Estate of Antoinette, Matter of

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: YESAWICH
• Citation: Estate of Antoinette, Matter of, 657 N.Y.S.2d 97, 238 A.D.2d 762 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
• Decision Date: 17 April 1997
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Marie ANTOINETTE, Deceased. Edith Camp, Appellant; Laurie M. Greenwood et al., Respondents.

Page 97

657 N.Y.S.2d 97

238 A.D.2d 762

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Marie ANTOINETTE, Deceased Edith Camp, Appellant Laurie M. Greenwood et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

April 17, 1997.

Segel, Goldman & Mazzotta P.C. (Peter Bishko, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Iseman, Cunningham, Riester & Hyde (Frederick C. Riester, of counsel), Albany, for respondents.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and MIKOLL, CREW, WHITE and YESAWICH, JJ.

YESAWICH, Justice.

Appeal from a decree of the Surrogate's Court of Rensselaer County (Lang, S.), entered November 9, 1995, which denied probate of an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of Marie Antoinette.

On January 16, 1991, Marie Antoinette (hereinafter decedent) died, leaving a will dated July 24, 1990 (hereinafter the July will) in which she left the bulk of her estate to petitioner, her niece by marriage. Respondents, decedent's grandnieces and the beneficiaries of her prior will, dated April 30, 1990, objected to the probate of the July will, alleging that it had been procured by petitioner's fraud and undue influence. Petitioner's motion for summary judgment was denied and a trial ensued, at the close of which the jury found that the July will was the product of petitioner's undue influence upon decedent. The instrument was denied admission to probate, and petitioner appeals.

Petitioner's initial contention, that summary judgment should have been granted, is meritless for the affidavits submitted in opposition thereto contain factual averments which, when taken together, circumstantially support an inference that decedent's execution of the July will was the result of petitioner's exertion of a subtle, but pervasive, form of coercion and influence, by which she overwhelmed and manipulated decedent's volition to advance her own interests (see, Matter of Walther, 6 N.Y.2d 49, 53-54, 188 N.Y.S.2d 168, 159 N.E.2d 665; Matter of Burke, 82 A.D.2d 260, 270, 441 N.Y.S.2d 542; Matter of Kaufmann, 20 A.D.2d 464, 482-483, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, affd. 15 N.Y.2d 825, 257 N.Y.S.2d 941, 205 N.E.2d 864). No single circumstance is dispositive in this regard; rather, it is the confluence of many factors--including the nature of decedent's relations with petitioner, respondents and her attorney of long standing (see, Matter of Burke, supra, at 272-273, 441 N.Y.S.2d 542), and her lack of involvement in fiscal matters, prior to the events at issue; the abrupt and otherwise unexplained changes in decedent's behavior, beliefs and attitudes, culminating in a radical alteration of her testamentary disposition, shortly after petitioner began taking an active role in decedent's day-to-day affairs (see, Matter of Elmore, 42 A.D.2d 240, 242, 346 N.Y.S.2d 182); petitioner's sudden intense interest in decedent's financial circumstances, and the fact that she was overheard actually pressing her 90-year-old aunt to take certain actions with respect thereto; and decedent's apparent uncertainty and lack of understanding of some of the transactions she purportedly sought to effect with petitioner's assistance--that suggests that the July will does not truly reflect the independent testamentary intentions of decedent. Considered collectively, these elements demonstrate not only that petitioner had the motive and the opportunity to influence decedent, but that she actually wielded that influence (see, Matter of Walther, supra, at 55, 188 N.Y.S.2d 168, 159 N.E.2d 665) by, inter alia, convincing decedent that those she had formerly trusted were stealing from her and were improperly managing her property (see, Matter of...