Esposito v. Quatinez

• Decision Date: 05 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 09 CV 0421(DRH)(GRB).,09 CV 0421(DRH)(GRB).
• Parties: Amelia ESPOSITO, v. Lara QUATINEZ, M.D., personally; Laura Fochtmann, M.D., personally; Judith Arnold, R.N., personally; and Suffolk County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

2 F.Supp.3d 406

Amelia ESPOSITO,

v.Lara QUATINEZ, M.D., personally; Laura Fochtmann, M.D., personally; Judith Arnold, R.N., personally; and Suffolk County, Defendants.

No. 09 CV 0421(DRH)(GRB).

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

Signed March 5, 2014.

Civil Rights Clinic, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center by Michelle K. Caldera, Esq., William M. Brooks, Esq., Melissa Beth Greenberger, Esq., Central Islip, NY, for Plaintiff.

NYS Attorney General by Terrance K. DeRosa, Esq., Happauge, NY, for Defendant Lara Quatinez.

Simmons Jannace, LLP by Steven D. Jannace, Esq., Syosset, NY, for Defendant Laura Fochtmann.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HURLEY, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff Amelia Esposito (“plaintiff” or “Esposito”) was involuntarily committed the psychiatric unit of Stony Brook University Hospital (“SBUH”) from February 2, 2008 to March 6, 2008 pursuant to New York State Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”). During her hospitalization, plaintiff received care from attending physician Dr. Laura Fochtmann (“Fochtmann”) as well as Dr. Lara Quatinez (“Quatinez”), (collectively “defendants” ¹).

On October 13, 2010, plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (“Amend. Compl.”), the operative pleading in this action, bringing the following claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) that defendant Quatinez, M.D. violated the plaintiff's right to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “[b]y causing forcible restraint of the plaintiff without considering less restrictive alternatives, and when the plaintiff was not causing an emergency;” (2) that defendant Fochtmann violated the plaintiff's right to religious freedom pursuant to the First Amendment “[b]y refusing to transfer the plaintiff to a hospital where abortions were not performed;” (3) that defendant Quatinez committed assault and battery on the plaintiff “[b]y authorizing the forcible restraint of the plaintiff when plaintiff was not posing a danger to herself or others, and was not creating an emergency within the hospital setting.”

Presently before the Court is defendant Fochtman's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 seeking to dismiss plaintiff's First Amendment claim and defendant Quatinez's Rule 56 motion seeking to dismiss plaintiff's Due Process and assault and battery claims. For the reasons set forth below, both motions are denied.

BACKGROUND²

The following material facts are drawn from the parties' Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statements and evidentiary submissions and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

On February 1, 2008, Esposito had a dispute with Dawn Rizzo, the property manager of the assisted living community ³ where plaintiff resided, concerning plaintiff's smoking in the facility's community room against property rules. Following the dispute, which plaintiff characterizes as verbal and “not at all” physical, (Esposito Dep. at 30–31), the Suffolk County Police Department arrived on the scene and took plaintiff to Stony Brook University Hospital (“SBUH”), where she was evaluated in the Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (“CPEP”) and involuntarily admitted that same day. Plaintiff was placed in the Acute Inpatient Unit on floor 10N for bipolar disorder. Although the hospital records state that plaintiff presented grandiose behavior, religious preoccupation and paranoia, plaintiff disputes that she was in need of hospitalization. Dr. Laura Fochtmann was plaintiff's attending psychiatrist from February 2, 2008 until February 22, 2008.

It is undisputed that throughout plaintiff's hospitalization at SBUH, she stated that she wanted to be released or transferred to a hospital that did not perform abortions. Defendant Fochtmann, however, disputes that plaintiff told her or Dr. Kuruvilla, a resident physician, that the reason for her request for a transfer was rooted in her religious beliefs. In addition, defendant Fochtmann disputes that plaintiff had personal knowledge as to whether abortions were being performed at SBUH, although plaintiff claims that she learned that abortions were being performed at SBUH through her involvement with the Right to Life Committee. (Esposito Decl. ¶ 9–10.) It is SBUH policy that patients may request a transfer to another hospital, and SBUH instructs patients to contact the hospital to which they wish to transfer to see if the hospital has any available beds. If the requested facility has an available bed, it can issue an order of transfer that allows SBUH to transfer the patient to the requested facility.

In this case, Dr. Kuruvilla told plaintiff to contact St. Catherine's Hospital to assure that space was available to accommodate plaintiff's transfer. Plaintiff called St. Catherine's Hospital. Initially, St Catherine's told plaintiff that there were no beds available to accommodate her. Plaintiff claims, however, that later in the conversation the person she spoke with told her that a bed was available if someone from SBUH called and requested one. (Esposito Decl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff contends that she told Fochtmann's associate about her conversation and requested that she take steps to facilitate the transfer, however, nothing was done. ( Id. at 18.)

It is undisputed that during plaintiff's hospitalization, she was permitted to see visitors from her church, and plaintiff prayed, discussed the Bible, and read scriptures with her friends. In general, SBUH provides patients with opportunities to practice their chosen religions through in-house or visiting clergy, religious ceremonies performed by those clergy, and Bibles provided by the hospital.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is only appropriate where admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or other documentation demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and one party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Viola v. Philips Med. Sys. of N. Am., 42 F.3d 712, 716 (2d Cir.1994). The relevant governing law in each case determines which facts are material; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). No genuinely triable factual issue exists when the moving party demonstrates, on the basis of the pleadings and submitted evidence, and after drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the non-movant, that no rational jury could find in the non-movant's favor. Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1996).

To defeat a summary judgment motion properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or other documentation, the non-movant must offer similar materials setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir.1996). The non-movant must present more than a “scintilla of evidence,” Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505), or “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), and cannot rely on the allegations in his or her pleadings, on conclusory statements, or on “mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1996) (citations omitted). “When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., LP, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994).

The district court, in considering a summary judgment motion, must also be mindful of the underlying burdens of proof because “the evidentiary burdens that the respective parties will bear at trial guide district courts in their determination of summary judgment motions.” Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir.1988). Where the non-moving party will bear the ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, “the moving party's burden under Rule 56 will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the” non-movant's claim. Id. at 210–11. Where a movant without the underlying burden of proof offers evidence that the non-movant has failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claim, the burden shifts to the non-movant to offer “persuasive evidence that his claim is not ‘implausible.’ ” Id. at 211 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348).

II. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ... person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law [or a] suit in equity....” To assert a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.” Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted); Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.2008). Neither defendant in this case asserts that they did not act under color of state law, but both defendants challenge whether their conduct deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right.

III. Defendant Fochtmann's Motion for Summary Judgment on Pla...