Estabrook v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission

• Decision Date: 19 September 1979
• Docket Number: No. 62629,62629
• Parties: 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,490 Frederick ESTABROOK, Appellant, v. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 306

283 N.W.2d 306

21 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,490

Frederick ESTABROOK, Appellant, v. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellee.

No. 62629.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 19, 1979.

James R. Potter of Chicago Legal Assistance Foundation, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Raymond D. Perry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Considered en banc.

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice.

The basic question in this appeal is whether the appellant employee Estabrook was entitled to a chapter 17A contested case evidentiary hearing in the "probable cause" phase of his age-discrimination complaint before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission under the provisions of chapter 601A, The Code 1977.

December 16, 1976, Estabrook filed a complaint with the commission, claiming his employer, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., discriminated against him on the basis of age when it changed his work assignment and reduced his wages. Following a commission determination of no probable cause, Estabrook petitioned district court for judicial review and secured a remand order directing the commission to receive additional evidence and issue a new decision. The commission and staff person assigned to the complaint investigated further and considered affidavits and written materials but did not provide a full-blown section 17A.12 notice and evidentiary hearing.

April 18, 1978, the commission notified Estabrook it still found no probable cause to take action on his complaint.

Estabrook again sought judicial review, contending (1) the commission failed to hold an evidentiary hearing in a contested case proceeding as required by statute, (2) he had a constitutional right to an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissal of his complaint, and (3) the finding of no probable cause was not supported by the weight of substantial evidence.

District court concluded the commission's finding was reviewable as final agency action, but not as a contested case. It therefore utilized the section 17A.19(8)(g) standard ("Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.") and found that it had not been violated. It affirmed the commission's finding. We affirm district court's decision, but on a different basis.

Appealing here, Estabrook asserts the commission's probable cause function is a contested case proceeding under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act and that the commission's finding of "no probable cause" was not supported by substantial evidence.

Because the procedural issue necessarily involves resolution of constitutional questions, ordinarily we would first examine the substantive merits of Estabrook's dispute with the commission's decision. But his only district court challenge to the merits of that decision was that it was not supported by substantial evidence. Section 17A.19(8)(f) expressly limits this review standard to contested case proceedings.

We cannot review the merits of the commission's ruling under the contested case standard unless and until we decide that ruling involved a contested case proceeding.

I. Contested case evidentiary hearing issue.

Section 17A.2(2) provides:

"Contested case" means a proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by Constitution or statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.

We have said the only question which arises under this definition is whether the Constitution or a statute requires an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. Airhart v. Iowa Department of Social Services, 248 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Iowa 1976).

A. Although Estabrook asserted on judicial review in district court he had a Statutory right to an evidentiary hearing on the probable cause issue, we do not interpret his brief here as taking that position. In any event, we construe the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, chapter 601A, The Code 1977, as requiring a hearing only after certain conditions are met, including a finding of probable cause by the investigating official, § 601A.14(3), an attempt by commission personnel to settle the matter through conference, conciliation, and persuasion, § 601A.14(3), and a commission determination that circumstances warrant further proceedings on the complaint, § 601A.14(6). We find no statutory mandate for another evidentiary hearing prior to the issuance of a probable cause ruling.

B. We thus reach Estabrook's contention that constitutional due process requires a hearing prior to a no probable cause finding.

It must be kept in mind that the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 was designed to correct a broad pattern of behavior rather than merely affording a procedure to settle a specific dispute. Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 770 (Iowa 1971).

The legislature established the commission in 1965 "to eliminate unfair and discriminatory practices in public accommodations (and) employment." 1965 Session, 61st G.A., ch. 121 (title of act). Chapter 601A delegates to the commission the power and duty "(t)o receive, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging unfair or discriminatory practices." § 601A.5(2), The Code 1977. It also authorizes and directs the commission in more general terms to eliminate discrimination. See generally § 601A.5(3)-.5(12). It lists unfair and discriminatory practices in employment, public accommodations and services, housing, and credit transactions. See §§ 601A.6-.9.

"Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or unfair practice may . . . file with the commission a . . . complaint . . .." § 601A.14(1). The commission then makes "a prompt investigation." § 601A.14(3). If it determines "that probable cause exists for crediting the allegations of the complaint, the investigating official shall promptly endeavor to eliminate such discriminatory or unfair practice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id. The commission may seek a temporary injunction when it appears the complainant may suffer irreparable injury. § 601A.5(4).

When informal resolution is unsuccessful, the commission may commence formal proceedings against the respondent. § 601A.14(6). The commission may amend the complaint allegations. § 601A.14(10). It presents the case in support of the complainant through one of its own attorneys. § 601A.14(7). The complainant may be allowed to intervene and present evidence. § 601A.14(8). In that event, complainant has the burden of proof. § 601A.14(11).

If the commission finds respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or unfair practice, it issues a cease and desist order and orders whatever "affirmative action" it judges to be necessary. § 601A.14(12). In employment cases affirmative action may include hiring, reinstatement, promotion and back pay. Id.

The legislature apparently also enacted chapter 601A to provide a legal enforcement tool for federal civil rights legislation. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), 2000e-2 (1974), proscribes discrimination in public accommodations and employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or (in employment) sex. The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1975), proscribes discrimination in employment on the basis of age.

The employment portions of these federal laws are administered and enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of Labor respectively. That Congress anticipated creation of state commissions to effect this federal mandate, however, is clear from examination of the legislation. Referring to the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court recently said:

Congress intended through (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)) . . . to give state agencies a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination and thereby to make unnecessary resort to federal relief by victims of the discrimination.

Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, --- U.S. ----, ----, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2071, 60 L.Ed.2d 609, 615 (1979) (citation omitted). The Court concluded the purpose, relevant language, and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act were the same, and transposed the legislative intent of section 2000e-5(c) onto 29 U.S.C. § 633(b).

"(P)rior resort to appropriate state proceedings is required under (section 633(b)), just as under (section 2000e-5(c))." Oscar Mayer, --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. at 2071, 60 L.Ed.2d at 616. See also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972) (prior resort to deferral states required under section 2000e-5(c)). If settlement on the local level is unsuccessful or does not occur within sixty days, then a complainant may utilize federal administrative and, ultimately, judicial remedies. In its own determination of reasonable cause, EEOC accords "substantial weight" to state findings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). There are no comparable provisions for crediting state findings in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Under both statutes, however, the civil suit brought by a still-dissatisfied complainant is a de novo trial rather than judicial review of administrative action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1822-23, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 676 (1973) (Civil Rights Act); Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

In these situations we are not dealing with "civil liberties" which are immunities restraints on government protected by constitutional provisions. Rather, we are involved with "civil rights" which are enforceable claims rooted in legislation. Iron Workers, 191 N.W.2d at 771. The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, ---...