the alleged ineffective assistance.
The circuit court entered an order dismissing the petition on June 23, 2014. Escamilla appeals.3
Escamilla assigns error as follows:
Escamilla asserts that the circuit court erred in ruling that he was not detained without lawful authority and that it did not have jurisdiction to consider his habeas corpus petition. “Because entitlement to habeas relief is a mixed question of law and fact, the habeas court's findings and conclusions are not binding upon this Court, but are subject to review to determine whether the court correctly applied the law to the facts.” Zemene v. Clarke, 289 Va. 303, 306–07, 768 S.E.2d 684, 686 (2015). When a habeas court dismisses the petition based only upon a review of the pleadings, we review the decision to dismiss the petition de novo. Id.
“Habeas corpus is a writ of inquiry granted to determine whether a person is illegally detained.” Smyth v. Midgett, 199 Va. 727, 730, 101 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1958). Code § 8.01–654(A)(1) provides that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum shall be granted forthwith by the Supreme Court or any circuit court, to any person who shall apply for the same by petition, showing by affidavits or other evidence probable cause to believe that he is detained without lawful authority.” The statutory phrase “detained without lawful authority” allows a petitioner to challenge the lawfulness of the entire duration of his or her detention so long as an order entered in the petitioner's favor will result in a court order that, on its face and standing alone, will directly impact the duration of the petitioner's confinement. Carroll v. Johnson, 278 Va. 683, 693, 685 S.E.2d 647, 652 (2009). Thus, for a Virginia court to exercise jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition, the Commonwealth must be the source of both the challenged conviction and detention.
Detention is jurisdictional in habeas corpus, and therefore a prerequisite to any consideration of a habeas petition. See Blair v. Peyton, 210 Va. 416, 417, 171 S.E.2d 690, 691 (1970). The detention requirement was historically interpreted strictly to mean actual physical detention, but in modern times, this reading has been rejected. See Carroll, 278 Va. at 691–92, 685 S.E.2d at 651. Today we recognize that a petitioner is “detained” within the meaning of Code § 8.01–654 so long as the sentence under attack has not been “fully served.” See Midgett, 199 Va. at 730, 101 S.E.2d at 578. A petitioner who enjoys physical freedom but remains subject to a sentence not yet fully served, such as a suspended sentence, supervised parole, or probation, is under detention. See, e.g. Code § 8.01–654(B)(3) (). An individual is detained so long as he was sentenced to a term of incarceration and the Commonwealth retains active power over him that could result in immediate physical detention. E.C. v. Virginia Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 283 Va. 522, 529, 722 S.E.2d 827, 830 (2012) (); Zemene, 289 Va. at 309 n. 4, 768 S.E.2d at 687 n. 4 (); see also Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) ().
Jurisdiction for habeas proceedings must exist at the time the petition is filed. E.C., 283 Va. at 527–28, 722 S.E.2d at 829–30. The “scope of the inquiry is limited to the propriety of the prisoner's present detention.” Smyth v. Holland, 199 Va. 92, 97, 97 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1957) (collecting authorities). Generally, this means that courts do not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of a sentence under which the petitioner is not detained at the time he files the petition.5 Midgett, 199 Va. at 730, 101 S.E.2d at 578 ; see also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) ().
Here, Escamilla was not subject to actual or constructive detention for the conviction he seeks to challenge through his habeas petition. Escamilla seeks to attack his 2003 petit larceny conviction, but he completed his sentence for that crime in 2006, eight years prior to seeking habeas relief in 2014. Although he was physically detained at the time he filed the habeas petition, he was not detained by the Commonwealth for a violation of Virginia law. Rather, he was detained by the federal government based upon federal law.
Escamilla argues that his federal immigration detention was sufficient to satisfy the detention required for a Virginia court...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sabisch v. Moyer, 6, Sept. Term, 2019
...appears to be consistent with the basic concept set out in Jones[ ], 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373 [.]See also Escamilla v. Superintendent, 290 Va. 374, 777 S.E.2d 864, 868 (2015) (The Supreme Court of Virginia held that a person is "detained" for purposes of that State's habeas corpus statute......
-
Henderson v. Cook, Trustee for Noojin
...n.*, 737 S.E.2d 905 (quoting Dowdy v. Commonwealth , 278 Va. 577, 590 n.14, 686 S.E.2d 710 (2009) ). Accord Escamilla v. Superintendent , 290 Va. 374, 379 n.4, 777 S.E.2d 864 (2015) ; Herring , 288 Va. at 71-72, 758 S.E.2d 225. We have defined non-substantive alterations as those that "do n......
- McKellar v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc.
-
Brown v. Brown
...corpus statute ...." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). Virginia has a similar rule. See Escamilla v. Superintendent, Rappahannock Reg'l Jail, 777 S.E.2d 864, 868 (Va. 2015) ("petitioner who enjoys physical freedom but remains subject to a sentence not yet fully served, such as ......