Essex County Welfare Bd. v. Department of Institutions and Agencies

• Decision Date: 10 February 1976
• Citation: 353 A.2d 132,139 N.J.Super. 191
• Parties: ESSEX COUNTY WELFARE BOARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCIES and Brenda Banks, Respondents-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 191

139 N.J.Super. 191

353 A.2d 132

ESSEX COUNTY WELFARE BOARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCIES and Brenda Banks Respondents-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Submitted Jan. 5, 1976.

Decided Feb. 10, 1976.

William J. Tamburri, Newark, for petitioner-appellant (Susan J. Barone, Newark, on the brief).

William F. Hyland, Atty. Gen., for respondent, Dept. of Institutions and Agencies (Stephen Skillman, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel and Guy S. Michael and Paul N. Watter, Deputy Attys. Gen., on the brief).

Frank E. Catalina, Rutgers Urban Legal Clinic, for respondent Brenda Banks (Alan Zaks, Newark, on the brief).

Before Judges ALLCORN, KOLE and KING.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KING, J.S.C., Temporarily Assigned.

The Essex County Welfare Board (board) appeals from the decision of the State Department of Institutions and Agencies (Department) which, following a fair hearing procedure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 44:7--18, rule in favor of Ms. Banks and directed assistance retroactive to September 1974.

Applicant Brenda Banks, a resident of Essex County, was enrolled as a third-year student at Ramapo College, majoring in political science at the time the board discontinued benefits. Ms. Banks has been a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) for a number of years under the grant program of the board. In addition to her regular monthly grant she has been receiving training allowance and child care payments from the board in order to assist her in the pursuit of her education, pursuant to §§ 420.1 and 411.2 of the Financial Assistance Manual (FAM). Ms. Banks requested continued child care and training allowances after completing two years of college. On September 30, 1974 the board sent her notification of its intent to suspend payment of the requested additional benefits in aid of her education. On October 11, 1974 she requested a fair hearing before the Division of Public Welfare (Division) of the Department to contest suspension of her benefits under N.J.S.A. 44:7--18.

At the hearing held on October 30, 1974 the board's representative testified that Ms. Banks' training allowance and child care expenses were suspended on the basis of the board's general policy to terminate such benefits after the successful completion of two years of college. The board stated that all recipients in such a position are deemed 'job ready and further education is not considered reasonable or feasible.' The hearing officer from the Division found that the board's suspension of service payments constituted abuse of its lawful discretionary authority insofar as it was based on a county-formulated board policy and not on an individual consideration of Ms. Banks' particular situation.

On January 23, 1975 the Division's decisional panel adopted the hearing officer's recommended findings and directed the board to reinstate Ms. Banks' supplemental benefits retroactive to September, 1974. The hearing officer's decision as adopted by the Commissioner states as follows:

Regulations as specified in section 400 do require consideration of the merits of each request on an individual case basis. There is no evidence that such an evaluation was undertaken by the Welfare Board. Duly promulgated official regulations may not be abrogated by unilateral action on the part of the County Welfare Board. The hearing officer concludes that the Welfare Board's rejection of appellant's request, solely on the grounds of Welfare Board policy, is an unreasonable exercise of lawful discretionary authority. Accordingly, the hearing officer recommends that the Welfare Board be directed to provide the requested service payments, retroactive to September, 1974.

The Decisional Panel recognizes the discretion accorded the Welfare Board to approve or deny such special payments as requested in the instant case. However, the exercise of such discretion requires determinations based on the merits of the individual case. According to the evidence the determination in the instant case was pursuant to a locally formulated policy without deliberate review and evaluation of the vocational objective or whether attainment of such objective was reasonable or feasible. Accordingly, the action terminating expenses incident to training has not been adequately substantiated and such action is reversed.

The Essex County Welfare Board is directed to reinstate expenses incident to training retroactive to September 1974 and to recognize verified child care costs actually incurred during such period.

On March 4, 1975 appellant filed a notice of appeal for a reversal of the Division's findings and a termination of contested payments.

The county welfare board argues on appeal that although its power to continue or terminate grants is limited by specific statutory prescriptions, the discretionary powers granted to the local boards by those enactments is controlling in this case. We find this contention to be without merit. Pursuant to the New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies, Division of Public Welfare, Manual of Administration, Part II, 'Individual and Public Assistance,' the following pertinent policy was adopted.

The goal of public assistance is to help the client realize his full potential and make use of his own capabilities for self-support.

Therefore, every individual, unless specifically exempt as below, shall personally register for manpower services, training and employment.

The County Welfare Board as agent of the Department of Labor is responsible, through the income maintenance staff, for determining who is required to register and who is exempt. A personal interview with each individual is desirable but not mandatory. However, each registrant must personally sign the registration form (e.g., a mother cannot sign for her 16 year old child). (Manual of Administration, § 2286)

The above section established what was commonly known as the W.I.N. program. The State of New Jersey, through the Department of Institutions and Agencies, then provided the means by which a local board could choose to devise a policy for training those persons who were either exempt or not eligible to participate in the W.I.N. program. This program was optional with the local board.

420. Expenses Incident to Training

420.1 An allowance for expenses incident to training shall be recognized except when Section 420.2 is applicable, for each member of the eligible unit participating in one of the following:

a. a job or work experience training program designated and/or approved by the County Welfare Board;

b. enrollment in a full-time (as defined by the institution client is attending) educational experience other than the normal four year high school curriculum, regardless of the type of program, Provided such educational program is designed to attain a vocational objection which, in the judgment of the County Welfare Board, is both feasible and reasonable.

420.2 An allowance for expenses incident to training shall not be recognized in any of the following situations:

b. In ADC, client is participating in the W.I.N. program. (Financial Assistance Manual, Part IV, page 6, 11/1/72; emphasis supplied)

The county welfare board correctly notes that the above cited regulation was optional with the local board, that is, each and every board in the State did not have to provide the funds as an allowance for expenses incident to such training. However, the Essex County Welfare Board did adopt this section. The board further argues that in doing so it prescribed specific guidelines as to the limit of expenditures which could be made from its public funds. The board thus concludes that it assumed a specific limit to the amount of the resulting expenditures which this 'voluntarily assumed' responsibility could entail. The board looks to the language of the state standard that 'in the judgment of the County Welfare Board, (it) is both feasible and reasonable,' 420.1(b), Supra, for justification of its policy. On the basis of this language alone, the board argues that the mandate of the state regulation is for the grant to be allowed or disallowed exclusively in accordance with the policy and judgment of the county welfare board.

The county welfare board, pursuant to this reasoning, promulgated its policy providing payments for two years of college level vocational training, or 60 credits. Similar to the W.I.N. program, they allegedly provided continuation of the college program benefits beyond the two year level for exceptional cases whose merits would be individually considered. The board then applied these standards to Ms. Banks' request and automatically terminated her supplemental education benefits because she had completed her two years of college-level training. No individual consideration was afforded to Ms. Banks' case. The hearing examiner specifically found that 'Regulations as specified in section 400 do require consideration of the merits of each request on an individual case basis. There is no evidence that such an evaluation was undertaken by the Welfare Board.'

Participation in the jointly funded AFDC program is dependent on state conformity with the requirements of the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 601 Et seq.) and regulations promulgated thereunder by HEW (45 C.F.R. § 201 Et seq.). 45 C.F.R. § 205.100(a)(i) provides that a state plan under the AFDC program must be administered or supervised by a single state agency. (45 C.F.R. § 220.2(a) deals with service payments.) Additionally, 45 C.F.R. § 220.2(b)(1)...