Essex Ins. Co. v. RHO Chem. Co.
| Decision Date | 03 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–CV–6628,14–CV–6628 |
| Citation | 145 F.Supp.3d 780 |
| Parties | Essex Insurance Company, Plaintiff, v. RHO Chemical Company, Inc., Robert Rolih, Lorraine Rolih, General Surfactants, Inc., and Milan Stavinoha, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Steven Nickolas Novosad, P. Scott Ritchie, Paul Wilson Daugherity, Clausen Miller P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
James P. Marsh, Momkus McCluskey, LLC, Lisle, IL, Bruce D. Goodman, Ronald W. Kalish, Steinberg, Goodman & Kalish, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Plaintiff and Defendants have filed cross motions for summary judgment seeking Declaratory Judgment as to an exclusion provision's applicability to an insurance policy. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denies Defendants' motions.
requires the moving party to provide “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue.” Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009). The nonmoving party then must file “a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” Id. (citing N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) ). Indeed, “[w]hen a responding party's statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party's statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.” Id . The nonmoving party also must present a separate statement of additional facts, if any, that it contends require the denial of summary judgment. See
Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643–44 (7th Cir.2008) (citing N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C) ). These rules assist the courts by “organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.” Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Br. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir.2000) (citation omitted).
“is designed, in part, to aid the district court, ‘which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,’ in determining whether a trial is necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). In general, the aim of Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses is to identify the relevant admissible evidence supporting the material facts, not to make factual or legal arguments. See
Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.2006) (). The rule makes the summary judgment process less burdensome on district courts by requiring the parties to nail down the relevant facts and the way they propose to support or refute them.
Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632 ; Cichon, 401 F.3d at 809–10 ; Cady , 467 F.3d at 1060 ; Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 528. In sum, “[f]or litigants appearing in the Northern District of Illinois, the Rule 56.1 statement is a critical, and required, component of a litigant's response to a motion for summary judgment.” Sojka , 686 F.3d at 398.
Here, the Court has not considered statements of fact set forth by either side that fail to comply with Local Rule 56.1
, and it has deemed as admitted those statements of fact to which the opposing party failed to properly respond. See
Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632. Furthermore, the Court considered the facts asserted in the underlying complaints. See
Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paszko Masonry, Inc. , 718 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir.2013) (). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts.
Essex Insurance Company (“Essex”) is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in Glen Allen, Virginia. (R. 61, Essex Stmnt. of Facts, at ¶1.) RHO Chemical Company, Inc. (“RHO”) is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Joliet, Illinois. (Id . at ¶2.) General Surfactants, Inc. (“GSI”) is an Illinois Corporation with its principal place of business in Joliet, Illinois. (Id . at ¶6.) GSI is not a named insured and does not otherwise qualify as an insured under the insurance policy at issue. (Id . at ¶7.) Robert Rolih is the president of RHO, the president of GSI, and a citizen of Illinois. (Id . at ¶3.). Lorraine Rolih is Robert Rolih's wife and a citizen of Illinois. (Id . at ¶4.) RHO and the Rolihs are named insureds under Essex Insurance Policy No. 3DF8043 (“insurance policy”). (Id . at ¶5.) Milan Stavinoha (“Stavinoha”) is a citizen of Illinois and the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit filed on April 11, 2014 entitled Milan Stavinoha v. RHO Chemical Company, Inc., General Surfactants, Inc., Robert Rolih, and Lorraine Rolih , No. 14 L 302. (Id . at ¶8.) The underlying case is currently pending in the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit in Will County, Illinois. (Id .)
Both parties seek relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201
, 2202. DeBartolo v. Healthsouth Corp. , 569 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir.2009). Here, the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. (R. 61 at ¶¶12-14.) Venue is premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 1391. (Id . at ¶15.) In addition, all parties agree that Illinois law applies. (Id . at ¶11.)
Stavinoha filed a lawsuit in state court against RHO, GSI, and the Rolihs, claiming he suffered severe injuries on April 27, 2012, when portions of a building's roof fell out from under him at 30 Industry Avenue, Joliet, Illinois. (R. 9-4, Stavinoha Compl., at ¶4; R. 61 at ¶¶18-20.) He alleges that RHO, GSI, and the Rolihs owned, controlled, maintained and operated the building at the time of his injury. (R. 9-4 at ¶1; R. 61 at ¶18.) On the day of his injury, Stavinoha was present at the Industry Avenue premises performing work on the roof pursuant to his employment with P&P Roofing & Carpenters Construction (“P&P”). (R. 61 at ¶20.) Specifically, Stavinoha asserts that he was a lawful invitee on the premises when he was injured, and seeks to recover from Defendants for their negligence and associated unsafe working conditions. (R. 9-4 at ¶2-4.)
Defendants then filed a Third Party Complaint in the underlying action seeking contribution against P&P, whom they admitted was Stavinoha's employer. (R. 61 at ¶40.) In their Third Party Complaint, Defendants allege that P&P sent Stavinoha to repair the roof of a building on Industry Avenue pursuant to an oral agreement between P&P and the Rolihs. (Id .) Defendants conclude that Stavinoha was repairing the roof when the roof collapsed, causing him severe injuries, and maintain that P&P bears responsibility for Stavinoha's injuries as his employer. (Id .)
Further undisputed facts apart from the underlying complaints illustrate that Stavinoha was injured while repairing the building's roof under P&P's employment. First, on June 12, 2012, Stavinoha filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits with the Illinois Industrial Commission due to his April 27, 2012 injuries received in the course and scope of his P&P employment. (Id . at ¶21.) Since then, Stavinoha successfully received benefits pursuant to his claim against P&P. (Id . at ¶22.) Second, on or about April 25, 2014, Defendant Robert Rolih reported Stavinoha's underlying personal injury lawsuit to his insurance agency, admitting that “a roofer went up on the roof to repair it and fell thru [sic] the concrete panels.” (Id . at ¶16.)
At the time of Stavinoha's injuries, Essex insured RHO and the Rolihs. (Id . at ¶5.) Under Paragraph 1(a), the policy states:
We [Essex] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance does not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any “occurrence” and settle any claim or “suit” that may result.
The insurance policy also contains a “Combination General Endorsement Form – MEGL 0001 05/10” that includes an exclusion for bodily injury claims made by contractors and their employees. Specifically, Paragraph 7 (“exclusion provision”) states:
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