Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hosp.

• Decision Date: 21 September 2016
• Docket Number: F071761
• Citation: 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 651,3 Cal.App.5th 547
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Emma ESPARZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KAWEAH DELTA DISTRICT HOSPITAL, Defendant and Respondent.

3 Cal.App.5th 547

207 Cal.Rptr.3d 651

Emma ESPARZA, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.KAWEAH DELTA DISTRICT HOSPITAL, Defendant and Respondent.

F071761

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Filed September 21, 2016

Quinlan, Kershaw & Fanucchi and David M. Moeck, Fresno, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Weiss Martin Salinas & Hearst, Lisa M. Martin, Fresno, and Carol A. O'Neil for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

FRANSON, J.

This appeal from a judgment of dismissal raises the following question about proper pleading: What facts must a plaintiff allege to adequately plead he or she complied with the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act?¹

This question was answered in Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 709 (Perez ), where we held that “a plaintiff may allege compliance with the claims presentation requirement in the Government Claims Act by including a general allegation that he or she timely complied with the claims statute.” (Id . at p. 1237, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 709, fn. omitted.)

In this case, plaintiff checked the boxes to item 9.a of the Judicial Council Form for pleading a personal injury cause of action and thereby alleged that she was required to comply with a claims statute and had complied with applicable claims statutes. Later in her pleading, plaintiff alleged that she “served a claim on Kaweah Delta District Hospital pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 910 et seq. on or at December 3, 2013.”

Plaintiff's additional allegation about serving a claim on or at a specific date does not contradict her general allegation of compliance. Consequently, applying the rule adopted in Perez, we conclude she adequately alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act and the demurrer should have been overruled. We publish this decision to confirm the holding of Perez and set forth our interpretation of the California Supreme Court's decision in DiCampli–Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884 (DiCampli ). We do not read DiCampli, a summary judgment case that did not address the adequacy of the pleadings, as impliedly disapproving Perez or the rule allowing plaintiffs to plead compliance with the claims statutes using a general allegation.

We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The Medical Malpractice Claim

Plaintiff Emma Esparza was hospitalized at defendant Kaweah Delta District Hospital² from about June 3, 2013, to about June 8, 2013. During her stay, defendant's employees administered the wrong dosage of a medication named Gentamicin to plaintiff. Specifically, they gave her 100 milligrams instead of the prescribed amount of 10 milligrams. The actions of defendant's employees breached the applicable standard care. This breach caused plaintiff to suffer vertigo, loss of hearing, balance issues, visions issues and other damages including, but not limited to, medical expenses.

The Pleadings

On June 2, 2014, plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against defendant. The operative pleading in this case is plaintiff's second amended complaint, which consisted of a completed Judicial Council form PLD–PI–001 (rev. Jan. 1, 2007)—the form complaint for personal injury claims—and a one-page attachment.

The second amended complaint alleged: “Plaintiff is required to comply with a claims statute, and [¶] ... has complied with applicable claims statutes....” Plaintiff made this allegation by checking the boxes for item 9.a on the Judicial Council form. The page attached to the form complaint included the additional allegation that plaintiff had “served a claim on Kaweah Delta District Hospital pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 910 et seq. on or at December 3, 2013.”

The Demurrer

Defendant demurred to the second amended complaint on the grounds that it failed to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act or, alternatively, its allegations were uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible with regard to compliance with the Government Claims Act. Defendant asserted plaintiff's allegation that she served a claim on defendant did not match up with the requirements of Government Code sections 910 and 915, subdivision (a). Defendant also asserted that the second amended complaint failed to state how it responded to plaintiff's claim—that is, whether defendant “acted on Plaintiff's government claim or was deemed to have rejected the claim by not acting on it.” Based on these purported deficiencies, defendant contended that plaintiff failed to allege facts showing a disposition of her claim that would authorize her to file a complaint.

The Trial Court's Ruling

In November 2014, the trial court filed a minute order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The minute order stated that the court could not discern from the facts stated in the second amended complaint if plaintiff's medical malpractice claims were “viable, time-barred, or that plaintiff timely presented a proper claim to [defendant] to comply with the requirements of the Government Claims Act.” The minute order also stated plaintiff did not allege facts showing that she had presented her claim to defendant by one of the methods of service authorized by subdivision (a) of section 915 and defendant acted on her claim and rejected it or, alternatively, was deemed to have rejected it by failing to act within the statutory period. The minute order also noted plaintiff had not alleged facts showing she was excused from complying with the Government Claims Act.

In December 2014, a signed order sustaining the demurrer was filed by the trial court. In March 2015, after a motion to vacate and set aside the order sustaining the demurrer was denied, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a trial court sustains a demurrer on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the appellate court independently reviews the allegations and determines their sufficiency. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171.) When conducting this independent review, appellate courts “treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.]” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 614, 161 P.3d 1168 (Dinuba ).) Where a pleading includes a general allegation and an inconsistent specific allegation, the specific allegation controls over the inconsistent general allegation. (Perez , supra , 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 709.)

II. HOW TO ALLEGE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLAIM REQUIREMENT

A. A General Allegation of Compliance Is Allowed

In Perez, we discussed State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116, Code of Civil Procedure section 459,³ and Ley v. Babcock (1931) 118 Cal.App. 525, 5 P.2d 620, before concluding “that a plaintiff may allege compliance with the claims presentation requirement in the Government Claims Act by including a general allegation that he or she timely complied with the claims statute.”⁴ (Perez , supra , 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 709, fn. omitted.) That discussion need not be repeated here because it already is published. (Id . at pp. 1236–1237, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 709.)

In this appeal, defendant argues that Perez is no longer good law because it was decided two months before the California Supreme Court decided DiCampli , supra , 55 Cal.4th 983, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884 and was implied overruled. We disagree.

In DiCampli, a patient sued two surgeons and a county hospital for malpractice. (DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 987–988, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884.) The patient's attorney prepared a letter notifying the defendants, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 364, of her intent to sue them for negligence. (DiCampli, supra, at p. 987, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884.) The attorney personally delivered the letter to an employee of the medical staffing office in the hospital's administration building, but did not deliver a copy to the county's clerk or auditor or the clerk of the county's board of supervisors. (Ibid . ) The county filed a motion for summary judgment, contending the patient failed to comply with the Government Claims Act because her claim was never presented to or received by a statutorily designated recipient as required by section 915. (DiCampli, supra, at p. 989, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884.) The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. (Ibid . ) The court of appeal reversed the trial court, concluding the patient had substantially complied with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. (DiCampli, supra, at p. 989, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884.) The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, which reinstated the order granting the county's motion for summary judgment. (Id . at p. 998, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884.) The Supreme Court determined the plain language of section 915 required delivery of the claim to one of the persons designated in the statute. (DiCampli, supra, at p. 992, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884.) Consequently, the court rejected the statutory interpretation that allowed substantial compliance with the claim delivery requirement. (Ibid . )

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the California Supreme Court's decision in DiCampli did not overrule Perez or otherwise disapprove the principle that the ultimate fact of compliance with the claims presentation requirement in the Government Claims Act can be pled using a general allegation.

First, DiCampli, supra , 55 Cal.4th 983, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884, did not mention Perez or the adequacy of the pleadings before it. Consequently, the court...