Eshagh v. Terminix Int'l Co.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | 1:11cv0222 AWI DLB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | EDVARD ESHAGH, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL COMPANY L.P., a limited partnership; TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants. |
REGARDING MOTION TO STAY
LITIGATION, COMPEL ARBITRATION
AND STRIKE CLASS CLAIMS
(Document 35)
Defendants Terminix International, Inc. and The Terminix International Company Limited Partnership ("Defendants") filed the instant motion to stay litigation, compel arbitration and strike class claims on August 30, 2011. The motion was heard on April 13, 2012, before the Honorable Dennis L. Beck, United States Magistrate Judge. David Creagh appeared on behalf of Defendants. Thomas Campbell and W. Scott Simpson1 appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Edvard Eshagh.
Plaintiff Edvard Eshagh ("Plaintiff"), purportedly on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, filed this action against Defendants The Terminix International Company L.P. and Terminix International, Inc. (collectively "Terminix" or "Defendants") on February 8, 2011.
On April 7, 2011, Terminix filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court granted the motion to dismiss, ordering Plaintiff to file an amended complaint regarding certain claims and dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's tort claims for breach of professional duty and assumpsit as time barred. Docs. 27 and 30.
On August 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Pursuant to the FAC, Plaintiff seeks recovery for breach of a California Subterranean Termite Plan and Agreement, and for violations of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") and False Advertising Law ("FAL"). Doc. 32.
On August 30, 2011, Terminix filed an answer to the breach of contract allegations in the FAC. Doc. 33. Concurrent with the answer, Terminix also filed: (1) a motion to dismiss the UCL and FAL causes of action; and (2) the instant motion to stay litigation, compel arbitration and strike class claims. Docs. 34 and 35.
On February 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to stay litigation, compel arbitration and strike class claims. Doc. 43. Terminix replied on February 27, 2012. Doc. 49. The motion was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) for Findings and Recommendations to the District Court.
Terminix moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. In relevant part, the FAA provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States districtcourt which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. . . .The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. . . .
9 U.S.C. § 4.
Plaintiff challenges the application of the FAA, arguing that the California Arbitration Act ("CAA") is the operable law. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2. To support this assertion, Plaintiff claims that Terminix did not invoke the FAA in its motion, but instead demanded arbitration based on unidentified state law. Doc. 43, p. 9. Plaintiff points to a phrase contained in Terminix's prayer for relief, which requests arbitration "pursuant to applicable California law and the parties' arbitration agreement." Doc. 35-1, p. 6. However, it is evident from Terminix's moving papers that the demand for arbitration is based on the FAA. Doc. 35-1, p. 2.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). Plaintiff suggests that this action does not involve interstate commerce. This argument is unpersuasive in light of Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). In Allied-Bruce, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the FAA's "interstate commerce" provision is interpreted broadly and that the FAA's reach coincides with that of the Commerce Clause. Considering the broad interpretation, the Supreme Court concluded that a termite protection contract "involved commerce" under the FAA based on the multi-state nature of Terminix and the shipping of materials from out-of-state. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282.
Plaintiff does not reference Allied-Bruce and instead argues that state law controls because the parties entered the agreement in California, the contract is expressly designated "California Subterranean Termite Plan and Agreement" and California maintains a regulatory scheme regarding structural pest control services. Cal. Civ. Code § 1646; Cal Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 8505 et seq.; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 8525 et seq.; Cal. Food & Agric. Code §§ 15201 et seq. However, these facts alone do not remove this transaction from interstate commerce. Courts construing the "transaction involving commerce" language of section 2 have focused on the nature of the defendant's business. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Labor Ready, Inc., 1997 WL 294393, *3 (N.D. Cal. 1997). The interstate nature of Terminix is enough to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the FAA. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281-82; Terminix Intern. Co. Ltd. P'ship v. Jackson, 669 So.2d 893, 895-96 (Ala. 1995); Baer v. Terminix Intern. Co., Ltd. P'ship (975 F.Supp. 1272, 1278 (D. Kan. 1997). Therefore, the FAA is applicable to the request for arbitration in this case.
The FAA creates "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability." Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). Thus, unless the agreement provides otherwise, all questions regarding interpretation of arbitration agreements are determined by federal standards. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22-24. Any question concerning arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1999).
"[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (citations omitted); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 925 F.2d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 1991). As with any contract, the parties' intentions control. Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist., 925 F.2d at 1139. However, theparties' intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
The FAA "leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (emphasis in original). The court's role is limited to determining: "(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001). If both questions are answered in the affirmative, then the FAA requires the court to enforce arbitration. Id.
Plaintiff and Terminix entered into a "California Subterranean Termite Plan and Agreement" ("CSA") on or about September 20, 1999. Exhibit A to FAC. Terminix argues that Plaintiff's claims are the subject of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. Terminix cites Section 10 of the CSA, which states:
10. ARBITRATION. The Purchaser and Terminix agree that all matters in dispute between them, including but not limited to any controversy or claim between them arising out of or relating to this agreement or the identified property in any way, whether by virtue of contract, tort or otherwise shall be settled exclusively by arbitration. Such arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules then in force of the American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator(s) shall be bound by rules of substantive law and shall not be bound by the rules of evidence, whether or not set out by statute, except for provisions relating to privileged communications. Any award of damages pursuant to such arbitration shall be included in a written decisions which shall state the reasons upon which the award was based, including all the elements involved in the calculation of any award of damages. The decision of the arbitrator shall be a final and binding resolution of the disagreement which may be entered as a judgment by any court of competent jurisdiction. Neither party shall sue the other except for enforcement of the arbitrator's decision. In no event shall either party be liable to the other for indirect, special or consequential damages or loss of anticipated rents...
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