Espinoza v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa
Decision Date | 21 December 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 1,CA-SA,1 |
Citation | 886 P.2d 1364,180 Ariz. 608 |
Parties | Raymond ESPINOZA, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, IN and FOR the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, the Honorable Gregory H. Martin, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge, The STATE of Arizona, ex rel. Richard ROMLEY, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest. 93-0236. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Petitioner Raymond Espinoza (Espinoza) brings this special action challenging the trial court's rejection of the plea agreement he reached with the Maricopa County Attorney. We take jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Rules 3 and 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Special Actions because the issues reflect statewide concern in the criminal justice system and are likely to recur.
The general issues presented are: 1) whether the trial court's rejection of a plea agreement pursuant to an announced "quadrant B policy" violates the rules of criminal procedure; 2) whether the "quadrant B policy" improperly creates a local rule; and 3) whether the "quadrant B policy" violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Superior Court criminal divisions in Maricopa County are divided into four quadrants. Each quadrant is assigned a designating letter A through D. In January 1993, the five judges of quadrant B adopted a policy that states in relevant part:
1. Plea agreements may stipulate to "probation," or "department of corrections" for felonies, or "county jail" for misdemeanors. Agreements may not stipulate to any term of years (other than lifetime probation in dangerous crimes against children) or to any non-mandatory terms and conditions of probation (including, but not limited to, jail time, fines or surcharges, or community service hours), or to sentences running concurrently or consecutively, except for DOC time followed by lifetime probation in dangerous crimes against children.
In a memorandum explaining this policy, the quadrant B judges recognized that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4 permits the parties to negotiate and reach agreement on "any aspect of the disposition of the case." They concluded, however, that the court had discretion to reject a stipulated sentence on the ground that the parties should not be allowed to dictate sentencing to an unwilling court.
In June 1993, Espinoza was indicted for one count of offering to sell narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony, and one count of misconduct involving weapons, a class 4 felony. The case was assigned to a court division within quadrant B. Espinoza eventually appeared before respondent Judge Martin seeking to enter a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement crafted by the attorneys involved. Judge Martin refused to consider the plea agreement because it contained a stipulation that Espinoza's sentences were to run concurrent with each other and with a probation violation. The rejection rested solely on quadrant B's policy. Judge Martin stated that the sentence stipulations violated the quadrant B policy. Espinoza then filed this special action.
The Attorney General's Office, representing the respondent judge, argues that this court should not accept jurisdiction because the claim in this case was previously decided in State ex rel. Bowers v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 34, 839 P.2d 454 (App.1992). We disagree. In Bowers, an individual judge summarily rejected a plea agreement containing sentence stipulations because he found the stipulated sentences "repugnant." Id. at 40, 839 P.2d at 460. The instant case differs from Bowers in part because it presents the unique question whether a quadrant of judges, rather than an individual judge, may adopt a formal written policy requiring rejection of plea agreements with sentence stipulations. We accordingly find additional reason for taking jurisdiction.
Espinoza first argues that the quadrant B policy violates Rule 17.4. Rule 17.4's relevant parts are as follows:
(a) Plea Negotiations. The parties may negotiate concerning, and reach an agreement on, any aspect of the disposition of the case. The court shall not participate in any such negotiation.
. . . . .
(d) Acceptance of Plea. After making such determinations [as required under 17.4(c) ] and considering the victim's view, the court shall either accept or reject the tendered negotiated plea. The court shall not be bound by any provision in the plea agreement regarding the sentence or the term and conditions of probation to be imposed, if, after accepting the agreement and reviewing a presentence report, it rejects the provision as inappropriate.
(e) Rejection of Plea. If an agreement or any provision thereof is rejected by the court, it shall give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea, advising him that if he permits his plea to stand, the disposition of the case may be less favorable to him than that contemplated by the agreement.
His four-part argument on this issue is summarized as follows:
1) Under Rule 17.4(a), parties are allowed to negotiate and agree upon "any" aspect of a criminal case under Rule 17.4(a), which, in his view, includes reaching binding sentencing stipulations.
2) After an initial acceptance of the plea and a review of the presentence report, judges have the power to reject a sentence as inappropriate under Rule 17.4(d). Because judicial discretion in sentencing includes this authority to reject an inappropriate sentence, a priori rejection of a plea merely because of a stipulated sentence is, in his view, an abuse of judicial discretion.
3) A criminal defendant may withdraw from a plea only if the court rejects a provision of the plea. To Espinoza, a judge's decision to dishonor a sentence stipulation deprives a defendant the opportunity of withdrawing from his plea. In his view, the quadrant B policy circumvents the defendant's "protection" to withdraw under Rule 17.4(e).
4) Because the terms of a potential sentence are an important factor in plea negotiations, a judge's a priori refusal to impose a stipulated sentence on a defendant, according to Espinoza, interjects the judge into the plea negotiation process in violation of Rule 17.4(a).
Before addressing these varieties of his first argument, we offer these background observations about the roles of the parties in the plea bargaining process.
Plea bargains are no longer an exception in the criminal justice system; rather than trials, plea bargains now constitute the nearly universal way of resolving criminal charges. See G. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws, 81 Cal.L.R. 61-124 at 85, (1993) ( ).
The prevalence of plea bargaining and its usurpation of the right to trial have raised both constitutional and practical concerns. A recent report on the Arizona criminal justice system focuses in part on problems with stipulated sentences in plea agreements. See Hon. Barry G. Silverman, Chairman, A System in Crisis: The Report of the Committee to Study the Criminal Justice System in the Arizona Superior Court, Draft at 26-33 (June 15, 1993). Addressing the plea bargain climate, the report states that:
The criminal justice system today bears more resemblance to a middle eastern marketplace than a thoughtful system for determining the truth. Plea bargaining has replaced adjudication. This unfortunate phenomenon permeates the entire criminal justice process but is manifested most dramatically at the time of sentencing.
This report noted that, as of 1993, the terms of most sentences in plea agreements were dickered over by defendants and counsel and then presented to the court as a fait accompli.
In another era:
a judge would carefully and sagaciously evaluate all the circumstances of the crime, the defendant's previous record, his statements to the court at the time of sentencing, the needs of the victim and society, and then thoughtfully impose a sentence within the range prescribed by the legislature.
Today, however, defendants now typically negotiate their sentences in advance of judicial sentencing--in the hallway, in the holding cell, over the phone--and then appear in court with their binding contract in hand, expecting the judge to acquiesce in the sentence the lawyers chose for them. In such a system the sentencing judge is relegated to the "ministerial formality" of echoing the sentence bargained-for by others. Id. at 29.
Those members of the committee critical of this practice concluded that:
[S]entences thus imposed greatly reduce their punitive and rehabilitative impact. The obvious lesson of such a [stipulated] sentence is that punishment can be reduced or even avoided by skillful negotiation. That lesson is 180-degrees askew of the one which could have been taught had the very same sentence been meted out by the court in a judicious, meaningful way.
Judicial recourse to the lawyers about the propriety of the stipulated sentence is not likely to be helpful. Asking the lawyers about the propriety of the sentence they selected matches asking a salesperson whether the price for merchandise is good.
While some judges regularly do acquiesce in the sentencing stipulations negotiated by the prosecutor and the defendant, Arizona law allows its judiciary to choose, if it wishes, to play a more active role in sentencing. Article 3 of the Arizona Constitution embodies the doctrine of separation of powers:
The powers of the government of the State of...
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