Eskridge v. State
| Decision Date | 25 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05–1111–PC–629.,49A05–1111–PC–629. |
| Citation | 984 N.E.2d 719 |
| Parties | James ESKRIDGE, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court; The Honorable Grant W. Hawkins, Judge; The Honorable Christina R. Klineman, Master Commissioner; Cause No. 49G05–9701–CF–15475.
James Eskridge, New Castle, IN, Appellant Pro Se.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, George P. Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
James Eskridge, pro se, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged the revocation of his parole.1 Eskridge raises three issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
The relevant facts as discussed in Eskridge's direct appeal follow:
On January 5, 1997, [R.B.], Brian Mitchell and Eskridge were inmates in cell block 2–1 at the Marion County Jail. Early that morning, [R.B.] ate breakfast and then climbed in a top bunk bed to sleep. At some point, [R.B.] woke up and there was a towel around his mouth. [R.B.] saw Eskridge standing on his right side holding his arms and Mitchell behind him with his pants down. Mitchell hit [R.B.] on the back and told him to “Take it like a bitch.” Next, [R.B.] felt a sharp pain in his rectum which lasted for approximately five minutes. The object that penetrated [R.B.]'s rectum felt like “skin,” not an inanimate object. [R.B.] also felt punches to his body. He tried to resist but could not because his arms were being held down. [R.B.] was unable to scream because of the towel around his face. When the pain stopped, Mitchell told [R.B.] if he told anyone about the incident he would kill him. [R.B .] eventually told a corrections officer who then transported him to the hospital.
When [R.B.] arrived at the hospital, he told the nurse that he had been assaulted. Dr. Jason Zelenka, the physician who examined [R.B.], observed bruising around [R.B.]'s left eye and large bruises on his left leg. The rectal examination performed by Dr. Zelenka revealed no external trauma, i.e., no scrapes, abrasions or bleeding. Nor was semen detected during the examination. [R.B.] was withdrawn and quiet throughout the physical examination.
On January 8, 1997, Detective Steven Summers interviewed [R.B.], and [R.B.] identified Eskridge and Mitchell in a photo line-up as the inmates who had sexually assaulted him. Detective Summers took photos of [R.B.] during the interview, and those photos revealed bruises on [R.B.]'s left leg, left eye, upper right arm and lower right buttock.
[R.B.] was then transferred out of cell block 2–1. [R.B.] later encountered Eskridge in an elevator, and Eskridge asked [R.B.] why he had “snitched” on him and Mitchell.
Eskridge v. State, No. 49A02–9803–CR–288, slip op. at 2–3 (Ind.Ct.App. October 20, 1998) (footnotes omitted). After a jury trial, Eskridge was convicted of criminal deviate conduct as a class B felony. Id. at 2. The court sentenced Eskridge to twenty years. Id. On direct appeal, Eskridge argued that the evidence was insufficient and that the court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of a prior incident between Eskridge and the victim. Id. This court affirmed. Id.
On February 20, 2002, Eskridge filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 2 The post-conviction court denied Eskridge's petition. On appeal, this court affirmed the post-conviction court.
On March 11, 2008, Eskridge was released to parole, but he was returned to the Department of Correction as a violator on July 18, 2008. On August 14, 2008, Eskridge's parole was revoked at a revocation hearing. On January 15, 2009, the Indiana Parole Board (the “Board”) decided to grant Eskridge release to parole, and Eskridge was released to parole on or about February 24, 2009. Eskridge signed a conditional parole release agreement dated February 23, 2009, which included the following provisions:
4. OWNING, LEASING, AND OPERATING MOTOR VEHICLES
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b) I agree to consult with my supervising officer and receive his written permission prior to purchasing or leasing a motor vehicle. Permission to own, lease, or operate a motor vehicle is granted with the understanding that I shall comply with all state laws, local ordinances, and regulations of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles pertaining to ownership, financial responsibility, and the operation of motor vehicles.
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10 COMMUNICATION AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS—I agree to report to my supervising officer as instructed and to respond to any and all communications from any authorized employee of the Department of Correction. I will abide by any special conditions imposed by the Indiana Parole Board which have been reduced to writing and included as a condition of my parole.
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1. You shall enroll in, actively participate in and successfully complete an approved sex offender treatment program. You must maintain steady progress toward all treatment goals and may not change treatment providers without prior approval of your parole agent. Prompt payment of any fees is your responsibility.
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5. You must not reside, visit or be within one thousand (1,000) feet of public parks with playgrounds, pools, rides, and/or nature trials; schools, day care centers, public swimming pools, public beaches, theaters, or any other place where children can reasonably be expected to congregate.
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17. You shall not stay overnight with any adult and/or establish an intimate and/or sexual relationship with any adult without prior approval by your parole agent and treatment clinician. You must also report whether the person you are having a relationship with has children under the age of eighteen (18) and/or if children under the age of eighteen (18) reside in the person's home.
Exhibit D.
In late August 2009, Agent Arthur Torrance of the Indianapolis Parole District filed a report which alleged that Eskridge violated provision 4(b) regarding the use of a vehicle and provisions 10–1, 10–5, and 10–17.3 In a report dated August 27, 2009, the Board ordered Eskridge to return immediately and scheduled a parole revocation hearing within sixty days of August 27, 2009. 4 Agent Torrance explained to Eskridge that he had the right to have a preliminary hearing to “let him know the allegations that he was being faced with at that time, let him know he had the right to speak on his own behalf....” Transcript at 17. Initially, Eskridge indicated that he wanted to have a hearing, but after interacting with Agent Green, Eskridge indicated that he wanted to sign the waiver. On August 27, 2009, Eskridge signed a waiver of Preliminary Hearing form which stated: “I plead guilty to the following alleged technical parole violations: Rule # 4 Driving without/suspended license, stipulation # 1 failure to attend treatment[,] stipulation # 5 being within 1000 feet of a school, stipulation # 17 being in a[n] unapproved sexual relationship and waive my right to a preliminary hearing.” Exhibit Q. This form was also signed by Agent Torrance as a witness.
On September 23, 2009, Eskridge signed a form titled “Notification of Parole Violation Hearing” which indicated that his parole violation hearing had been scheduled for September 29, 2009. Exhibit G. On September 29, 2009, a parole revocation hearing was held. At the beginning of the hearing, a member of the Board asked whether Eskridge had received a notice of the hearing and whether he was ready to proceed, and Eskridge answered affirmatively to each question. The Board then read the alleged violations and referenced the fact that Eskridge had signed the waiver form. Eskridge stated that he was told “just to sign” the waiver form and that signing the form would “get [him] out of county jail and back here in front of you all quicker.” Exhibit L. When a member of the Board questioned Eskridge regarding the fact that he had initialed the part of the form which stated “I plead guilty to the following alleged technical parole violations,” Eskridge stated that he did not understand the form. Id. A member of the board then indicated that he would read the allegations and take Eskridge's pleas “such as they would have done on a preliminary hearing.” Id. Eskridge pled not guilty to violating Rules 4(b), 10–1, and 10–17, pled guilty to Rule 10–5, and testified regarding the alleged violations. The Board acknowledged the presence of Eskridge's visitors but told Eskridge that it does not take public testimony on hearing days. At the end of the hearing, Eskridge asked the members of the Board whether they had received letters of recommendation. A member of the Board stated that it did not receive driver's license information and that it did not have a letter from Foundry Services. The Board found Eskridge guilty of violating Rules 4(b), 10–5, and 10–17, not guilty of violating Rule 10–1, and ordered that Eskridge be assessed the balance of his sentence and scheduled his next parole appearance for October 2010.
On May 24, 2010, this court authorized Eskridge to file a petition for post-conviction relief and on September 15, 2010, Eskridge did so. Eskridge alleged that the Board denied him due process by denying him the right to present testimony and evidence. Eskridge also alleged that the “[p]reliminary hearing was waived with the misrepresentation by the said parole officer who was in fact filing the violation on the petitioner.” Appellant's Appendix at 92. Eskridge also alleged that the “facts supporting the violation were fabricated in nature, and restrictions did not reasonably relate to [him].” Id.
On March 9, 2011, the court held an evidentiary hearing. On October 13, 2011, the court denied Eskridge's petition. The court's order states:
Findings of Fact
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2. A parole revocation...
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