Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions

Citation198 L.Ed.2d 22,137 S.Ct. 1562
Decision Date30 May 2017
Docket NumberNo. 16–54.,16–54.
Parties Juan ESQUIVEL–QUINTANA, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General.
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner.

Allon Kedem, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Michael Carlin, Law Office of Michael Carlin PLLC, Ann Arbor, MI, Jeffrey L. Fisher, David T. Goldberg, Pamela S. Karlan, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Jayashri Srikantiah, Immigrants' Rights Clinic, Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner.

Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Allon Kedem, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley, Patrick J. Glen, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, provides that "[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony after admission" to the United States may be removed from the country by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One of the many crimes that constitutes an aggravated felony under the INA is "sexual abuse of a minor." § 1101(a)(43)(A). A conviction for sexual abuse of a minor is an aggravated felony regardless of whether it is for a "violation of Federal or State law." § 1101(a)(43). The INA does not expressly define sexual abuse of a minor.

We must decide whether a conviction under a state statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21–year–old and a 17–year–old qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA. We hold that it does not.

I

Petitioner Juan Esquivel–Quintana is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pleaded no contest in the Superior Court of California to a statutory rape offense: "unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator," Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 261.5(c) (West 2014); see also § 261.5(a) ("Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor"). For purposes of that offense, California defines "minor" as "a person under the age of 18 years." Ibid.

The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against petitioner based on that conviction. An Immigration Judge concluded that the conviction qualified as "sexual abuse of a minor," 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), and ordered petitioner removed to Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissed his appeal. 26 I. & N. Dec. 469 (2015). "[F]or a statutory rape offense involving a 16– or 17–year–old victim" to qualify as " 'sexual abuse of a minor,' " it reasoned, "the statute must require a meaningful age difference between the victim and the perpetrator." Id., at 477. In its view, the 3–year age difference required by Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c) was meaningful. Id., at 477. Accordingly, the Board concluded that petitioner's crime of conviction was an aggravated felony, making him removable under the INA. Ibid. A divided Court of Appeals denied Esquivel–Quintana's petition for review, deferring to the Board's interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 810 F.3d 1019 (C.A.6 2016) ; see also id., at 1027 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted certiorari, 580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 368, 196 L.Ed.2d 283 (2016), and now reverse.

II

Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) makes aliens removable based on the nature of their convictions, not based on their actual conduct. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1980, 1986–1987, 192 L.Ed.2d 60 (2015). Accordingly, to determine whether an alien's conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under that section, we "employ a categorical approach by looking to the statute ... of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime." Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483, 132 S.Ct. 1166, 182 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) ; see, e.g., Gonzales v. Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) (applying the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), to the INA). Under that approach, we ask whether " 'the state statute defining the crime of conviction' categorically fits within the 'generic' federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony." Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (quoting Duenas–Alvarez, supra, at 186, 127 S.Ct. 815 ). In other words, we presume that the state conviction "rested upon ... the least of th[e] acts" criminalized by the statute, and then we determine whether that conduct would fall within the federal definition of the crime. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) ; see also Moncrieffe, supra, at 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678 (focusing "on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute").1 Petitioner's state conviction is thus an "aggravated felony" under the INA only if the least of the acts criminalized by the state statute falls within the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor.

A

Because Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c) criminalizes "unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator" and defines a minor as someone under age 18, the conduct criminalized under this provision would be, at a minimum, consensual sexual intercourse between a victim who is almost 18 and a perpetrator who just turned 21. Regardless of the actual facts of petitioner's crime, we must presume that his conviction was based on acts that were no more criminal than that. If those acts do not constitute sexual abuse of a minor under the INA, then petitioner was not convicted of an aggravated felony and is not, on that basis, removable.

Petitioner concedes that sexual abuse of a minor under the INA includes some statutory rape offenses. But he argues that a statutory rape offense based solely on the partners' ages (like the one here) is " 'abuse' " "only when the younger partner is under 16." Reply Brief 2. Because the California statute criminalizes sexual intercourse when the victim is up to 17 years old, petitioner contends that it does not categorically qualify as sexual abuse of a minor.

B

We agree with petitioner that, in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16. Because the California statute at issue in this case does not categorically fall within that definition, a conviction pursuant to it is not an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(A). We begin, as always, with the text.

Section 1101(a)(43)(A) does not expressly define sexual abuse of a minor, so we interpret that phrase using the normal tools of statutory interpretation. "Our analysis begins with the language of the statute." Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) ; see also Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006) ("The everyday understanding of" the term used in § 1101"should count for a lot here, for the statutes in play do not define the term, and so remit us to regular usage to see what Congress probably meant").

Congress added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA in 1996, as part of a comprehensive immigration reform act. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 321(a)(i), 110 Stat. 3009–627. At that time, the ordinary meaning of "sexual abuse" included "the engaging in sexual contact with a person who is below a specified age or who is incapable of giving consent because of age or mental or physical incapacity." Merriam–Webster's Dictionary of Law 454 (1996). By providing that the abuse must be "of a minor," the INA focuses on age, rather than mental or physical incapacity. Accordingly, to qualify as sexual abuse of a minor, the statute of conviction must prohibit certain sexual acts based at least in part on the age of the victim.

Statutory rape laws are one example of this category of crimes. Those laws generally provide that an older person may not engage in sexual intercourse with a younger person under a specified age, known as the "age of consent." See id., at 20 (defining "age of consent" as "the age at which a person is deemed competent by law to give consent esp. to sexual intercourse" and cross-referencing "statutory rape"). Many laws also require an age differential between the two partners.

Although the age of consent for statutory rape purposes varies by jurisdiction, see infra, at 1571, reliable dictionaries provide evidence that the "generic" age—in 1996 and today—is 16. See B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 38 (2d ed. 1995) ("Age of consent, usu[ally] 16, denotes the age when one is legally capable of agreeing ... to sexual intercourse" and cross-referencing "statutory rape"); Black's Law Dictionary 73 (10th ed. 2014) (noting that the age of consent is "usu[ally] defined by statute as 16 years").

Relying on a different dictionary (and "sparse" legislative history), the Government suggests an alternative " 'everyday understanding' " of "sexual abuse of a minor." Brief for Respondent 16–17 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990)). Around the time sexual abuse of a minor was added to the INA's list of aggravated felonies, that dictionary defined "[s]exual abuse" as "[i]llegal sex acts performed against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance," and defined "[m]inor" as "[a]n infant or person who is under the age of legal...

To continue reading

Request your trial
193 cases
  • Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • October 21, 2020
    ...Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34, 37, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) ); see also Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567-68, 198 L.Ed.2d 22 (2017). Here, "[t]he categorical approach requires a two step analysis: first, we must ascertain the definition f......
  • Silva v. Garland
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • February 28, 2022
    ...basis for denying the petition. First, we follow the mode of analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 198 L.Ed.2d 22 (2017), and so apply "the normal tools of statutory interpretation," id. at 1569 . We hold the generic federa......
  • Diaz-Rodriguez v. Garland
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 8, 2022
    ...under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) . We begin by "using the normal tools of statutory interpretation." Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions , 581 U.S. 385, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1569, 198 L.Ed.2d 22 (2017). In some cases, this task is straightforward, as when Congress provides a definition of the offense in the......
  • United States v. Semler
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • June 1, 2021
    ...the heroin when she gave it to Werstler.IIA When interpreting a statute, "[w]e begin, as always, with the text." Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 (2017). "Our first step . . . is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning" that resolve......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Title 18 Insider Trading.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 130 No. 7, May 2021
    • May 1, 2021
    ...Circuit's internal disagreement on this point by holding that neither lenity nor Chevron applied because the statute was unambiguous. 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (336.) Where no agency regulation was relevant to the decision, the Court has held that lenity applies to civil statutes whose rules ca......
  • Uncommon Allies: Bridging the Gap Between Auer Deference and the Rule of Lenity in Criminal Cases.
    • United States
    • Suffolk University Law Review Vol. 54 No. 2, March 2021
    • March 22, 2021
    ...(stating he remains "receptive" to granting review of issue when raised in proper setting); see also Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (declining to decide whether rule of lenity supplants Chevron deference because statute not (8.) See, e.g., United States v. Phife......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT