Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr.

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: OWENS
• Citation: Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 275 P.3d 1119 (Wash. 2012)
• Decision Date: 03 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 85679–6.
• Parties: The ESTATE OF Ashlie BUNCH, by and through its Personal Representative, Steven Bunch; and Steven Bunch, individually, Plaintiffs, v. McGRAW RESIDENTIAL CENTER, a d/b/a of Seattle Children's Home, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Respondent,andAlexander Chun, individually; Edrene Patterson and Anthony Patterson, husband and wife; Susan Riley and Roy Riley, Jr., husband and wife; and John and Jane Does 1–10, Defendants,andAmy Kozel, Petitioner–Intervenor.

275 P.3d 1119

The ESTATE OF Ashlie BUNCH, by and through its Personal Representative, Steven Bunch; and Steven Bunch, individually, Plaintiffs,

v.McGRAW RESIDENTIAL CENTER, a d/b/a of Seattle Children's Home, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Respondent,andAlexander Chun, individually; Edrene Patterson and Anthony Patterson, husband and wife; Susan Riley and Roy Riley, Jr., husband and wife; and John and Jane Does 1–10, Defendants,andAmy Kozel, Petitioner–Intervenor.

No. 85679–6.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Nov. 8, 2011.Decided May 3, 2012.

Elena Luisa Garella, Attorney at Law, Jeffrey Lawrence Herman, Herman Law Firm LLC, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Lawrence M. Kahn, Lawrence Kahn Law Group PS, Bellevue, WA, for Plaintiffs.

Pamela Marie Andrews, Kristen Dorrity, Andrews Skinner, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Respondent.George M. Ahrend, Ahrend Albrecht PLLC, Moses Lake, WA, Bryan Patrick Harnetiaux, Spokane, WA, amicus counsel for Washington State Assoc. for Justice.OWENS, J.

¶ 1 This case arises out of the tragic death of a teenage girl, Ashlie Bunch. Ashlie's adoptive father, Steven Bunch (Bunch) brought an action under RCW 4.24.010, a statute creating a right of action for the injury or death of a child, against the treatment center where Ashlie committed suicide, McGraw Residential Center. Ashlie's adoptive mother, Amy Kozel, sought to join the lawsuit as a necessary party under CR 19(a). The superior court denied Kozel's motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding that Kozel satisfied statutory standing requirements and CR 19(a), we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.

Facts

¶ 2 This case involves both disputed and undisputed facts. There is no dispute about the facts prior to 2003. In 1998, Kozel and Bunch, then married and living in Florida, adopted two biological sisters: Ashlie and Emily. Ashlie was two years older than Emily. In 2001, Kozel and Bunch divorced. Ashlie and Emily remained with Kozel in Florida while Bunch moved to Washington State. Kozel provided all parental functions while Bunch visited his daughters twice and regularly contributed child support. This arrangement lasted until 2003.

¶ 3 In 2003, Kozel and Bunch arranged for Ashlie to move to Washington and live with Bunch. Kozel decided that this was necessary because Ashlie, who was at some point diagnosed with, among other things, a fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, began assaulting her younger sister Emily.

¶ 4 Kozel and Bunch give conflicting accounts of Kozel's involvement in Ashlie's life following Ashlie's move to Washington. Kozel claims that she “spoke with [Ashlie] regularly by phone, at least once a week, until she was admitted to inpatient facilities,” sent her Christmas presents, and hoped that Ashlie would be able to live with Emily and Kozel again in the future. Clerk's Papers at 57. Bunch, on the other hand, claims that Kozel “did not have a relationship of any kind with Ashlie,” only once sent a Christmas present to Ashlie, and called Ashlie only once. Id. at 69–70.

¶ 5 Around 2006, Ashlie's mental health issues appear to have worsened. In 2006, Ashlie was hospitalized at three different children's hospitals because of her mental health problems. On March 13, 2007, Ashlie was involuntarily committed to Kitsap Mental Health Hospital due to her statements that she intended to kill herself. In May 2007, she was transferred to the McGraw Residential Center. While under the care of the McGraw Residential Center, Ashlie committed suicide on January 29, 2008.

¶ 6 In May 2009, Bunch, on behalf of himself and Ashlie's estate, filed a complaint in King County Superior Court against McGraw Residential Center and several of its employees. He alleged the tort of outrage, medical malpractice, negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and wrongful death of a child. Bunch provided Kozel with notice of the action in accordance with RCW 4.24.010. In June 2009, Kozel filed a timely motion to intervene pursuant to CR 19(a). McGraw Residential Center and Bunch both opposed Kozel's motion to intervene. The trial court denied Kozel's motion to intervene without stating its basis for doing so. Kozel filed a timely notice of appeal on July 14, 2009. On September 21, 2009, while the appeal remained pending, the trial court dismissed the case pursuant to a stipulation between Bunch and McGraw Residential Center that followed a settlement between the two parties.

¶ 7 On February 7, 2011, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying Kozel's motion to intervene. Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 159 Wash.App. 852, 855, 248 P.3d 565 (2011). We granted Kozel's petition for review. Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 171 Wash.2d 1021, 257 P.3d 662 (2011).

Issue

Did the trial court err in denying Kozel's motion to intervene?

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

¶ 8 “The trial court's decision on whether a party is necessary under CR 19(a) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Freestone Capital Partners, LP v. MKA Real Estate Opportunity Fund I, LLC, 155 Wash.App. 643, 669, 230 P.3d 625 (2010) (citing Gildon v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 158 Wash.2d 483, 493, 145 P.3d 1196 (2006)). Legal conclusions, including the proper interpretations of statutes, are reviewed de novo. Gildon, 158 Wash.2d at 493, 145 P.3d 1196; Dowler v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 172 Wash.2d 471, 481, 258 P.3d 676 (2011).

II. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Kozel's Motion To Intervene

¶ 9 The trial court erred in denying Kozel's motion to intervene pursuant to CR 19(a).¹ CR 19(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if ... (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (A) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.A party satisfying the requirements of CR 19(a) is a “necessary party.” Burt v. Dep't of Corr., 168 Wash.2d 828, 833, 231 P.3d 191 (2010) (plurality opinion); id. at 839, 231 P.3d 191 (Sanders, J., concurring). There appears to be no dispute that if Kozel has standing under RCW 4.24.010, she would be a necessary party under CR 19(a). Kozel was clearly subject to service of process, and her joinder would not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Kozel also satisfies the second requirement of CR 19(a) by claiming an interest in participating in the wrongful death action arising out of her adopted daughter's tragic and untimely death. Further, RCW 4.24.010 “creates only one cause of action,” and failure of the parent not named as a plaintiff to join “shall bar such parent's action to recover any part of an award made to the party instituting the suit.” Failure to join Kozel therefore effectively denies her the opportunity to recover for the wrongful death of her daughter. Thus, Kozel satisfies the final CR 19(a) requirement.

¶ 10 The fundamental point of contention in this case is whether Kozel has standing to proceed under RCW 4.24.010. This requires that we interpret the statute. Interpretation of a statute is guided by well-established principles. A court's “fundamental objective” when interpreting a statute “is ‘to discern and implement the intent of the legislature.’ ” Flight Options, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 172 Wash.2d 487, 500, 259 P.3d 234 (2011) (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)). Legislative intent is implemented “by giving effect to the plain meaning of a statute,” and the plain meaning “may be gleaned ‘from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’ ” Id. (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). If a “statute is ‘susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,’ the statute is ambiguous.” Id. (quoting Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wash.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005)). “However, a statute is not ambiguous merely because two or more interpretations are conceivable.” Id. If a statute is ambiguous, we “may look to the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment to determine legislative intent.” Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003).

¶ 11 We must pause to address whether this statute is to be liberally or strictly construed. The Court of Appeals strictly construed the statute because it is in derogation of the common law. Bunch, 159 Wash.App. at 865, 248 P.3d 565. Amicus curiae Washington State Association for Justice argues that the wrongful death statutes should instead be given a liberal construction because they are remedial in nature. The distinction between “liberal construction” and “strict construction” is easily overstated. Neither a liberal construction nor a strict construction may be employed to defeat the intent of the legislature, as discerned through traditional processes of statutory interpretation. See Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash.2d 716, 720, 440 P.2d 471 (1968) (“Whether done liberally or strictly, judicial interpretation is necessary.”). Strict construction is simply a requirement that, where two interpretations are equally consistent with legislative intent, the court opts for the narrower interpretation of the statute.² See State v. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d 167, 172, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992); cf. State v. Ervin, 169 Wash.2d 815, 823 n. 1, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) (“[T]he rule of lenity ... is applicable only after employing tools of statutory construction.” (citation omitted)); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 154–55, 812 P.2d 858 (1991) (discussing, in dicta, the “proper...