Escobedo v. Dynasty Insulation, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. EP-08-CV-137-KC.,EP-08-CV-137-KC.
• Citation: 694 F. Supp.2d 638
• Parties: Sergio ESCOBEDO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DYNASTY INSULATION, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

694 F. Supp.2d 638

Sergio ESCOBEDO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DYNASTY INSULATION, INC., Defendant.

No. EP-08-CV-137-KC.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

March 3, 2010.

David Van Os, Ricardo Alberto Garcia, David Van Os & Associates, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff.

Michael D. McQueen, Gilbert Luis Sanchez, Kemp Smith LLP, El Paso, TX, for Defendant.

ORDER

KATHLEEN CARDONE, District Judge.

On this day, the Court considered Sergio Escobedo, et al.'s ("Plaintiffs") and Defendant Dynasty Insulation, Inc.'s ("Dynasty") respective cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Pls.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Pls.' Mot.") (Doc. No. 64); Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot.") (Doc. No. 65). In ruling upon these motions, the Court also considered Dynasty's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence ("Motion to Strike") (Doc. No. 67). For reasons discussed below, Dynasty's Motion to Strike is DENIED. Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED. Dynasty's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former employees of Dynasty who were hired to perform insulation work for the Southwest Cheese Company, L.L.C., located in Clovis, New Mexico ("Southwest Cheese Project"). Pls.' Mot. to Proceed as a Collective Action, for Notice to Potential Class Members, and for Disclosure of the Names, Information, Addresses and Contact Information of Potential Class Members ("Motion to Proceed") (Doc. No. 12). Dynasty is a Texas corporation that manufactures and installs commercial insulation. Pls.' Original Compl. k 4 ("Compl.") (Doc. No. 1); Def.'s Mot. to Strike Pls.' Summ. J. Evidence and Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Def.'s Resp.") (Doc. No. 67). According to Dynasty, Plaintiffs were employed by it sometime between the commencement of the Southwest Cheese Project in November 2004, through its alleged completion in December 2005. Def.'s Resp. 5. Dynasty claims that the last paychecks for insulation work performed on the Southwest Cheese Project were issued no later than January 2006. Id. 5. Plaintiffs, however, allege that work on the project was still being performed as late as March 19, 2006, and that it is possible that work continued after that date. Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Strike Pls.' Summ. J. Evidence and Reply to Def.'s Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Partial Summ J. 5 ("Pls.' Reply") (Doc. No. 71).

On April 24, 2008, five of Dynasty's former employees: Sergio Escobedo ("Escobedo"), José Cibrián ("Cibrián"), Freddy Torres, Héctor García ("García"), and César Torres (collectively, "Original Plaintiffs") filed a Complaint in this Court, alleging that Dynasty failed to pay them overtime wages for work performed in excess of forty hours, as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et. seq. ("FLSA"). See generally Compl. On August 18, 2009, Original Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See generally Mot. to Proceed. Thereafter, the Court issued an Order, conditionally certifying

all individuals who worked for Defendant Dynasty Insulation, Inc., who fabricated insulation materials or performed insulation or insulating work on the South West Cheese Company project, and who are or were eligible for overtime and were not paid overtime wages, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207.

Order, Sept. 19, 2008, 6 ("September 2008 Order") (Doc. No. 17).

Following the Court's September 2008 Order, ten additional former employees of Dynasty: José Magallanes ("Magallanes"), Ramón Hernández ("Hernández"), Artemio Rodríguez ("Rodríguez"), Manuel Hernández-Carrasco ("Hernández-Carrasco"), José J. Rubio ("Rubio"), Abel G. Romero ("Romero"), Antonio Gabaldón ("Gabaldón"), Felipe Pina ("Pina"), Ralph Armendáriz and Hiram Hinojosa ("Hinojosa") (collectively, "Opt-in Plaintiffs") opted-in to the instant lawsuit. Consent to Opt-in by Magallanes (Doc. No. 31); Consent to Opt-in by Hernández (Doc. No. 32); Consent to Opt-in by Rodríguez (Doc. No. 33); Consent to Opt-in by Hernández-Carrasco (Doc. No. 34); Consent to Opt-in by Rubio (Doc. No. 39); Consent to Opt-in by Romero (Doc. No. 40); Consent to Opt-in by Gabaldón (Doc. No. 41); Consent to Opt-in by Pina (Doc. No. 42); Consent to Opt-in by Ralph Armendáriz (Doc. No. 43); Consent to Opt-in by Hinojosa (Doc. No. 44). Magallanes, Hernández and Rodríguez filed their consents to opt-in on March 24, 2009. Hernández-Carrasco filed his consent to opt-in on March 26, 2009. The remaining six Opt-in Plaintiffs filed their consents to opt-in on April 22, 2009.

Dynasty subsequently challenged the class's certification on the ground that Opt-in Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred, and it submitted a motion to decertify the class. Def's Mot. to Decertify 2 ("Mot. to Decertify") (Doc. No. 55). The Court denied the Motion to Decertify, addressing Dynasty's statute of limitations argument only insofar as the argument affected the Court's analysis of whether Original Plaintiffs and Opt-in Plaintiffs were "similarly situated" for purposes of certification under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Order, Jul. 31, 2009, 10, 2009 WL 2382982 ("July 2009 Order") (Doc. No. 61).

As noted above, the parties have filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Pls.' Mot.; Def.'s Mot. Plaintiffs filed their motion on August 21, 2009. Pls.' Mot. Dynasty filed its Response on September 4, 2009. Def.'s Resp. The certified class filed a reply on September 18, 2009. Pls.' Reply.

The same day that Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, August 21, 2009, Dynasty filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Def.'s Mot. Dynasty also filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs' summary judgment evidence on the ground that it violated Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Def.'s Resp. The certified class filed its Response to Dynasty's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on September 3, 2009. Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Pls.' Resp.") (Doc. No. 66). Dynasty filed its Reply on September 18, 2009. Def.'s Reply in Support of Its Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Def.'s Reply") (Doc. No. 72).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard

Summary judgment is required "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2006). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir.1996). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Ellison, 85 F.3d at 189.

"The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir.1996). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by "conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence." Warfield, 436 F.3d at 557 (quoting Freeman v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 860 (5th Cir.2004)). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). Thus, the ultimate inquiry in a summary judgment motion is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Dynasty's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence

As an initial matter, Dynasty challenges Plaintiffs' summary judgment evidence; namely, the Declarations of Ralph Armendáriz and Rubio. Def.'s Resp. 3-4 (citing Pls.' Resp. Ex. 1 ("Rubio Decl."); Pls.' Mot. Ex. 1 ("Ralph Armendáriz Decl.")). Without these declarations, Dynasty claims that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof. Id.

Dynasty argues that the Declaration of Ralph Armendáriz is inadmissible because 1) Ralph Armendáriz lacks the personal knowledge required by Rule 56(e); and 2) the Declaration is inadmissible hearsay. Id. ("citing Ralph Armendáriz Decl."). Dynasty also challenges the Rubio Declaration as inadmissible hearsay. Id. ("citing Rubio Decl."). Without the Declaration of Ralph Armendáriz, Dynasty argues, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that any Plaintiff was unlawfully denied overtime wages. Id. at 6.

In its Response to Dynasty's Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs argue that, as Plaintiffs' direct supervisor, Ralph Armendáriz had personal knowledge of their claims. Pls.' Reply 2. Further, Plaintiffs contend that Dynasty's hearsay objection is inapplicable because Ralph Armendáriz's Declaration "reflects a reasonable inference gleaned from a review of the timesheets that he submitted for Mr. Torres and the corresponding paychecks Mr. Torres received as compensation for those workweeks." Id. at 2. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the statements made to Ralph Armendáriz and Rubio by Vice President and owner of Dynasty, Ricardo Armendáriz, qualify as admissions by a party-opponent and...