Esczuk v. Chicago Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 28 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. 40804,40804
• Citation: 236 N.E.2d 719,39 Ill.2d 464
• Parties: Bernice ESCZUK, Appellee, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. Appeal of GRECO CONTRACTORS, INC., et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 719

236 N.E.2d 719

39 Ill.2d 464

Bernice ESCZUK, Appellee, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. Appeal of GRECO CONTRACTORS, INC., et al.

No. 40804.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 28, 1968.

Rehearing Denied May 27, 1968.

Robert J. Nolan, Chicago (Mortimer, Nolan O'Malley & Dunne, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Leon C. Wexler and Bernard Davis, Chicago, for appellee.

SOLFISBURG, Chief Justice.

On November 23, 1960, the plaintiff, Bernice Esczuk, filed her complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against several defendants. The case was called for pretrial conference on January 18, 1965. Neither plaintiff nor defendants appeared and the trial court ordered the cause dismissed for want of prosecution. The trial court refused to reinstate the case after 30 days and the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded the cause with directions to sustain the petition to reinstate. (84 Ill.App.2d 247, 228 N.E.2d 553.) We have granted leave to appeal on the petition of defendants Greco Contractors, Inc. and Eugene McCartney.

Plaintiff's first petition to reinstate was filed approximately 18 months after the judgment and alleged no grounds for relief under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, chap. 110, par. 72), and was properly dismissed.

Thereafter on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff filed a petition to reinstate under section 72, alleging that although plaintiff's case had been called for pretrial on January 18, 1965, neither the plaintiff nor the defendants, Greco Contractors, Inc., and McCartney, had knowledge of such pretrial and did not attend; that because of plaintiff's failure to attend, the case was dismissed for want of prosecution; that neither the plaintiff nor defendants received notice of said dismissal until June, 1966; that the plaintiff had assumed that the matter was still pending on the trial calendar, but when the case did not appear on the calendar in its normal chronological order in June, 1966, the court file was checked and the dismissal order discovered; that the plaintiff has a good claim and should be allowed her day in court; that the defendant recognizes the validity of the claim and cause of action and made no motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, but rather answered the plaintiff's complaint; that immediately upon receiving knowledge of the dismissal order the plaintiff filed her petition under section 50 of the Civil Practice Act, which was denied. Plaintiff further alleged that the failure to attend the pretrial was 'mere inadvertence and excusable neglect.'

No answer or counteraffidavit was filed by defendants, and the trial court denied the petition.

The appellate court reversed on the ground that the trial court's refusal to reinstate the case was an abuse of discretion since 'it is uncontradicted that (1) plaintiff was not notified of the pretrial or of the dismissal for want of prosecution; (2) that plaintiff immediately checked the court file when the case did not appear on the trial calendar in its normal chronological order and (3) that plaintiff has a good cause of action.'

At the time plaintiff's suit was dismissed, Supreme Court Rule 22 governing pretrial procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 101.22) provided that 'In any civil action the court may hold a pretrial conference,' and that 'The court shall make and enforce all rules and orders necessary to compel compliance with this rule, and may apply the remedies provided in Rule 19--12(3);' which remedies included dismissal of the complaint.

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute the propriety of a dismissal for failure to attend a pretrial conference, but claims that her alleged lack of knowledge of the pretrial justified relief under section 72.

Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act substitutes a simple remedy by petition for various forms of post-trial relief and enables a party to bring before the court rendering a judgment matters of fact which, if known to the court at the time judgment was entered, would have prevented its rendition. (Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill.2d 502, 165 N.E.2d 294; Glenn v. People, 9 Ill.2d 335, 137 N.E.2d 336.) However, a party may not avail himself of the remedy provided by section 72 'unless he shows that through no fault or negligence of his own, the error of fact or the existence of a valid defense was not made to appear to the trial court. (Citations.) Such a motion or petition is not intended to relieve a party from the consequences of his own mistake or negligence.' (Brockmeyer v. Duncan, 18 Ill.2d 502, 505, 165 N.E.2d 294, 296.) The burden is upon the petitioner under section 72 to allege and prove the facts justifying relief.

It is significant that although plaintiff denied knowledge of both the pretrial conference and of the dismissal, she does not allege that no notices were sent to her or to her attorney of record nor does she deny that notice of the pretrial and the dismissal were duly published in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. Indeed, she attributes the failure to attend the pretrial conference to 'mere inadvertency or excusable neglect * * *.' The section 72 petition does not allege and there is no suggestion that plaintiff's lack of knowledge was due in any way to fraud on the part of defendants or the court.

We do not believe the facts alleged...