Estate of Braden v. State

• Decision Date: 30 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. CV–10–0300–PR.,CV–10–0300–PR.
• Citation: Estate of Braden v. State , 228 Ariz. 323, 266 P.3d 349, 622 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 35 (Ariz. 2011)
• Parties: ESTATE OF Jacob BRADEN, by and through its personal representative, Tonya GABALDON, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. The STATE of Arizona, a body politic; and the Division of Developmental Disabilities of the Arizona Department of Economic Security, a body politic, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

228 Ariz. 323

266 P.3d 349

622 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 35

ESTATE OF Jacob BRADEN, by and through its personal representative, Tonya GABALDON, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.The STATE of Arizona, a body politic; and the Division of Developmental Disabilities of the Arizona Department of Economic Security, a body politic, Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV–10–0300–PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

Nov. 30, 2011.

Knapp & Roberts, P.C. by Craig A. Knapp, Dana R. Roberts, and David L. Abney, Scottsdale, and Law Office of Scott E. Boehm, P.C. by Scott E. Boehm, Phoenix, and Warnock, MacKinlay & Carman, P.L.L.C. by Krista M. Carman, Prescott, Attorneys for the Estate of Jacob Braden and Tonya Gabaldon.

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General by Fred M. Zeder, Assistant Attorney General, Michael G. Gaughan, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel P. Schaack, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona and Arizona Department of Economic Security Division of Developmental Disabilities.

OPINION

BRUTINEL, Justice.

¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether the Adult Protective Services Act (“APSA”), A.R.S. § 46–455(2011), subjects the state to an action for damages under that statute.We hold that it does not and, therefore, affirm the superior court's summary judgment in favor of the State.

I.

¶ 2Jacob Braden, an adult with developmental disabilities, received services from Arizona Integrated Residential and Educational Services (“AIRES”), a licensed private corporation that contracted with the Arizona Department of Economic Security's Division of Developmental Disabilities to provide services for Jacob.In 2005, Jacob died as a result of injuries suffered while residing at an AIRES facility.Jacob's estate sued the State alleging a statutory claim under APSA for abuse and neglect.¹

¶ 3The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not a proper defendant under A.R.S. § 46–455, and the trial court granted the motion.In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed.Estate of Braden v. State,225 Ariz. 391, 397–99 ¶¶ 24–36, 238 P.3d 1265, 1271–73(App.2010).The majority concluded that the State was not exempt from liability under § 46–455.Id.The dissent, however, would have affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding that “the legislature did not intend the State to be one of the enterprises included within A.R.S. § 46–455(B).”Id. at 399–400 ¶ 38 n. 9, 238 P.3d at 1273–74 n. 9(Hall, J., dissenting).

¶ 4We granted review because this case presents a recurring and purely legal issue of statewide importance.We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona ConstitutionandA.R.S. § 12–120.24.

II.

A.

¶ 5We are not called on today to consider whether the state may be liable under a common law negligence theory or under Arizona's wrongful death statute, A.R.S. § 12–611.Nor do we consider the potential liability of individual state employees.This case concerns only the state's exposure to liability under APSA.

B.

¶ 6Section 46–455 is part of a statutory scheme that protects vulnerable adults by imposing criminal penalties on and providing for civil enforcement against those who violate its terms.When first enacted in 1988, APSA provided only criminal penalties against certain “persons” who caused an incapacitated adult to be endangered, injured, or imperiled by neglect.1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 85, § 2(2d Reg.Sess.).In 1989, the legislature amended the statute to add a civil cause of action.1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 118, § 3(1st Reg.Sess.).The relevant provision, which is at issue here, now states:

A vulnerable adult whose life or health is being or has been endangered or injured by neglect, abuse or exploitation may file an action in superior court against any person or enterprise that has been employed to provide care, that has assumed a legal duty to provide care or that has been appointed by a court to provide care to such vulnerable adult for having caused or permitted such conduct.

A.R.S. § 46–455(B)(emphasis added).Thus, the civil damages provision in § 46–455 expanded the scope of potential liability beyond “persons” to also include “enterprises” when the other elements of subsection (B) are established.

¶ 7 At the same time it created a civil damages action under APSA, the legislature broadened the statute to recognize the state's central role in both civil and criminal enforcement.APSA authorizes the state to file civil actions on behalf of vulnerable adults who are endangered or injured by neglect, abuse, or exploitation, § 46–455(E), and to intervene in any private action that is of special public importance, § 46–455(M).Additionally, APSA requires the state to maintain an abuse registry regarding persons and enterprises against whom civil or criminal complaints have been filed for abuse, neglect, or exploitation of vulnerable adults.A.R.S. § 46–457(D).

C.

¶ 8 Our goal “in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.”In re Estate of Winn,214 Ariz. 149, 151 ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 236, 238(2007).“When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the statute.”State v. Christian,205 Ariz. 64, 66 ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241, 1243(2003).Statutory terms, however, must be considered in context.SeeState v. Wise,137 Ariz. 468, 470 n. 3, 671 P.2d 909, 911 n. 3(1983).

¶ 9 Both the court of appeals majority and our dissenting colleagues correctly note that because APSA is remedial in nature, it warrants a broad interpretation.But “[a] liberal construction is not synonymous with a generous interpretation,”Nicholson v. Indus. Commn,76 Ariz. 105, 109, 259 P.2d 547, 549(1953), and we will not impose “[a] burden or liability not within the terms or spirit of the law,”Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Indus. Commn,62 Ariz. 398, 402, 158 P.2d 511, 513(1945).

¶ 10We first examine APSA's language to determine if it has a plain meaning and clearly reflects the legislature's intent.As explained below, we conclude that its meaning is not entirely clear.The text of § 46–455(B) permits an APSA action to be filed against a person or an enterprise.APSA does not define the term “person,” but, as the Estate acknowledges, the general statutory definition of that word would not include the state.SeeA.R.S. § 1–215(29)(defining “person” as including “a corporation, company, partnership, firm, association, or society, as well as a natural person”);see alsoState ex rel. Dep't of Health Services v. Cochise County,166 Ariz. 75, 800 P.2d 578(1990)(holding that the state is not a “person” required to file a pre-lawsuit claim against a county under A.R.S. § 11–622).Because the state is not a person, it can be liable under APSA only if it is an “enterprise.”

¶ 11The legislature defined “enterprise” for purposes of APSA, stating that it “means any corporation, partnership, association, labor union or other legal entity, or any group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity, that is involved with providing care to a vulnerable adult.”§ 46–455(Q)(emphasis added).The state is not a corporation, partnership, association, or group of associated persons that is not a legal entity; therefore, the state is subject to suit under APSA only if it is included in the term “other legal entity.”A “legal entity” is “[a] body, other than a natural person, that can function legally, sue or be sued, and make decisions through agents.”Black's Law Dictionary 976 (9th ed.2009).Generally, and as the dissent correctly notes, the state is thought of as a “legal entity.”²If we were to construe the words “legal entity” in isolation, we would readily conclude that the state is an enterprise.

¶ 12We do not, however, consider words in isolation when interpreting statutes.SeeAdams v. Comm'n on Appellate Court Appointments,227 Ariz. 128, 136 ¶ 34, 254 P.3d 367, 375(2011)(citingDeal v. United States,508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44(1993)).Importantly, the legislature did not create “other legal entity” as an independent and isolated category in its definition of “enterprise.”It defined enterprise, in part, as a “labor union or other legal entity” rather than “labor union, or other legal entity.”The absence of a comma after the phrase “labor union” makes a difference.Syntactically, this suggests “other legal entity” does not function as an independent catch-all category, but instead relates to legal entities like labor unions.³Because the state is not a legal entity like a labor union, we conclude it is not the kind of “other legal entity” to which the legislature intended to refer.

¶ 13 Likewise, to the extent the text of § 46–455 is not clear, applicable canons of statutory construction support construing “enterprise” in § 46–455(Q) as not including the state.The phrase “other legal entity” in subsection (Q) follows the enumeration “corporation, partnership, association, [or] labor union”—all terms that are normally understood to refer to business organizations.Ejusdem generis dictates that “general words [that] follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things should be interpreted as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class.”State v. Barnett,142 Ariz. 592, 596, 691 P.2d 683, 687(1984).Similarly, noscitur a sociis—a canon closely related to ejusdem generis—dictates that a statutory term is interpreted in context of the accompanying words.SeePlanned Parenthood Comm. of Phoenix, Inc. v. Maricopa Cnty.,92 Ariz. 231, 235–36, 375 P.2d 719, 722(1962).Because the phrase “other legal entity” follows specifically enumerated (and generally private) business entities, the phrase is most reasonably interpreted as applying to such entities rather than to governmental bodies.

¶ 14 The dissent correctly notes...