Espinosa v. Metcalf
| Docket Number | 21-cv-10356-DJC |
| Decision Date | 23 June 2023 |
| Parties | SERGIO ESPINOSA SR. and SERGIO ESPINOSA JR., Plaintiffs, v. ANDREW C. METCALF d/b/a JUDGMENT ACQUISITIONS UNLIMITED, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
The Court has previously granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs Sergio Espinosa Sr. (“Senior”) and Sergio Espinosa Jr. (“Junior”) (collectively “Plaintiffs” or the “Espinosas”) on their claims against Andrew C. Metcalf (“Metcalf”) d/b/a Judgment Acquisitions Unlimited (“JAU”) and Champion Funding, Inc. (“Champion”) (collectively “Defendants”) under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (Counts I, IV and VI), Mass. Gen. L. c. 93 and 93A (Counts V and IX) and for conversion (Count X) arising from an attempted debt collection. D. 92. After a one-day bench trial on damages, the Court now issues its findings of facts and conclusions of law on damages for the aforementioned claims against Metcalf, JAU and Champion and shall enter judgment for the Espinosas accordingly.
The Espinosas instituted this action against Metcalf, JAU, Champion, Export Enterprises Inc. (“Export”), Massachusetts Constable Inc. d/b/a Massachusetts Constables Office (“MCO”) and Brian Abelli (“Abelli”) (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting various claims. D. 1, 41. The Espinosas settled their claims with Export. D. 89. The Espinosas and Abelli and MCO filed cross motions for partial summary judgment, D. 63, D. 67. Abelli and MCO also settled with the Espinosas, D. 90, and the Court accordingly denied their motion as moot, D. 67, and denied the Espinosas' motion for partial summary judgment, D. 63, to the extent that it concerned claims against Abelli and MCO. D. 90, 92 at 1-2. Accordingly, the only part of the motions for partial summary judgment that remained for the Court's consideration was the Espinosas' motion as to Counts I, IV, V, VI, IX, and X against Champion, Metcalf and JAU. D. 63. The Court allowed the Espinosas' motion for partial summary judgment as to these claims. D. 92 at 2, 16-17. Following this ruling, the Espinosas withdrew their remaining claims against Champion, Metcalf and JAU. D. 96 at 1-2. Accordingly, the only question that remained for the bench trial was the measure of damages on the Espinosas' FDCPA (Counts I, IV and VI), Mass. Gen. L. c. 93 and 93A (Counts V and IX) and conversion (Count X) claims against Metcalf, Champion and JAU.
At the bench trial, D. 112, the Espinosas, Senior and Junior, testified. D. 113. The Espinosas also introduced four exhibits: copies of their Chapter 93A letters to Metcalf, JAU and Champion and the Defendants' responses to the same. D. 113; D. 107-1; D. 107-2; D. 107-3; D. 107-4. Metcalf, JAU and Champion did not introduce additional evidence. The Court took the matter under advisement. D. 112.
On the question of liability, the Court incorporates the undisputed facts recited in its summary judgment ruling. D. 92. The undisputed facts established that Champion, Metcalf and JAU are debt collectors who seized a vehicle belonging to Junior and a vehicle leased by Senior, neither of which Champion, Metcalf and JAU had a legal right to possess. Id. at 7-9. Accordingly, the Court's findings of fact are limited to those which pertain to damages.
1. In 2006, a default judgment in Lowell District Court was entered against Senior for a credit card debt. Id. at 3.
2. Junior, a child in 2006, had nothing to do with this credit card debt, or with the resultant judgment obtained thereon. Id.
3. Fourteen years later, on September 22, 2020, Export and MCO seized Junior's Mini Cooper on behalf of Metcalf, JAU and Champion in an attempt to collect Senior's debt. Id. at 4.
4. On September 23, 2020, Junior called JAU and spoke with Metcalf, advising him that the Mini Cooper belonged to him, not Senior. Id. at 5; Tr. at 22:5-23:8.[1]
5. Metcalf responded by calling Junior a “liar” and mentioned that he “deals with liars all the time.” Tr. at 23:4-8.
6. Metcalf and JAU told Junior that he would have to pay $4,000 and that Junior would need to pay that sum within twenty-four hours if he wanted to get his Mini Cooper back. Tr. at 24:3-11.
7. On September 24, 2020, Junior emailed JAU's attorney, Michael Zola, advising him that his vehicle was wrongfully taken. Tr. at 23:20-25.
8. With that email, Junior also enclosed copies of financing documentation showing that he owned the Mini Cooper. Tr. at 23:20-25.
9. Over the next sixteen days, until October 9, 2020, Champion, Metcalf, JAU and Export continued to hold Junior's Mini Cooper. D. 92 at 5; Tr. at 32:22-25.
10. On October 9, 2020, Export brought Junior's Mini Cooper back to the Espinosas' residence and immediately seized Senior's Honda Accord. D. 92 at 5; Tr. at 48:15-17.
11. Senior does not own this Honda Accord, which is leased from Honda and owned by Honda. D. 92 at 5; Tr. at 33:6-17.
12. On October 21, 2020, after being instructed by JAU that the Honda Accord was released, Junior and Senior drove to Export's tow yard to retrieve it. D. 92 at 5; Tr. at 49:1-4.
13. At that time, an Export representative advised the Espinosas that they would first have to pay the towing and storage fees sought by Export. D. 92 at 5-6; Tr. at 49:1-6.
14. Senior could not afford to pay the towing and storage fees that Export wanted, so he and Junior returned home without the Honda Accord. D. 92 at 6; Tr. at 49:7-10.
15. Metcalf, Champion, JAU and Export continued to hold onto Senior's vehicle for seven months until it was returned to the Espinosas' residence on May 1, 2021. D. 92 at 6; Tr. at 39:15-16.
16. More than thirty days before this lawsuit was filed on March 3, 2021, the Espinosas sent demand letters to Metcalf, JAU and Champion, setting forth their claim under Mass. Gen. c. L. 93A. D. 107-1 (dated January 5, 2021); D. 107-2 (dated January 7, 2021).
17. Metcalf, JAU and Champion received these letters, as evidenced by their responses.
18. In response to the Espinosas' demand letters, Metcalf, JAU and Champion each offered $10 for settlement of the claims. D. 107-3 at 1; D. 107-4 at 1.
19. Junior was deprived of his Mini Cooper for sixteen days, while he continued to pay his monthly loan payment in the amount of $138 plus car insurance. Tr. at 19:16-25.
20. The lowest amount Junior has ever rented a car was at a rate of approximately $80 per day. Tr. at 25:9-14.
21. During this period of time, Junior's girlfriend sometimes drove him in her car to and from work, which he found embarrassing. Tr. at 18:17-21; see 21:5-17; 27:2-7.
22. Junior was forced to reveal his father's indebtedness to some of his colleagues at work in having to ask those colleagues for rides to and from work, which exposed him to further embarrassment. Tr. at 18:8-21.
23. Junior was also forced to reveal his father's indebtedness to his friends whenever they planned get-togethers and he could not drive. Tr. at 20:17-21:4; 24:18-25:3.
24. Senior was deprived of his Honda Accord for 204 days, between October 9, 2020 and May 1, 2021. D. 92 at 5-6; Tr. at 39:15-16.
25. During this time, Senior was still forced to pay his monthly lease payments that he owed to Honda, even though he did not have access to it at this time. Tr. at 46:7-10.
26. Senior sometimes had to walk to work and other destinations during that time. Tr. at 35:8-15.
27. After Junior's Mini Cooper was returned on October 21, 2020, Senior would sometimes use it during the week to get to work, leaving Junior without use of a vehicle. Tr. At 39:22-40:3.
28. The lowest amount Senior has ever rented a car was at a rate of approximately $60 to $65 per day. Tr. at 46:3-5.
29. Senior further suffered shame, embarrassment and trouble sleeping because his Honda Accord was taken and because he had to reveal his indebtedness to his family and friends. Tr. at 46:11-47:9.
1. While damages do not need to be a mathematical certainty, they cannot be recovered if “remote, speculative, hypothetical, and not within the realm of reasonable certainty.” Kitner v. CTW Transport, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 741, 748 (2002) (quoting Lowrie v. Castle, 225 Mass. 37, 51 (1916)).
2. The general rule with respect to mitigating damages is that the plaintiff may not recover damages that were avoidable by use of reasonable precautions. Glob. Invs. Agent Corp. v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 812, 825 (2010) (citation omitted). Such reasonable efforts are determined by what is “appropriate in the circumstances to avoid loss by making substitute arrangements or otherwise.” Brewster Wallcovering Co. v. Blue Mountain Wallcoverings, Inc., 68 Mass.App.Ct. 582, 612 (2007). That is, the “appropriateness of efforts to mitigate damages must be evaluated under the totality of circumstances which pertain in each individual case.” Performance Indicator, LLC v. Once Innovations, Inc., 56 F.Supp.3d 99, 102 (D. Mass. 2014).
3. The Court has already concluded that Defendants violated the FDCPA as to Senior and Junior. D. 92 at 13. If a plaintiff is successful in establishing a claim under the FDCPA, the defendant is liable for actual damages sustained by the plaintiff “as a result of such failure [to comply with FDCPA]”, statutory damages (i.e., “such additional damages as the [C]ourt may allow, but not exceeding $1,000”), and “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the [C]ourt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)-(3).
4. “In determining the amount of liability” under the FDCPA, “the [C]ourt shall consider, among...
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