Espejo v. Cornell Univ.

• Decision Date: 03 March 2021
• Docket Number: 3:20-CV-467 (MAD/ML)
• Citation: 523 F.Supp.3d 228
• Parties: Emilio ESPEJO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Alec Faber, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and Ahnaf Rahman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

523 F.Supp.3d 228

Emilio ESPEJO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Alec Faber, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and Ahnaf Rahman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

3:20-CV-467 (MAD/ML)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed March 3, 2021

OF COUNSEL: JOHN C. CHERUNDOLO, ESQ., CHERUNDOLO LAW FIRM, PLLC, AXA Tower One, 15th Floor, 100 Madison Street, Syracuse, New York 13202, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

OF COUNSEL: ROY T. WILLEY, IV, ESQ., ERIC POULIN, ESQ., BLAKE G. ABBOTT, ESQ., ANASTOPOULO LAW FIRM, LLC, 32 Ann Street, Charleston, South Carolina 29403, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

OF COUNSEL: MAX STUART ROBERTS, ESQ., PHILIP LAWRENCE FRAIETTA, ESQ., BURSOR & FISHER, P.A., 888 7th Avenue, 3rd Floor, New York, New York 10106, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

OF COUNSEL: SARAH WESTCOT, ESQ., BURSOR & FISHER, P.A., 701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1420, Miami, Florida 33131, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

OF COUNSEL: EDWARD TOPTANI, ESQ., TOPTANI LAW PLLC, 375 Pearl Street, Ste 1410, New York, New York 10038, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

OF COUNSEL: KELSEY W. SHANNON, ESQ., LYNN LAW FIRM, LLP, M&T Bank Building, 101 South Salina Street, Suite 750, Syracuse, New York 13202, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

OF COUNSEL: EDWARD CIOLKO, ESQ., GARY F. LYNCH, ESQ., JAMES PATRICK MCGRAW, III, ESQ., CARLSON LYNCH, LLP, 1133 Penn Avenue, Ste 5th Floor, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

OF COUNSEL: KATHLEEN P. LALLY, ESQ., CARLSON LYNCH, LLP, 111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240, Chicago, Illinois 60602, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

OF COUNSEL: VALERIE L. DORN, ESQ., ADAM PENCE, ESQ., CORNELL UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF COUNSEL, 300 CCC Building, 235 Garden Avenue, Ithaca, New York 14853, Attorneys for Defendant.

OF COUNSEL: ISHAN KHARSHEDJI BHABHA, ESQ., LAUREN J. HARTZ, ESQ., JENNER, BLOCK LAW FIRM - DC OFFICE, 1099 New York Avenue, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20001, Attorneys for Defendant.

OF COUNSEL: PAUL RIETEMA, ESQ., JENNER & BLOCK LLP, 353 N. Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois 60654, Attorneys for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 23, 2020, Olivia Haynie filed this putative class action against Defendant Cornell University alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion stemming from Cornell's decision to close its campus and transition to online learning in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Dkt. No. 1. On April 25, 2020 and May 31, 2020, Plaintiffs Faber and Rahman, respectively, filed nearly identical class action complaints against Cornell University. See Faber v. Cornell , No. 3:20-CV-471, Dkt. No. 1 (N.D.N.Y.); Rahman v. Cornell University , No. 3:20-CV-592, Dkt. No. 1 (N.D.N.Y.). On August 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate these actions. See Dkt. No. 27. The motion to consolidate was granted, and, soon thereafter, Plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 32, 33. In the amended complaint, Plaintiffs added Emilio Espejo as a Plaintiff to this action. See Dkt. No. 33. On October 29, 2020, Plaintiff Haynie voluntarily dismissed her claim. See Dkt. Nos. 36, 37.

On November 10, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 38. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. See Dkt. No. 39. At the parties’ request, the Court held oral argument on the motion on February 8, 2021. Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this case as a result of Cornell's decision not to issue certain refunds for the Spring 2020 semester after all classes were transitioned to an online format, most campus buildings were closed, and students were required to leave campus due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs are students, or parents of students, who were enrolled at Cornell University during the Spring 2020 term. See Dkt. No. 33 at ¶¶ 9-11, 18.

Cornell's Spring 2020 semester began on January 21, 2020. See id. at ¶ 36. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendant announced on March 13, 2020, that it was suspending all classes effective immediately. See id. at ¶ 39. The same day, Cornell announced that all undergraduate and most professional students were required to leave campus no later than March 29, 2020, unless the students received an exception. See id. at ¶ 40. The announcement also "strongly encouraged" students to leave campus prior to the deadline. See id. Although not alleged in the complaint, Defendant states that online instruction of students began on April 6, 2020. See Dkt. No. 38-1 at 11.

Cornell has since announced that it has, or soon will, issue refunds on room and board fees to be pro-rated from the March 29, 2020 closure. See id. at ¶ 50. However, Cornell has refused to offer refunds on tuition or other fees for the Spring 2020 term. See id. at ¶¶ 47-49. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of all people who paid tuition, fees, and room and board for – or on behalf of – students enrolled in classes for the Spring 2020 term. See id. at ¶ 55.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark , 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd. , 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleading, the court may consider documents that are "integral" to that pleading, even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal , 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. , 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) ).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the claim," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]’ " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quotation omitted). Under this standard, the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level," see id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible on [their] face," id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief." ’ " Id. (quoting [Twombly , 550 U.S.] at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 ). Ultimately, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly , 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed[,]" id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

B. Plaintiff Espejo's Standing

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal court may only exercise subject matter jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff has standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the three "irreducible constitutional minimum" elements of Article III standing. See id. "The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016).

To establish an "injury in fact," a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." ’ " Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas , 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) ). To be "particularized," an injury must affect the plaintiff "in a personal and individual way," and to be "concrete" an injury "must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist." Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548. As for the "actual or imminent" requirement, a plaintiff must allege a non-speculative injury. See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 583-84, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

Here, Plaintiff Espejo's standing is based solely on the fact that he paid tuition for his child. See Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 39 at 31-32. Plaintiffs do not allege that Plaintiff Espejo's child is a minor, that he directly contracted with Cornell, or that he is an intended third-party beneficiary. See generally Dkt. No. 33. Without such allegations, Plaintiff Espejo cannot demonstrate injury-in-fact. Therefore, this Court, as have many others considering similar issues, finds that Plaintiff Espejo does not have standing to advance his claim. See Bergeron v. Rochester Inst. of Tech. , No. 20-CV-6283, 2020 WL 7486682, *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020) ; Salerno v. Fla. S. Coll. , 488 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1216–17, (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2020) ; Lindner v. Occidental Coll. , No. CV-20-8481, 2020 WL...